Location: Edgecliffe G03 Title: Ought and the Transmission of Reasons Abstract: According to the widely held Weightiest Reasons view about how reasons for action and the practical ought are related to one another, (WR)  an agent ought to φ if, and only if, the reasons for φ are weightier than the reasons for every incompatible alternative to […]

Title: Beyond the Now: Epistemic Oppression and the “Common” Sense of Incarceration Abstract: In this presentation, I narrate an encounter with 2 Black teenagers who attempted to steal my cellphone and the difficulty of insisting on accountability while avoiding the worst parts of the state-run criminal justice system. Ultimately, I demonstrate that, at times, when a situation calls for accountability for a serious wrongdoing […]

Title: Epistemic Akrasia: No Apology Required Abstract: It is natural to think that rationality imposes some relationship between what a person believes, and what she believes about what she’s rational to believe. Epistemic akrasia—for example, believing P while believing that P is not rational to believe in your situation—is often seen as intrinsically irrational. This […]

Title: Legislative Intent: A Rational Unity Account (co-authored with David Tan (Deakin University)) Abstract: Does the legislature have intentions concerning the effects of legislation? If so, how can that intent be known by outsiders? Existing theories of legislative intent can be divided into three camps: skepticism, constructivism, and realism. This paper begins by outlining problems for […]