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X-ORIGINAL-URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
X-WR-CALDESC:Events for CEPPA
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END:VTIMEZONE
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260415T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260415T173000
DTSTAMP:20260701T163606
CREATED:20260414T174156Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260414T174157Z
UID:10000903-1776268800-1776274200@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group (MPRG)
DESCRIPTION:MPRG with Giuli Cavaliere:\nChapter Title: ‘Rescue\, Aid\, and the Challenge from Adoption’\n\nChapter Abstract: This paper examines and responds to two versions of what I refer to as the challenge from adoption. According to the first\, those who wish to have children are morally required to adopt existing children in need rather than procreate. According to the second\, the state ought not to support fertility services\, since doing so may reduce the adoption prospects of children in institutional care. I argue that neither version succeeds. In response to the first\, I show that\, under current non-ideal conditions\, adoption is not analogous to cases of easy rescue: the very features that give rise to a putative duty to adopt also make adoption exceedingly demanding in ways that the argument for such a duty cannot adequately accommodate. Under ideal conditions\, where these costs are set aside\, the deontic framework relied on by proponents of the duty to adopt remains ill-suited to appraising practices such as procreation\, parenthood\, and adoption\, because it obscures their distinctive value and flattens the moral landscape. In response to the second\, I argue that institutional duties towards children require that they be protected and supported\, but not that the state secures the best possible outcome through adoption.\nLocation: Edgecliffe 104
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-mprg-4-9/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:Reading Group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260401T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260401T173000
DTSTAMP:20260701T163606
CREATED:20260401T134506Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260401T134507Z
UID:10000902-1775059200-1775064600@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group (MPRG)
DESCRIPTION:Reading: Anscombe’s ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’ \nLocation: Edgecliffe 104
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-mprg-4-8/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:Reading Group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260325T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260325T173000
DTSTAMP:20260701T163606
CREATED:20260126T111951Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260126T111951Z
UID:10000901-1774454400-1774459800@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group (MPRG)
DESCRIPTION:Reading:tbc \nLocation: Edgecliffe 104
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-mprg-4/2026-03-25/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:Reading Group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260319T153000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260319T180000
DTSTAMP:20260701T163606
CREATED:20260123T102419Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260318T135126Z
UID:10000884-1773934200-1773943200@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:The Possibility of Respect book workshop with Remy Debes (University of Memphis)
DESCRIPTION:On Thursday 19 March\, under the auspices of CEPPA\, there will be an ‘author meets critics’ event on The Possibility of Respect: Human Dignity and the Ethics of Difference by Remy Debes (Memphis). The book was published by OUP late last year\, and is available via the Library here.\n\n\n\nHere’s an abstract of the book’s argument:\n\nThis book defends a radical new theory of respect against the backdrop of a critical analysis of Western claims to moral progress. Drawing from a wide range of typically marginalized voices both past and present\, and often working through real-life reflections on the experience of disrespect\, it demonstrates the ways that our existing ideas about respect—though inspiring—have misled our efforts to validate the equal human dignity of persons. We grow up being told that respecting persons requires focusing on the ways that all persons are alike in virtue of their equal capacity for agency\, autonomy\, and rights. However\, this book argues that sometimes respecting persons requires de-emphasizing what they have in common with all other persons\, in favor of what is different about them. According to this alternative theory\, it is not a person’s autonomy or rights that matter most\, but their unique\, individual perspective on the world. And the way we respect or recognize this perspective is by trying to understand it. Hence the central thesis of this book: understanding persons sometimes constitutes a way of respecting them. Only if we start thinking about respect in this way\, the book concludes\, can we break free of Western myths of progress that continue to stymie our fundamental moral aspirations.\n\nFeaturing Adam Etinson (St Andrews)\, Michael Cholbi (Edinburgh)\, and Emma Gordon (Glasgow) \nLocation: Edgecliffe 104
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/book-workshop-with-remy-debes-university-of-memphis/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Workshop
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260318T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260318T173000
DTSTAMP:20260701T163606
CREATED:20260316T132830Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260316T132831Z
UID:10000900-1773849600-1773855000@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group (MPRG)
DESCRIPTION:Reading: For next week’s MPRG session\, Jenny Mace will lead us in discussing the paper\, “Locating Animals in Political Philosophy”\, by Kymlicka and Donaldson \nLocation: Edgecliffe 104
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-mprg-4-7/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:Reading Group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260311T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260311T173000
DTSTAMP:20260701T163606
CREATED:20260306T124631Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260306T125310Z
UID:10000899-1773244800-1773250200@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group (MPRG)
DESCRIPTION:Reading: Rae Langton’s paper\, “Objective and Unconditioned Value” \nLocation: Edgecliffe 104
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-mprg-4-6/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:Reading Group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260225T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260225T173000
DTSTAMP:20260701T163606
CREATED:20260223T134649Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260223T134826Z
UID:10000898-1772035200-1772040600@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group (MPRG)
DESCRIPTION:Reading: Aliza Ashraf will lead us in discussing Eugene Marshall’s paper\, “Spinoza on the Problem of Akrasia”. \nLocation: Edgecliffe 104
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-mprg-4-5/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:Reading Group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260218T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260218T173000
DTSTAMP:20260701T163606
CREATED:20260216T143516Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260216T143516Z
UID:10000897-1771430400-1771435800@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group (MPRG)
DESCRIPTION:Reading: Jason Kawall’s “Moral Realism and Arbitrariness”. \nLocation: Edgecliffe 104
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-mprg-4-4/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:Reading Group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260211T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260211T173000
DTSTAMP:20260701T163606
CREATED:20260209T111453Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260209T111453Z
UID:10000896-1770825600-1770831000@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group (MPRG)
DESCRIPTION:Reading: Ida Miczke will lead us in a discussion of Jessica Fischer’s recent paper\, “Consequentialism and the Separateness of Persons”. \nLocation: Edgecliffe 104
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-mprg-4-3/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:Reading Group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260204T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260204T173000
DTSTAMP:20260701T163606
CREATED:20260126T112157Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260126T112158Z
UID:10000895-1770220800-1770226200@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group (MPRG)
DESCRIPTION:Reading: Wittgenstein – Lecture on Ethics (p.42-51 in this edition.) \nLocation: Edgecliffe 104
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-mprg-4-2/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:Reading Group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20251126T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20251126T170000
DTSTAMP:20260701T163606
CREATED:20250915T115643Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20251124T135440Z
UID:10000754-1764172800-1764176400@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group (MPRG)
DESCRIPTION:Reading: Nick Zangwill’s 2021 paper\, “Our Moral Duty to Eat Meat”. \nLocation: Edgecliffe 104
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-mprg-2/2025-11-26/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:Reading Group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20251120T143000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20251120T153000
DTSTAMP:20260701T163606
CREATED:20251118T120945Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20251118T120955Z
UID:10000753-1763649000-1763652600@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group (MPRG)
DESCRIPTION:Reading: Dan Baras’s 2023 paper\, “Carbon Offsetting” \nLocation: Edgecliffe 104
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-mprg-2-4/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:Reading Group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20251112T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20251112T140000
DTSTAMP:20260701T163606
CREATED:20251111T131716Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20251111T131717Z
UID:10000752-1762952400-1762956000@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group (MPRG)
DESCRIPTION:Reading: Keshav Singh’s paper\, “What’s in an Aim?”. This paper discusses a central issue for positions that attempt to ground normativity in constitutive features of agency. \nLocation: Edgecliffe 104
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-mprg-2-3/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:Reading Group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20251105T170000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20251105T180000
DTSTAMP:20260701T163606
CREATED:20251104T112740Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20251104T112740Z
UID:10000867-1762362000-1762365600@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group (MPRG)
DESCRIPTION:Reading: \nThis Wednesday\, we are discussing the paper “The Women of Trachis: Fictions\, Pessimism\, Ethics” by Bernard Williams \nSee you all next Wednesday\, November 5th\, from 5-6pm at Edgecliffe (room 104). \nLocation: Edgecliffe 104
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-mprg-3/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:Reading Group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20251029T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20251029T170000
DTSTAMP:20260701T163606
CREATED:20251027T143141Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20251027T143142Z
UID:10000751-1761753600-1761757200@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group (MPRG)
DESCRIPTION:Reading: \nFor next week’s MPRG\, we are returning to Abelard Podgorski’s paper\, “Complaints and Tournament Population Ethics”. Our new PhD colleague\, Ida Miczke\, will guide the discussion. Please find the paper attached\, or by accessing the following link: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/phpr.12860. \n\nBelow are some suggested questions from Ida to help us focus in on different aspects of the paper. \n\nWhat do you think of the claim that there can be no victimless wrongs? Is it possible to commit a wrongdoing without wronging anyone?\n⁠Is the idea of morality based on complaints intuitive? What about morality based on gratitude?\nWhat are your intuitions about the neutrality condition – is bringing happy people into existence neutral\, i.e. neither obligatory nor wrong? What if we phrase it in axiological terms instead – is bringing happy people into existence neutral\, i.e. neither good nor bad?\nCan we really bite the bullet on the non-identity problem?\nCan all of ethics be a tournament\, or is it just population ethics?\n\n\nSee you all next Wednesday\, October 29th\, from 4-5pm at Edgecliffe (room 104). \nLocation: Edgecliffe 104
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-mprg-2-2/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:Reading Group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20251015T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20251015T170000
DTSTAMP:20260701T163606
CREATED:20250915T115643Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20251124T135440Z
UID:10000750-1760544000-1760547600@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group (MPRG)
DESCRIPTION:Reading: Nick Zangwill’s 2021 paper\, “Our Moral Duty to Eat Meat”. \nLocation: Edgecliffe 104
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-mprg-2/2025-10-15/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:Reading Group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20251001T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20251001T170000
DTSTAMP:20260701T163606
CREATED:20250911T150041Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250916T152606Z
UID:10000613-1759334400-1759338000@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group (MPRG)
DESCRIPTION:Reading: Thomas Hurka – The Well Rounded Life \nLocation: Edgecliffe 104
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-12-2/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:Reading Group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20250924T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20250924T170000
DTSTAMP:20260701T163606
CREATED:20250915T115643Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20251124T135440Z
UID:10000747-1758729600-1758733200@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group (MPRG)
DESCRIPTION:Reading: Nick Zangwill’s 2021 paper\, “Our Moral Duty to Eat Meat”. \nLocation: Edgecliffe 104
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-mprg-2/2025-09-24/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:Reading Group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20250515T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20250515T173000
DTSTAMP:20260701T163606
CREATED:20250130T201701Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250513T152322Z
UID:10000579-1747324800-1747330200@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in-person & online) – Vid Simoniti (University of Liverpool)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Merely Imagined Moralities\n \nAbstract: Artworks and other cultural products (films\, novels\, operas\, pop songs\, etc.) often express heroic\, pessimistic\, melancholy\, or dark ways of looking at the world (also referred to as ‘perspectives’). Sometimes\, these worldviews appear politically inflected; we may\, for instance\, describe a work as “feminist” or “patriotic” according to the worldview it expresses. Drawing on Elisabeth Camp’s and Nelson Goodman’s work\, I propose that when artworks express worldviews\, they (i) represent sets of mental dispositions for interpreting and reacting to the real world\, and (ii) they achieve this by leading the audience to temporarily inhabit those dispositions. This view has at least two important implications: first\, it makes little sense to morally evaluate artworks for expressing worldviews\, because representing mental dispositions does not amount to endorsing them. Secondly\, the expression of worldviews through artworks and other cultural products nevertheless plays a specific\, underappreciated role in political discourse. \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-online-vid-simoniti-university-of-liverpool/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20250508T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20250508T173000
DTSTAMP:20260701T163606
CREATED:20250130T201612Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250130T201612Z
UID:10000578-1746720000-1746725400@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in-person & online) – Clotilde Torregrossa (St Andrews)
DESCRIPTION:Title: The (Aesthetic) Value of Environmental Activism \nAbstract: TBC \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-online-clotilde-torregrossa-st-andrews/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20250501T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20250501T173000
DTSTAMP:20260701T163606
CREATED:20250130T201531Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250429T144945Z
UID:10000577-1746115200-1746120600@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (online) – Carla Bagnoli (University of Modena and Reggio Emilia)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Hope and the Powers of Shared Agency \nAbstract: This paper argues that Kant’s theory of radical evil exalts the powers of organized\, shared and institutional\, agency. In section 1\, I illustrate the paradoxicality of radical evil and the novelty of Kant’s “empowering” conception focused on human agency. In section 2\, I argue that radical evil entails a normative variety of unintelligibility\, signaling lack of self-knowledge and self-alienation. In section 3\, I show that the (moral) opacity of maxims does not undermine one’s awareness of the moral law\, does not prevent self and co-legislation\, and therefore does not preclude the exercise of moral agency. In section 4\, I account for the distinctive functions of hope and faith\, denying that they are complementary. In sections 5 and 6\, I argue that the reliance on hope or faith points to different modes of contrasting evil by organizing human agency in institutional forms. In section 7\, I conclude that the most powerful response to radical evil is the organization of shared agency – a communal\, ethical\, political\, and institutional enterprise. \nLocation: Online but streamed from Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-online-carla-bagnoli-university-of-modena-and-reggio-emilia/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20250417T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20250417T173000
DTSTAMP:20260701T163606
CREATED:20250130T201400Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250417T135908Z
UID:10000576-1744905600-1744911000@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in-person & online) – Lucy O’Brien (UCL)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Autonomy and control over one’s social self-consciousness \nAbstract: Humans have the capacity to absorb – to feel – others’ feelings. More particularly we feel others’ feelings about ourselves: at least as long as we are awake\, we are subject to being self-consciously affected in our interactions with others. We are capable of social self-consciousness\, and such a capacity plays a critical part in our general capacity to care about\, calibrate\, and organise human life. In this talk I want to consider a subject’s relation to her own affective social self-consciousness. Two areas I will consider are (i) a subject’s practical management of their social self-consciousness\, and (i) a subject’s appraisals of their own social self-consciousness. I will suggest that the latter concern can be thought of in the context of a general problem of the rationality of deference. I suggest that our self-appraisals should be understood as allowing for a kind of necessary instability\, tension\, and opacity. In so far as our self-conscious lives\, are rationally permeated with the appraisals of others\, we risk standing in an uncomprehending\, but committed\, sense of ourselves and our value \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-online-lucy-obrien-ucl/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20250403T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20250403T173000
DTSTAMP:20260701T163606
CREATED:20250130T201317Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250401T144731Z
UID:10000575-1743696000-1743701400@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (online) – Christine Korsgaard (Harvard University)
DESCRIPTION:Title: The Incomparable Value of the Individual \nAbstract: Kant believed that every human being should be treated as an end in itself. In the Groundwork\, Kant explains many of our duties by arguing that their violation would involve treating a human being as a mere means. But we cannot explain all of our duties that way. Nor can we explain what is wrong with treating an individual as a mere means unless we have a positive account of what is involved in being an end in itself. Kant does not spell out this positive account. \nI find a clue to what Kant could mean in his claim that individuals who possess dignity have incomparable value. I propose that to treat someone as an end in itself is to evaluate the events and conditions of that person’s life in accordance with the value they have for her\, and to regard that value as incomparable with the value those events and conditions might have for anyone else. I explain why this conception rules out the aggregation of value across the boundaries between individuals and show how it supports John Taurek’s attack on aggregation. I also explain how this conception of the value of the individual is connected to the idea that individuals have rights.\nLocation: Online but live-streamed from Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-online-christine-korsgaard-harvard-university/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20250320T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20250320T173000
DTSTAMP:20260701T163606
CREATED:20250130T201157Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250317T170729Z
UID:10000574-1742486400-1742491800@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in-person & online) – Tom Sinclair (Oxford)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Hypocrisy as Evasion \nAbstract: Hypocrites attract moral condemnation and are widely thought to lack standing to criticise others. This paper argues against attempts to explain this that appeal to moral conditions on blaming and notions of moral authority\, proposing instead an account based on a conception of moral interactions as fundamentally dialogical in character. According to this account\, blame is just one of many tools of moral exchange whose proper use is the building of a shared moral world of mutually acknowledged responsibilities. The hypocrite misuses these tools\, and this both generates a basic moral objection to hypocrisy that is prior to the more specific objections highlighted by other accounts and explains the hypocrite’s loss of standing. \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-online-tom-sinclair-oxford/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20250313T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20250313T173000
DTSTAMP:20260701T163606
CREATED:20250130T201114Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250306T171239Z
UID:10000573-1741881600-1741887000@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in-person & online) – Daniela Dover (UCLA)
DESCRIPTION:Title: The Democratic Soul in Plato and Whitman \nAbstract: In Books II-IV of the Republic\, Plato famously proposes an analogy between the constitution of the Greek city-state and the constitution of the human soul. The methodological assumption that underlies the architecture of the Republic is that philosophical questions about topics that we might today group under the heading of ‘moral psychology’–descriptive and normative questions about the workings of the human psyche–cannot be separated from questions of political philosophy. I argue that Plato was right to think that you cannot theorize the soul without at the same time theorizing the city\, and vice versa. I go on to ask: what happens if we retain the idea that there is a profound methodological insight embedded in the city-soul analogy\, but\, unlike Plato\, we want to defend democracy as the best form of government? How might that democratic aspiration interact with our ways of thinking about the soul\, or the self? \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-online-daniela-dover-ucla/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20250227T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20250227T173000
DTSTAMP:20260701T163606
CREATED:20250130T201035Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250130T201035Z
UID:10000572-1740672000-1740677400@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in-person & online) – Katharina Bernhard (St Andrews)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Multiple Aims of Science and the New Demarcation Problem \nAbstract: TBC \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-online-katharina-bernhard-st-andrews/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20250206T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20250206T173000
DTSTAMP:20260701T163606
CREATED:20250130T200250Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250203T191323Z
UID:10000569-1738857600-1738863000@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in-person & online) – Philip Ebert (University of Stirling)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Philosophical Challenges in Risk Communication of Rare and Severe Events \nAbstract: In this talk\, I will discusses different philosophical challenges in communicating and dealing with the risk of rare and severe events. As a case study\, I use avalanche risk: a form of voluntary risk taking in which the individual is often partly responsible for the occurrence of the relevant event. In particular\, I highlight the challenge that avalanche risk communicators face when “informing” or “educating” individuals about the relevant risks\, and I will present some experimental work on the risk perception of end users of the Scottish avalanche forecasts and discuss their (mis)understanding of the relevant risks. \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-online-philip-ebert-university-of-stirling/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20241128T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20241128T173000
DTSTAMP:20260701T163606
CREATED:20240912T184554Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20241125T113606Z
UID:10000554-1732809600-1732815000@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in-person & online) – Katrin Flikschuh (LSE)
DESCRIPTION:Title: The Idea of Ancestry in African Philosophy \nAbstract: This paper concerns itself with the rationality of belief in ancestral existence. Although belief in ancestral existence remains widespread globally\, I shall focus on a-thinned out version of African forms of this belief. ‘Thinned-out’ in that I am not interested in this or that substantive version of the belief among different African peoples; nor am I interested in the particular cultural practises that attend or attest to the belief. I am interested in the general form of the belief\, and in the more general conception of the natural world in general which one would have to endorse for belief in ancestral existence to count as rational. In one sense\, the aims of this paper are quite modest: I merely aim to get clearer\, myself\, on what strikes me as an intuitively attractive belief. In another sense\, the paper is quite ambitious: the belief would seem to require Western readers to suspend routine metaphysical and scientific assumptions about the natural order. In putting pressure on these routine assumptions\, I shall touch on discussions around free will and consciousness as phenomena that share some of the features of ancestral existence. Considered comparatively\, belief in ancestral existence may be no less rationally defensible than belief in free will or (non-reductive) consciousness. \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-online-katrin-flikschuh-lse/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20241121T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20241121T173000
DTSTAMP:20260701T163606
CREATED:20240912T184522Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20241115T110644Z
UID:10000553-1732204800-1732210200@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in-person & online) – James Hutton (Delft)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Emotion-Based Environmental Ethics: The Radical Implications of Taking Wonder Seriously \nAbstract:\nIn environmental ethics\, we find many competing theories of environmental value\, but little discussion of the epistemological grounds for believing one theory rather than another. Building on the framework of moral empiricism (which I’ve developed elsewhere)\, I propose an “Emotion-Based” methodology for environmental ethics. The Emotion-Based methodology requires treating our emotional experiences as defeasible intuitions about value\, wrongness\, etc. – accepting their contents\, unless we have substantive reason not to. I offer some rationales for adopting the Emotion-Based methodology\, exploiting analogies with other domains of knowledge. In the final part of the talk\, I zoom in on the emotion of wonder. Wonder\, I argue\, presents its object as valuable for its own sake. If we take seriously the full range of our experiences of wonder\, we face pressure to adopt a pluralist view of environmental value\, on which some nonsentient beings (e.g. trees) and collective entities (i.e. ecosystems) are valuable for their own sake. Thus\, while moral empiricism is an abstract view about the conditions for moral knowledge\, it turns out to have fairly radical first-order implications for environmental ethics.\nLocation: Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-online-viviane-fairbank-st-andrews-and-simon-lee-st-andrews/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20241120T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20241120T180000
DTSTAMP:20260701T163606
CREATED:20241007T113131Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20241007T113131Z
UID:10000556-1732118400-1732125600@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Bradley Hillier-Smith’s 'The Ethics of State Responses to Refugees' Book Launch
DESCRIPTION:You are warmly invited to the book launch for Bradley Hillier-Smith’s brand-new book The Ethics of State Responses to Refugees (abstract below). The author will be interviewed by Kieran Oberman (LSE)\, after which we will all be in the opportunity to ask questions and celebrate the new book with some well-deserved drinks. All welcome!\n\nBradley Hillier-Smith: The Ethics of State Responses to Refugees\n Edgecliffe 104\, 20th November from 4pm – 6pm\, followed by drinks. For those unable to join in person\, the Teams link is here.\n\nAbstract for The Ethics of State Responses to Refugees\nAt a time of intense philosophical and political debates on how states ought to respond to refugees\, this book provides an account of what an ethical response to refugees would be. It does this by developing an understanding of the moral duties that states have towards refugees. The first half of the book analyses state practices used in response to refugees\, to understand the negative duties of states not to harm or violate the rights of innocent refugees. The second half analyses morally significant features of contemporary refugee displacement\, to understand the positive duties of states to alleviate the distinctive harms and injustices that refugees face. The two halves together thereby outline the negative and positive duties of states towards refugees which together constitute the elements of an ethical response. The book then demonstrates this ethical response is not only urgently required but is also within reach.\n\nAbout Kieran Oberman: Kieran Oberman is an Associate Professor in Philosophy at the LSE whose research and numerous publications specialise in the ethics of border control\, immigration\, migration ethics\, the freedoms and rights of migrants\, and obligations towards refugees among other topics in global justice.\n\nhttps://www.routledge.com/The-Ethics-of-State-Responses-to-Refugees/Hillier-Smith/p/book/9781032833675
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/bradley-hillier-smiths-the-ethics-of-state-responses-to-refugees-book-launch/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
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END:VCALENDAR