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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210218T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210218T173000
DTSTAMP:20210209T130436Z
CREATED:20200709T164951Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210209T130436Z
UID:10000258-1613664000-1613669400@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Works-in-Progress Talk – Lara Jost (St Andrews)
DESCRIPTION:The Epistemic Value of Affective Intentional Experience \nIn this paper\, I argue that despite risks of falsehood\, theorists should recognize that affective intentional experience (AIE)\, which includes emotions\, pains/pleasures and some gut feelings\, can be a source of knowledge and justification. Indeed\, AIE provides the best explanation for how we know certain things. I will focus the analysis on two such cases: pain in patients with endometriosis and microaggressions. I will then discuss points of resistance against the conclusion that AIE is epistemically valuable and why one might defend that it is not a genuine source of knowledge and justification. I will then offer some responses those challenges and explain how such resistance towards AIE impoverishes our epistemological theories and how it contributes to the silencing of marginalized agents\, in particular women and people of colour.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-2020-10-01-2021-02-18/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210217T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210217T160000
DTSTAMP:20210116T113802Z
CREATED:20201120T090404Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210116T113802Z
UID:10000297-1613574000-1613577600@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:CEPPA’s Moral Philosophy Reading Group reads and discusses an article per week\, chosen by a different member each time. \nSemester 2 schedule: \nWednesdays 3pm – 4pm\, beginning 3 February and ending 28 April. We will skip the following Wednesdays: 10 Feb\, 24 Mar\, 31 Mar\, 21 Apr. (Due to staff meetings and spring break.) \nOrganizer: Theron Pummer (tgp4). Teams link will be circulated in January 2021.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-3/2021-02-17/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210203T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210203T160000
DTSTAMP:20210116T113802Z
CREATED:20201120T090404Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210116T113802Z
UID:10000296-1612364400-1612368000@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:CEPPA’s Moral Philosophy Reading Group reads and discusses an article per week\, chosen by a different member each time. \nSemester 2 schedule: \nWednesdays 3pm – 4pm\, beginning 3 February and ending 28 April. We will skip the following Wednesdays: 10 Feb\, 24 Mar\, 31 Mar\, 21 Apr. (Due to staff meetings and spring break.) \nOrganizer: Theron Pummer (tgp4). Teams link will be circulated in January 2021.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-3/2021-02-03/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210128T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210128T173000
DTSTAMP:20210122T091619Z
CREATED:20200709T164951Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210122T091619Z
UID:10000257-1611849600-1611855000@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk - Lara Buchak (Princeton University)
DESCRIPTION:TITLE: RISK AND AMBIGUITY IN ETHICAL DECISION-MAKING \nABSTRACT: Some of my choices are primarily guided by the interests of others: for example\, which charities to give to or which political policies to vote for. Other of my choices have at least a significant component where I must take others’ interests into account\, though perhaps I can weigh them against my own interests: for example\, which environment-protecting measures to adopt in my personal life. This talk is about how to evaluate the other-affecting component of my decisions. In cases in which all of the empirical facts are known\, it may be easy to say which decision is best for another person. But in cases of risk—we don’t know how the world will turn out—or ambiguity—we don’t even know the probability of the world turning out in various ways—things are less simple. This is particularly the case given the wide range of attitudes towards risk and towards ambiguity that a person could rationally take. After laying out a framework for thinking about these choices\, I will argue for some principles that should govern them.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-2020-10-01-2021-01-28/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20201210T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20201210T173000
DTSTAMP:20201210T152552Z
CREATED:20200819T115017Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20201210T152552Z
UID:10000264-1607616000-1607621400@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk - Elizabeth Harman (Princeton University)
DESCRIPTION:Title: ‘Does Morality Speak within the Realm of the Morally Permissible?’ \nAbstract: You hear that your next-door neighbor Alicia is sick with COVID-19. You’re new to the neighborhood and haven’t met Alicia yet. You’re overwhelmed with working from home and overseeing your kids’ remote schooling. You could reach out to Alicia and ask whether she needs someone to pick up medicine or groceries for her; that would be a nice thing to do. Morality doesn’t require you to do it\, and you know that. You think it over. “I don’t have to offer to help\, but I should\,” you think\, and you are right. You offer to help. \nThis could be a true story. Sometimes\, there is a way that you could help someone; you don’t have to help; but all things considered\, you should help. This means that morality speaks within the realm of the morally permissible. Moral reasons can win out within the realm of the morally permissible to settle that you should do something morally good that you don’t have to do. Sometimes\, a supererogatory action should be done. If one fails to act\, then one makes a moral mistake that isn’t morally wrong: it turns out that some moral mistakes are not morally wrong. \nI will argue for this view and then discuss an objection from multiply satisfiable moral requirements. Sometimes you don’t have to do a particular thing because it is just one way of fulfilling a moral requirement; there are other ways you could also fulfill that requirement. This appears to be something that you should do that you don’t have to do. But doing it is not supererogatory—it’s just a way of fulfilling a moral requirement. The objection holds that the cases I use to argue for my view all involve multiply satisfiable moral requirements\, such as the general moral obligation to help some people sometimes. I pursue two lines of response to the objection: the more concessive line of response concedes that my argument needs to be revised in light of the objection\, but shows that this can be done; the less concessive line of response holds that my original argument survives the objection. \nHarman St Andrews Talk Handout December 2020
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-elizabeth-harman-princeton-university/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20200924T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20200924T173000
DTSTAMP:20200918T112423Z
CREATED:20200709T164951Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20200918T112423Z
UID:10000251-1600963200-1600968600@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Works-in-Progress Talk - Julia Driver (UT Austin and St Andrews)
DESCRIPTION:Title: ‘Blame and the Suberogatory’ \nAbstract: In this paper the claim that some actions are blameworthy even if they are not wrong is defended. Suberogatory actions\, which generally involve people standing on their rights in ways that display inadequate quality of the will\, are examples. I defend this claim against a strategy of assimilating these cases to the “right to do wrong” category and then sketch out a picture of the sorts of norm violations these actions represent. \nHandout: Handout_Blame and the Suberogatory
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-2020-09-24/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
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