Title: "Against 'Good For,' Against 'Well-Being'" Abstract: This paper challenges the widely held view that ‘good for’, ‘well- being’, and related terms express a distinctive evaluative concept of central importance for ethics and separate from ‘simply good’ as used by G.E. Moore and others. More specifically, it argues that there’s no philosophically useful good-for or well-being ... Read more
Wednesday, 15 June 2022 Edgecliffe, Room 104, University of St Andrews 9:30-10:00: Welcome coffee Morning session: Chair: James Harris (University of St Andrews) 10:00-10:45: David Harmon (University of St Andrews) “The Model of Human Nature and Whether ‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’ in Spinoza” 10:45-11:30: Ruth Boeker (University College Dublin) “Catharine Trotter Cockburn on Self-interest, Self-love, and ... Read more
Location: Teams (online only) Title: Can Fanaticism be a Liberatory Virtue? Abstract: Quassim Cassam (2022a) and Paul Katsafanas (2019) have argued that fanaticism and extremism are normatively negative concepts—characterized by, e.g., perverted ideals, vicious closed-mindedness, and unwarranted intolerance. I suggest an alternative approach that: (i) explains what makes fanaticism and extremism vicious in the very many cases ... Read more
Title: Threshold Deontology: Some Lessons from Vagueness Abtract: Threshold Deontology is the view that the positive consequences of an act do not normally override moral constraints, but when the positive balance of the consequences of an act is sufficiently great, it may be morally permitted, and possibly required to engage in an act that is ... Read more