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DTSTART:20190331T010000
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DTSTART:20191027T010000
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210915T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210915T160000
DTSTAMP:20210830T181258Z
CREATED:20210830T180836Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210830T181258Z
UID:10000325-1631718000-1631721600@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:Moral Philosophy Reading Group\nDescription: This group reads and discusses an article per week\, chosen by a different member each time. \nDay/time: Wednesdays 3pm to 4pm on Teams. \nOrganizer: Theron Pummer (tgp4).
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-4/2021-09-15/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210526T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210526T173000
DTSTAMP:20210429T164219Z
CREATED:20200709T164951Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210429T164219Z
UID:10000261-1622044800-1622050200@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk - Jonathan Quong (University of Southern California)
DESCRIPTION:Title: The Permissibility of Lesser Evil \nAbstract: \nFlood:   Flood water is headed toward a cave where five innocent people are trapped and will be killed if the water reaches them. The water can be diverted into a mineshaft\, but innocent Betty is trapped in the mineshaft and will be killed if the water is redirected. Albert is a bystander who has seen and understood the whole situation\, and he stands next to a switch that can divert the flood. He can easily flip the switch. \nWhen considering cases like this\, some people believe that Albert is morally required to save the five at the cost of Betty’s life (the requirement thesis). Others believe that Albert is permitted but not required to save the five (the permissive thesis). I argue in favor of the permissive thesis and against the requirement thesis. I conclude by considering some further implications for the ethics of self-defense and war.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-2020-10-01-2021-04-29/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210521T171500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210521T184500
DTSTAMP:20210511T201600Z
CREATED:20200821T141720Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210511T201600Z
UID:10000275-1621617300-1621622700@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:2021 Knox Lecture - Tim Scanlon (Harvard University)
DESCRIPTION:2021 Knox Lecture (online via Teams) \nKnox Lecturer: Tim Scanlon (Harvard University) \nTitle: Further Reflections on Tolerance and its Difficulty \nAbstract: The paper revisits the account of tolerance discussed in the author’s paper\, “The Difficulty of Tolerance\,” with the aim of clarifying (1) the reasons people have to care about the character of their society and (2) the range of others to whom the duties of tolerance are owed. \nPlease email Theron Pummer <tgp4@st-andrews.ac.uk> for the Teams link.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/2021-knox-lecture-tim-scanlon-harvard-university/
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/files/2020/08/faculty_scanlon.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210505T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210505T173000
DTSTAMP:20210428T193345Z
CREATED:20210305T184003Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210428T193345Z
UID:10000305-1620230400-1620235800@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Joe Slater Talk
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/joe-slater-talk/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20210409
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20210412
DTSTAMP:20210406T100311Z
CREATED:20201005T211300Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210406T100311Z
UID:10000291-1617926400-1618185599@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Workshop on Blame and Responsibility (UT Austin/St Andrews)
DESCRIPTION:Online Workshop Schedule\nPlease email Matthew Vermaire <matthew.vermaire@gmail.com> if you’d like the Zoom link. \n\nFriday April 9th:  \nJustin Snedegar (University of St Andrews) [9:00am – 10:15am Central Daylight Time] / [3pm – 4:15pm UK Time] \n“Dismissing Blame”\nAbstract: When someone blames you\, you might accept the blame or you might reject it\, challenging the blamer’s interpretation of the facts\, or providing a justification or excuse. Either way\, there are opportunities for edifying moral discussion and moral repair. But another common response is to simply dismiss the blame\, refusing to engage with the blamer even by rejecting the blame. This talk aims to make sense of this kind of response: what are we doing\, when we dismiss blame? This is important for understanding when and why such a response is or is not legitimate\, and should shed light on questions both about blame itself and about the standing to blame. My answer is that when we dismiss blame\, we dismiss a demand or expectation that we express our remorse to the blamer in a way that lets them witness that remorse. \nAdam Etinson (University of St Andrews) [10:30am – 11:45am Central Daylight Time] / [4:30pm – 5:45pm UK Time] \n“Anger and Remorse”\nAbstract: We know that remorse\, on the part of offenders\, has a powerful capacity to abate anger\, on the part of victims (and third parties). What this suggests is that anger is rooted\, not just in perceived wrongdoing\, but in concern that an offender fails to recognize and take responsibility for their wrongdoing. It also suggests that anger seeks the satisfaction of remorse itself. If that is right\, then anger is fundamentally about recognition\, not revenge – a discovery of significant psychological\, social\, and political importance. \n\nSaturday April 10th: \nErik Encarnacion (University of Texas\, Austin) [9:00am – 10:15am Central Daylight Time] / [3pm – 4:15pm UK Time] \n“Two Conceptions of Repair: Restoration or Resilience”\nAbstract: Legal philosophers\, especially those who explain tort law in terms of corrective justice\, often assert that if A wrongfully harms B\, then A owes B a duty of repair. But what does this duty require? Some specify it in terms of the object of repair—i.e.\, the thing needing repair. Courts\, for example\, traditionally award compensation to repair harms to a plaintiff’s body and property. Others focus instead on repairing frayed relationships between victim and wrongdoer. But this paper explores an overlooked\, cross-cutting way of distinguishing the duty’s content based on the standard of repair rather than its object. That is\, regardless of the underlying “thing” needing repair\, we can ask what normative ideal should govern the reparative task. More specifically\, I defend a distinction between restorative repair and resilient repair. The former seeks to make things as though the injury never happened; the latter makes no effort to pretend than an injury never occurred. Instead\, resilient repair involves transformative changes that acknowledge that certain injuries cannot be undone\, while allowing injured victims to live dignified lives that in some respects may be better than before the injury. I argue that\, although judicial rhetoric makes it appear as though compensatory damages seek only restorative repair\, certain aspects of compensatory damages—like hedonic damages—are better justified in light of the ideal of resilience articulated here. \nDaniela Dover (University of California\, Los Angeles) and Jonathan Gingerich (King’s College London) [10:30am – 11:45am Central Daylight Time] / [4:30pm – 5:45pm UK Time] \n“Beauvoir’s Groundwork”\nAbstract: In The Ethics of Ambiguity\, Simone de Beauvoir set out to create a systematic existentialist ethical theory. Like Kant’s Groundwork\, The Ethics of Ambiguity posits a close connection between one’s own freedom and one’s ethical obligations to others\, arguing that in order to will your own freedom\, you must also will the freedom of everyone else. Immoral action\, for Beauvoir as well as for Kant\, is unfree. There is very little secondary literature on The Ethics of Ambiguity\, and yet we believe the text has much to offer contemporary moral philosophy. Our talk will be a brief introduction to Beauvoir’s ethics and metaethics\, meant to stimulate an open-ended discussion of what Beauvoir can contribute to contemporary debates about moral motivation and moral responsibility.\n\n\n\n\nSunday April 11th: \nConnie Rosati (University of Texas\, Austin) [9:00am – 10:15am Central Daylight Time] / [3pm – 4:15pm UK Time] \n“The Value of Accepting Responsibility”\nAbstract: Much of our talk about blame and responsibility concerns third parties; it involves our laying the blame and placing responsibility on others. But our talk also concerns\, though\, unfortunately\, less often\, our taking the blame and accepting responsibility. I undertake herein to explore the nature and value of agents taking responsibility for their actions—for what they do and what they say. I shall explain and argue for the moral value of taking the blame and accepting responsibility\, but I shall also explain and argue for the prudential value of being and becoming—making oneself into—an accepter. Being an accepter is\, or so I hope to show\, good for you. \nZoë Johnson King (University of Southern California) [10:30am – 11:45am Central Daylight Time] / [4:30pm – 5:45pm UK Time] \n“Varieties of Moral Mistake”\nAbstract: Some philosophers think that if someone acts wrongly while falsely believing that her action is permissible\, though she is aware of the non-moral facts that ground her action’s wrongness\, then her moral mistake cannot excuse her wrongdoing. And some think that this is because it is morally blameworthy to fail to appreciate the moral significance of non-moral features of an action of which one is aware\, such that mistakenly believing that one’s action is permissible when it is in fact wrong is itself morally blameworthy. Here I challenge the view that it is blameworthy to fail to appreciate the moral significance of non-moral features of an action of which one is aware. This view seems okay if we focus on examples of people mistakenly believing that their wrongful actions are permissible. But it is not remotely plausible when we consider other varieties of moral mistake – such as believing that one’s action is required when it is in fact supererogatory\, believing that one’s action is wrong when it is in fact permissible\, and believing false things about the moral properties of other people’s actions and of merely possible actions. The upshot is that those who maintain that moral mistakes cannot excuse are sent back to the drawing board; we need a new explanation of why this would be the case. \n\nPlease email Matthew Vermaire <matthew.vermaire@gmail.com> if you’d like the Zoom link.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/workshop-on-blame-and-responsibility/
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/files/2019/04/IMG-0340.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210318T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210318T173000
DTSTAMP:20210311T195956Z
CREATED:20201005T111626Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210311T195956Z
UID:10000289-1616083200-1616088600@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Works-in-Progress Talk – James Harris (St Andrews)
DESCRIPTION:Title: “Some people and the people” \nAbstract: When is an action\, or a choice\, or a desire\, an action or choice or desire of the people\, as opposed to being an action\, or choice\, or desire of some people? In this talk I consider eight possible answers to this question. I focus in particular on the idea that the will of the people is the will of the majority\, and on the idea the will of the people is the will of representative institutions of government. My goal is to motivate the idea that it is never appropriate to describe a preference or policy as the will of the\, as opposed to some\, people. \nTeams link: https://teams.microsoft.com/l/meetup-join/19%3ameeting_ZGVlZmIzMWMtODY1Zi00NzNjLWIzNmYtNjhkYjU2YjliM2Zj%40thread.v2/0?context=%7b%22Tid%22%3a%22f85626cb-0da8-49d3-aa58-64ef678ef01a%22%2c%22Oid%22%3a%22af5d8a3f-611f-454d-ba4b-63510191e14e%22%7d
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-works-in-progress-talk-james-harris-st-andrews/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210317T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210317T160000
DTSTAMP:20210116T113802Z
CREATED:20201120T090404Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210116T113802Z
UID:10000300-1615993200-1615996800@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:CEPPA’s Moral Philosophy Reading Group reads and discusses an article per week\, chosen by a different member each time. \nSemester 2 schedule: \nWednesdays 3pm – 4pm\, beginning 3 February and ending 28 April. We will skip the following Wednesdays: 10 Feb\, 24 Mar\, 31 Mar\, 21 Apr. (Due to staff meetings and spring break.) \nOrganizer: Theron Pummer (tgp4). Teams link will be circulated in January 2021.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-3/2021-03-17/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210304T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210304T173000
DTSTAMP:20210210T152854Z
CREATED:20200709T164951Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210210T152854Z
UID:10000259-1614873600-1614879000@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk - Sara Bernstein (University of Notre Dame)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Biased Evaluative Descriptions \nAbstract: In 2008\, Joseph Biden called Barack Obama “an African-American who is articulate and bright and clean and a nice-looking guy.” Though intended as a compliment\, such a description would not be applied to a non-African-American leader in the same context. Such biased evaluative descriptions\, roughly\, well-intended descriptions whose apparently positive surface meanings are inflected with implicit bias or benevolent discrimination\, are the focus of this talk. After giving several different kinds of examples of biased evaluative descriptions\, I distinguish them from similar linguistic concepts\, including backhanded compliments\, slurs\, insults\, epithets\, pejoratives\, and dog-whistles. I discuss some challenges to the distinctiveness and evaluability of BEDs\, including intersectional social identities. I conclude by discussing the social significance and moral status of BEDs. Identifying BEDs is important for a variety of social contexts\, from the very general and broad (political speeches) to the very particular and small (bias in academic hiring).
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-2020-10-01-2021-03-04/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210303T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210303T160000
DTSTAMP:20210116T113802Z
CREATED:20201120T090404Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210116T113802Z
UID:10000299-1614783600-1614787200@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:CEPPA’s Moral Philosophy Reading Group reads and discusses an article per week\, chosen by a different member each time. \nSemester 2 schedule: \nWednesdays 3pm – 4pm\, beginning 3 February and ending 28 April. We will skip the following Wednesdays: 10 Feb\, 24 Mar\, 31 Mar\, 21 Apr. (Due to staff meetings and spring break.) \nOrganizer: Theron Pummer (tgp4). Teams link will be circulated in January 2021.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-3/2021-03-03/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210224T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210224T160000
DTSTAMP:20210116T113802Z
CREATED:20201120T090404Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210116T113802Z
UID:10000298-1614178800-1614182400@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:CEPPA’s Moral Philosophy Reading Group reads and discusses an article per week\, chosen by a different member each time. \nSemester 2 schedule: \nWednesdays 3pm – 4pm\, beginning 3 February and ending 28 April. We will skip the following Wednesdays: 10 Feb\, 24 Mar\, 31 Mar\, 21 Apr. (Due to staff meetings and spring break.) \nOrganizer: Theron Pummer (tgp4). Teams link will be circulated in January 2021.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-3/2021-02-24/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210218T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210218T173000
DTSTAMP:20210209T130436Z
CREATED:20200709T164951Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210209T130436Z
UID:10000258-1613664000-1613669400@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Works-in-Progress Talk – Lara Jost (St Andrews)
DESCRIPTION:The Epistemic Value of Affective Intentional Experience \nIn this paper\, I argue that despite risks of falsehood\, theorists should recognize that affective intentional experience (AIE)\, which includes emotions\, pains/pleasures and some gut feelings\, can be a source of knowledge and justification. Indeed\, AIE provides the best explanation for how we know certain things. I will focus the analysis on two such cases: pain in patients with endometriosis and microaggressions. I will then discuss points of resistance against the conclusion that AIE is epistemically valuable and why one might defend that it is not a genuine source of knowledge and justification. I will then offer some responses those challenges and explain how such resistance towards AIE impoverishes our epistemological theories and how it contributes to the silencing of marginalized agents\, in particular women and people of colour.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-2020-10-01-2021-02-18/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210217T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210217T160000
DTSTAMP:20210116T113802Z
CREATED:20201120T090404Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210116T113802Z
UID:10000297-1613574000-1613577600@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:CEPPA’s Moral Philosophy Reading Group reads and discusses an article per week\, chosen by a different member each time. \nSemester 2 schedule: \nWednesdays 3pm – 4pm\, beginning 3 February and ending 28 April. We will skip the following Wednesdays: 10 Feb\, 24 Mar\, 31 Mar\, 21 Apr. (Due to staff meetings and spring break.) \nOrganizer: Theron Pummer (tgp4). Teams link will be circulated in January 2021.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-3/2021-02-17/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210203T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210203T160000
DTSTAMP:20210116T113802Z
CREATED:20201120T090404Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210116T113802Z
UID:10000296-1612364400-1612368000@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:CEPPA’s Moral Philosophy Reading Group reads and discusses an article per week\, chosen by a different member each time. \nSemester 2 schedule: \nWednesdays 3pm – 4pm\, beginning 3 February and ending 28 April. We will skip the following Wednesdays: 10 Feb\, 24 Mar\, 31 Mar\, 21 Apr. (Due to staff meetings and spring break.) \nOrganizer: Theron Pummer (tgp4). Teams link will be circulated in January 2021.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-3/2021-02-03/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210128T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210128T173000
DTSTAMP:20210122T091619Z
CREATED:20200709T164951Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210122T091619Z
UID:10000257-1611849600-1611855000@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk - Lara Buchak (Princeton University)
DESCRIPTION:TITLE: RISK AND AMBIGUITY IN ETHICAL DECISION-MAKING \nABSTRACT: Some of my choices are primarily guided by the interests of others: for example\, which charities to give to or which political policies to vote for. Other of my choices have at least a significant component where I must take others’ interests into account\, though perhaps I can weigh them against my own interests: for example\, which environment-protecting measures to adopt in my personal life. This talk is about how to evaluate the other-affecting component of my decisions. In cases in which all of the empirical facts are known\, it may be easy to say which decision is best for another person. But in cases of risk—we don’t know how the world will turn out—or ambiguity—we don’t even know the probability of the world turning out in various ways—things are less simple. This is particularly the case given the wide range of attitudes towards risk and towards ambiguity that a person could rationally take. After laying out a framework for thinking about these choices\, I will argue for some principles that should govern them.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-2020-10-01-2021-01-28/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20201210T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20201210T173000
DTSTAMP:20201210T152552Z
CREATED:20200819T115017Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20201210T152552Z
UID:10000264-1607616000-1607621400@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk - Elizabeth Harman (Princeton University)
DESCRIPTION:Title: ‘Does Morality Speak within the Realm of the Morally Permissible?’ \nAbstract: You hear that your next-door neighbor Alicia is sick with COVID-19. You’re new to the neighborhood and haven’t met Alicia yet. You’re overwhelmed with working from home and overseeing your kids’ remote schooling. You could reach out to Alicia and ask whether she needs someone to pick up medicine or groceries for her; that would be a nice thing to do. Morality doesn’t require you to do it\, and you know that. You think it over. “I don’t have to offer to help\, but I should\,” you think\, and you are right. You offer to help. \nThis could be a true story. Sometimes\, there is a way that you could help someone; you don’t have to help; but all things considered\, you should help. This means that morality speaks within the realm of the morally permissible. Moral reasons can win out within the realm of the morally permissible to settle that you should do something morally good that you don’t have to do. Sometimes\, a supererogatory action should be done. If one fails to act\, then one makes a moral mistake that isn’t morally wrong: it turns out that some moral mistakes are not morally wrong. \nI will argue for this view and then discuss an objection from multiply satisfiable moral requirements. Sometimes you don’t have to do a particular thing because it is just one way of fulfilling a moral requirement; there are other ways you could also fulfill that requirement. This appears to be something that you should do that you don’t have to do. But doing it is not supererogatory—it’s just a way of fulfilling a moral requirement. The objection holds that the cases I use to argue for my view all involve multiply satisfiable moral requirements\, such as the general moral obligation to help some people sometimes. I pursue two lines of response to the objection: the more concessive line of response concedes that my argument needs to be revised in light of the objection\, but shows that this can be done; the less concessive line of response holds that my original argument survives the objection. \nHarman St Andrews Talk Handout December 2020
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-elizabeth-harman-princeton-university/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20200924T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20200924T173000
DTSTAMP:20200918T112423Z
CREATED:20200709T164951Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20200918T112423Z
UID:10000251-1600963200-1600968600@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Works-in-Progress Talk - Julia Driver (UT Austin and St Andrews)
DESCRIPTION:Title: ‘Blame and the Suberogatory’ \nAbstract: In this paper the claim that some actions are blameworthy even if they are not wrong is defended. Suberogatory actions\, which generally involve people standing on their rights in ways that display inadequate quality of the will\, are examples. I defend this claim against a strategy of assimilating these cases to the “right to do wrong” category and then sketch out a picture of the sorts of norm violations these actions represent. \nHandout: Handout_Blame and the Suberogatory
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-2020-09-24/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR