Title: "Against 'Good For,' Against 'Well-Being'" Abstract: This paper challenges the widely held view that ‘good for’, ‘well- being’, and related terms express a distinctive evaluative concept of central importance for ethics and separate from ‘simply good’ as used by G.E. Moore and others. More specifically, it argues that there’s no philosophically useful good-for or well-being ... Read more
Wednesday, 15 June 2022 Edgecliffe, Room 104, University of St Andrews 9:30-10:00: Welcome coffee Morning session: Chair: James Harris (University of St Andrews) 10:00-10:45: David Harmon (University of St Andrews) “The Model of Human Nature and Whether ‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’ in Spinoza” 10:45-11:30: Ruth Boeker (University College Dublin) “Catharine Trotter Cockburn on Self-interest, Self-love, and ... Read more
Location: Teams (online only) Title: Can Fanaticism be a Liberatory Virtue? Abstract: Quassim Cassam (2022a) and Paul Katsafanas (2019) have argued that fanaticism and extremism are normatively negative concepts—characterized by, e.g., perverted ideals, vicious closed-mindedness, and unwarranted intolerance. I suggest an alternative approach that: (i) explains what makes fanaticism and extremism vicious in the very many cases ... Read more