CEPPA Talk (in person) – Michael Gill (Edinburgh)

Title: The Formality of the Humean Authoritative Ought

Abstract: There are different things we ought to do. There is what we ought to do insofar as we are seeking to advance our long-term interests. There is what we ought to do insofar as we are trying to do our job well. There is what we ought to do insofar as we are trying to be good friends. Different oughts can conflict with each other. There may be times when we think such conflict is irresolvable. But at least sometimes we think the conflict is resolvable. At least sometimes we think that one thing we ought to do overrides all others. You might think, for instance, that helping a friend in a particular situation is what you really ought to do, even if it means neglecting your job and forgoing your own interests. Call the ought that overrides all others the authoritative ought.

What makes it true that we authoritatively ought to perform an action? What I will call Humean views hold that what makes it true that we authoritatively ought to perform an action is that we would, were we to reflect properly, have a positive response toward performing the action. In this paper I elucidate a distinction within Humean views of the authoritative ought, and argue for one side over the other. The distinction is between substantivism and formalism, and the side I argue for is the formalist.

Humean substantivists (such as Julia Driver and Dale Dorsey) believe that proper reflection will lead all of us to the same substantive practical principles—to principles with content, to principles that prescribe particular types of action. According to substantivists, because proper reflection would lead all of us to certain substantive principles, we can identify the actions that fall under those principles as those we authoritatively ought to perform. 

Humean formalists (such as W.D. Falk and Sharon Street) deny that we are warranted in thinking that proper reflection will lead everyone to the same substantive principles. According to formalists, we can identify the form of authoritative oughts: what we authoritatively ought to do is what we would respond positively to when we reflect properly. But that is all we can do. We cannot identify the authoritative ought with any substantive content.

Location: Edgecliffe G03