CEPPA Kant Colloquium
Peter Moser (St Andrews): "Ownership of non-physical things in Kant’s legal philosophy
Peter Moser (St Andrews): "Ownership of non-physical things in Kant’s legal philosophy
Title: Who has an expansive moral circle? Abstract: The moral circle describes who we do and do not think of as worthy of moral concern. In this talk, I will discuss psychological research that aims to understand variability in our moral circles. I will present work across several projects that aims to (a) map out ... Read more
Rafeeq Hasan (Amherst College): "Kant’s Sequence of Rights” MS Teams
Abstract: The Sudanese civil war has been described as a "forgotten crisis" that the world ought to pay more attention to. Some campaigners object that excess attention on migration is a “distraction" from other important issues. Such calls for cross-border attentional change are a frequent feature of our global political landscape. Yet while philosophers have ... Read more
Title: Practical Reason and the Satisfaction of Desire Location: Teams (online only) Abstract: I have a desire for dulce de leche ice-cream (or that I myself eat ice-cream) but there’s no ice-cream nearby. A heavenly angel takes pity on me and decides she will help me out. She conjures the ice-cream and quickly shoves it ... Read more
Title: Encroachment and epistemic negligence Abstract: In this talk, I argue that the moral duty of non-negligence is a fruitful way to understand and motivate the claim that moral reasons can ‘encroach’ on epistemic norms. More forcefully: we should readily affirm that on the epistemic norms governing agents like us—that is, who have limited cognitive ... Read more
Title: Is There Anti-Fittingness?" Abstract: The permissible and the forbidden are privative opposites: each is a lack of the other. The good and the bad are, by contrast, polar opposites: badness is anti-goodness, not non-goodness. What about the fitting and the unfitting, the appropriate and the inappropriate, the apt and the inapt, the warranted and ... Read more
Title: Threshold Deontology: Some Lessons from Vagueness Abtract: Threshold Deontology is the view that the positive consequences of an act do not normally override moral constraints, but when the positive balance of the consequences of an act is sufficiently great, it may be morally permitted, and possibly required to engage in an act that is ... Read more
Title: Risk, Ambiguity, and Ethical Decision-Making Abstract: I argue that it can be rational to defer to an authority about what to believe or what to do even when doing so goes against one’s own reasoning. Indeed, such deference is rational in typical cases in which individuals treat others as authorities: for example, experts in ... Read more
Title: Chance Prioritarianism Location: Teams (online only), and streamed from Edgecliffe G03 Abstract: I will defend what we could call survival chance prioritarianism, according to which the moral value of improving someone’s chance of surviving (some period) is greater the more likely the person was to die before the improvement. I motivate this view by ... Read more