CEPPA Talk (online) – Renee Jorgensen (Michigan)

Title: Encroachment and epistemic negligence

Abstract: In this talk, I argue that the moral duty of non-negligence is a fruitful way to understand and motivate the claim that moral reasons can ‘encroach’ on epistemic norms. More forcefully: we should readily affirm that on the epistemic norms governing agents like us—that is, who have limited cognitive resources, conduct inquiries with widely varying practical and moral stakes, and who rely on belief to simplify and structure their practical deliberation—the strength of evidential warrant necessary to justify belief is responsive to the gravity of the costs of being mistaken. I suggest that a ‘purism’ about doxastic justification that denies this faces a dilemma: either a belief’s being justified suffices to license using it to structure inference and inquiry, or it isn’t. If it is, then being insensitive to non-truth-conducive factors leaves the standard for justified belief unresponsive to relevant risks. If it isn’t, then it is unclear what theoretical value the notion justified belief has, and we still need something to fill the role of licensing the relevant epistemic moves (which will be responsive to the risks.)

Location: Teams (online only), we will bee streaming it from Edgecliffe G03