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X-WR-CALDESC:Events for CEPPA
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20250425T103000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20250425T120000
DTSTAMP:20260829T031753
CREATED:20250317T170635Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250317T170635Z
UID:10000599-1745577000-1745582400@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Knox Seminar
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/knox-seminar/
LOCATION:Butts Wynd Building room 09\, Butts Wynd\, St Andrews\, Fife\, KY16 9AJ\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Knox Lecture
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20250424T171500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20250424T184500
DTSTAMP:20260829T031753
CREATED:20250130T202131Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250414T205812Z
UID:10000580-1745514900-1745520300@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:2025 Knox Lecture - David Enoch (Hebrew University of Jerusalem/University of Oxford)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Shameless Liberalism: A Vision\n\n\nAbstract: Despite everything\, liberalism remains the one true political philosophy. Liberal principles – something about liberty and autonomy\, something about equality\, perhaps some universalist and rationalist assumptions – are still the right fundamental principles for political philosophy.But this doesn’t mean – nor did you think – that there are no more troubles for liberalism. The most dominant version of liberalism (in English-speaking political philosophy) over the past half century is weak and confused\, philosophically and politically. We should do better. And there are many other problems – new and old – to face. \nThe liberalism that we need to defend (not just theoretically) is robust and self-confident intellectually\, but very realistic and careful politically. It is in no way skeptical or relativistic\, but it is pragmatically flexible. It is philosophically uncompromising\, but politically willing to compromise about pretty much everything. \nThis paper is a broad-brush-stroke presentation and defense of this shameless kind of liberalism. \n\nLocation: School I
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/2025-knox-lecture-elizabeth-anderson-university-of-michigan/
LOCATION:School I (St Salvatores)\, St Andrews\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Knox Lecture
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/png:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/files/2025/01/Knox-lecture-2025-less-american.png
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240516T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240516T173000
DTSTAMP:20260829T031753
CREATED:20240506T124545Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240513T150318Z
UID:10000524-1715875200-1715880600@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in person) – Neil Sinhababu (National University of Singapore)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Pleasure Fundamentalism \nAbstract: Pleasure fundamentalism is the view that moral value is the same thing as pleasure and this explains all other moral facts. This talk presents two arguments for pleasure fundamentalism and discusses the form of naturalism they arise from. According to the Reliability Argument\, all processes generating moral belief are unreliable\, except for phenomenal introspection which tells us that pleasure is good. According to the Universality Argument\, pleasure is universal moral value\, because of its qualitative identity with the pleasure in the minds of all possible perceivers of moral value. Both arguments are available within an Einsteinian naturalism combining empiricism with a spacetime ontology\, and avoiding behaviorism in favor of a more Humean psychology. \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-neil-sinhababu-national-university-of-singapore/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20240515
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20240516
DTSTAMP:20260829T031753
CREATED:20230731T142533Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240405T154339Z
UID:10000411-1715731200-1715817599@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Book Workshop (in person) - Daniel Muñoz (UNC Chapel Hill)
DESCRIPTION:Workshop on Daniel Muñoz’s forthcoming book What We Owe to Ourselves\n\nDate: 15 May 2024\nLocation: Edgecliffe 104\nRegistration required: email Theron Pummer (tgp4@st-andrews.ac.uk)\n \nProvisional Schedule \n945am: Coffee/tea\, welcome\n10am: Jordan MacKenzie (Virginia Tech)\n1115am: Thomas Schmidt (Humboldt University)\n1225pm: Lunch\n130pm: Quinn White (Harvard University)\n240pm: Coffee/tea\n300pm: Kerah Gordon-Solmon (Queen’s University)\n415pm: Joseph Bowen (University of Leeds)\n5:25pm: Walk around town or go to pub\n630pm: Dinner\n \nAbout the Workshop\nThis is a pre-read event. The book manuscript will be circulated to all participants by 15 April. There are 20 spaces available at the catered workshop\, and 10 spaces available at the dinner. Please let me (tgp4) know if you have any access requirements I should be aware of which will help you attend this event.\n \nAbout the Book\nWhat We Owe to Ourselves is under contract with OUP. The book aims to unify\, in a fresh and systematic way\, the two main concepts in deontological morality. “Restrictions” forbid us from harming others for the greater good; “prerogatives” permit us not to harm ourselves. Muñoz argues that both concepts share a source in obligations. Restrictions consist in unwaived obligations to others\, and prerogatives are waivable obligations we have to ourselves. Just as you owe it to me not to harm me for someone else’s greater good\, you owe it to yourself not to harm yourself.\n \nThe key to this project is a thesis that Muñoz calls the Self-Other Symmetry: we owe the same basic things to ourselves as to a relevantly similar other. In the past\, Symmetry has been criticized as being too restrictive\, since we clearly have extensive freedoms when it comes to our own bodies and things. For me to slap your arm would be morally wrong; for me to slap my own is merely foolish. But the right way to understand this issue\, Muñoz argues\, is not by invoking a mysterious moral asymmetry between self and other. There is a simpler explanation: when I harm others\, I might very well lack their consent\, but I am always a willing party to my own intentional choices. Rather than a moral anomaly\, our relation to ourselves is fundamentally like our relation to a consenting other. The limits of what I may do to myself can be derived from the limits of consent in general.\n \nWhat’s more\, the book is the first Self-Other Symmetric take on restrictions and prerogatives. The standard view is that prerogatives come from the special goodness of self-interest\, while restrictions come from the special nastiness of blood on one’s own hands. This makes the moral agent seem rather self-centered\, caring more about a good time and clean hands than about\, say\, reducing global poverty. Muñoz wants to turn this picture inside-out. You should care about everybody equally. But the choice of what happens to your body is still yours. This follows from the obligations that people owe you. I may not take your spare kidney (even if I need it more)\, since I am restricted by my obligations to you. You may keep the kidney if you wish\, since you owe this to yourself. But the optimal choice—the “supererogatory” deed beyond the call—is to waive the obligations that you are owed for the sake of someone else’s greater good. Equal concern for all beings is the ideal\, but when the sacrifice falls on you\, the choice belongs to no one else.\n \nFunding and Support\nFor supporting this workshop\, we are grateful to the Scots Philosophical Association\, the Society for Applied Philosophy\, the Department of Philosophy at the University of St Andrews\, and CEPPA.\n\n\n\nRegistration\nAgain\, to reserve a spot at the workshop\, please register by emailing Theron Pummer (tgp4).
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/book-workshop-in-person-daniel-munoz-unc-chapel-hill/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Workshop
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240509T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240509T173000
DTSTAMP:20260829T031753
CREATED:20230731T141757Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240509T090022Z
UID:10000410-1715270400-1715275800@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CANCELLED CEPPA Talk (in person) –  Victor Tadros (University of Warwick)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Consent\, Intent\, and Communication \nWhat is consent? I will assume that it is a normative power – a power to alter rights and duties directly. If this is right\, how is consent exercised? I will argue that consent is exercised through the execution of intentions to alter practical reasoning. Successful communication is not needed for valid consent. Even an attempt to communicate is not needed (though it is the central way of consenting). What is needed is an intention that the consentee understands that their practical reasoning is altered – their understanding that they are permitted to do what the consenter consents to. More precisely\, I defend: \nPermissive Intentions: X consents to Y aing where they execute their intention permit Y to a by intending that Y understands that X has permitted Y to a. \nThis View contrasts with familiar alternative views in four ways. \nFirst\, consent is concerned with altering the consentee’s practical reasoning\, and not just with altering the normative status of the consentee’s conduct. So\, a person cannot give consent where they believe that altering the consentee’s practical reasoning is impossible\, even where they wish the normative status of the target’s conduct to be altered. This contrasts with pure mentalist views that consent can be given just by having a mental state or performing a mental action without attempting to alter the consentee’s practical reasoning. Second\, consent can be given without external behaviour that is sufficient to give the consentee grounds to conclude that the consenter has permissive intentions. Consenters can try but fail to give others evidence of their intentions. This contrasts with one kind of externalist view that external evidence or signs of permissive intentions are necessary for consent. Third\, consent is given only if the consenter intends to permit the consentee’s conduct. This contrasts with another kind of externalist view that external evidence or signs of permissive intentions are sufficient for consent. Fourth\, consenters necessarily intend to permit consentees’ conduct. It is insufficient for consent that a person intends the recipient of their communication to believe that they intend to permit them to act. A person can pretend to consent by communicating that they intend to permit an act without actually intending to permit it. And sometimes this might result in the consenter forfeiting a right against the consentee acting. But consent is absent. This contrasts with the view that intending to communicate that one has permissive intentions is sufficient for consent whether or not the consenter has these intentions. \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-online-neil-sinhababu-national-university-of-singapore/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240321T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240321T173000
DTSTAMP:20260829T031753
CREATED:20230620T081028Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240319T112928Z
UID:10000406-1711036800-1711042200@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in person) - Elad Uzan (Oxford)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Compromises and Lesser-Evil Compromises in Ending Wars. \nAbstract: Contemporary conflicts often lack a clear end-state\, posing challenges to the traditional notion of victory in just wars. This ambiguity calls for a revaluation of war’s objectives\, suggesting that wars should end without a clear victory. In this paper\, I will explore various moral and non-moral considerations that structure the duty to reach war-ending compromises. I will assess whether a defender has a duty to seek a compromise peace before fully achieving its objectives and address the tension between achieving a just peace and a lasting peace. The conclusion of a war often necessitates accepting moral hazards: the just side may need to make sacrifices and relinquish certain entitlements and the unjust side may secure wrongful gains. I will also examine the potential moral risks of prematurely terminating just wars. Lastly\, I will discuss the duty to enter negotiations and the moral complexities of negotiating the conclusion of wars. \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-elad-uzan-oxford/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20231102T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20231102T173000
DTSTAMP:20260829T031753
CREATED:20230602T090158Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231031T111128Z
UID:10000398-1698940800-1698946200@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (online) - Orri Stefánsson (Stockholm)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Chance Prioritarianism \nLocation: Teams (online only)\, and streamed from Edgecliffe G03 \nAbstract: I will defend what we could call survival chance prioritarianism\, according to which the moral value of improving someone’s chance of surviving (some period) is greater the more likely the person was to die before the improvement. I motivate this view by showing that it justifies some common moral judgements that ex post views cannot accommodate\, but I suggest that we should resist generalising the view to all chances (so\, we should resist ex ante prioritarianism) and I give some reason for resisting survival chance egalitarianism. Finally\, I defend the view against some natural objections
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-online-orri-stefansson-stockholm/
LOCATION:Microsoft Teams
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20230705T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20230705T143000
DTSTAMP:20260829T031753
CREATED:20230602T084044Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230609T123417Z
UID:10000393-1688562000-1688567400@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Special MPRG (in person) - Mark Oppenheimer (Johannesburg Bar)
DESCRIPTION:Location: Edgecliffe 104 \nTitle: Should hate speech be against the law? \nAbstract: Hate speech has become increasingly prevalent\, fuelled by social media\, political polarization\, and the rise of extremist groups. It can have a profoundly negative impact on individuals and communities\, causing harm\, inciting violence\, and perpetuating discrimination. However\, hate speech is notoriously difficult to define and regulate. We will discuss real life court cases involving offensive flags\, demands for an end to gay marriage\, and songs calling for the slaughter of ethnic minorities. Along the way we will uncover the value of freedom of expression and determine whether it should ever be limited. \n 
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/special-mprg-in-person-mark-oppenheimer-johannesburg-bar/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20230606
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20230609
DTSTAMP:20260829T031753
CREATED:20220802T172420Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230602T084722Z
UID:10000355-1686009600-1686268799@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Climate Ethics Panel (at Energy Ethics 2023)
DESCRIPTION:Panel on Climate Ethics at the Energy Ethics 2023 Conference.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/climate-ethics-conference/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Conference
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/png:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/files/2022/08/Climate-ethics-panel-poster.png
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20230605T100000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20230606T150000
DTSTAMP:20260829T031753
CREATED:20220802T171347Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230726T112026Z
UID:10000354-1685959200-1686063600@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Fest
DESCRIPTION:Registration Required: contact tgp4@st-andrews.ac.uk to register\nLocation: Edgecliffe 104 (5 The Scores\, St Andrews KY16 9AL) \nMonday 5 June\n\n10:00am – 11:15am — Julia Driver (UT Austin/St Andrews) “Undermining Promises”\nCoffee/tea break\n11:30am – 12:45pm — Jeff McMahan (Oxford) “The Counterfactual Problem in Gene Editing”\n12:45pm – 1:30pm — lunch\n1:30pm – 2:45pm — Joe Horton (UCL) “Practical Reason and Permissible Preference”\nCoffee/tea break\n3:00pm – 4:15pm — Rahul Kumar (Queen’s) “Morality and the Value of Mutual Recognition”\n6pm — Conference Dinner (for speakers and special guests only)\n\nTuesday 6 June\n\n11:15am — Coffee/tea\n11:30am – 12:45pm — Kerah Gordon-Solmon (Queen’s) “The Costs of Rescue”\n12:45pm – 1:30pm — lunch\n1:30pm – 2:45pm — Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (Duke) “Mental Illnesses as Failures of Attention”
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-fest/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Conference,CEPPA Workshop
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=application/pdf:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/files/2022/08/CEPPA-Fest-poster-1.pdf
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20230523T171500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20230523T184500
DTSTAMP:20260829T031753
CREATED:20220704T091810Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230509T150133Z
UID:10000353-1684862100-1684867500@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Knox Lecture 2023 – Sally Haslanger (MIT)
DESCRIPTION:Location: School III in-person and Teams online (for online attendees\, headphones should be worn to prevent a feedback loop from occurring) \nTitle: Social Reproduction and the Politics of Care \nAbstract: For decades\, socialist feminists have insisted that an adequate approach to any economy\, and especially to capitalism\, must involve attention to social reproduction\, i.e.\, to “the activities and attitudes\, behaviors and emotions\, and responsibilities and relationships directly involved in maintaining life\, on a daily basis and intergenerationally” (Brenner and Laslett 1991). Debates over social reproduction typically begin with a critique of Marxism\, arguing that wage labor crucially depends on the production of the laborer\, which is done mainly by women\, but mostly ignored by Marx. One approach to social reproduction is to locate it within patriarchy\, which is thought to be one of several interacting systems (others include capitalism and White supremacy). In this talk\, I will argue it is better to understand our current social formation as a single (patriarchal\, capitalist\, White supremacist) system\, and will discuss why this matters for developing a political agenda around care work. \nTeams link: https://teams.microsoft.com/l/meetup-join/19%3ameeting_Y2MwZTg1YWUtNWI2ZC00MDViLTg4YTMtYzJmNjc1NWQzOGM0%40thread.v2/0?context=%7B%22Tid%22%3A%22f85626cb-0da8-49d3-aa58-64ef678ef01a%22%2C%22Oid%22%3A%2251bd815f-5519-4c20-81c7-4701c95594b5%22%2C%22IsBroadcastMeeting%22%3Atrue%2C%22role%22%3A%22a%22%7D&btype=a&role=a \nFor online attendees\, headphones should be worn to prevent a feedback loop from occurring.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/knox-lecture-2023-sally-haslanger-mit/
CATEGORIES:Knox Lecture
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/files/2022/07/Knox-Lecture-Poster.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20230504T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20230504T173000
DTSTAMP:20260829T031753
CREATED:20221209T070749Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230325T134455Z
UID:10000388-1683216000-1683221400@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in person) – Eric Martin (Baylor)
DESCRIPTION:Location: Edgecliffe G03 \nTitle: Scientism and Humanities Education \nAbstract: In this talk I discuss a pedagogical implication of scientism. Because scientism elevates science and derogates what is deemed non-scientific\, the arts and humanities become\, on such a view\, less valuable parts of university curricula. I survey some of the current data on declining study of the humanities and explain how scientism may contribute to a trend disparaging the arts and humanities\, suggesting some problems with this view.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-eric-martin-baylor/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20230413T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20230413T173000
DTSTAMP:20260829T031753
CREATED:20221207T205510Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230406T051645Z
UID:10000384-1681401600-1681407000@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in person) – Daniel Muñoz (UNC Chapel Hill)
DESCRIPTION:Location: Edgecliffe G03 \nTitle: Values as Vectors \nAbstract: Often\, two things seem tied in value\, though slightly improving one would not break the tie. How can we model such ‘insensitivity to sweetening’? A leading answer is that overall values\, rather than being like precise numbers\, must be imprecise\, giving rise to a special nontransitive value relation\, which Chang calls parity. But parity is notoriously hard to pin down\, and imprecise values are neither necessary nor sufficient for modeling sweetening. I propose instead to model overall values as many-dimensional vectors. The result is a fresh and flexible framework for the stranger side of ethics—as well as an elegant definition of parity as a tie between things of nonfungible value.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-munoz/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20230412T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20230412T140000
DTSTAMP:20260829T031753
CREATED:20221017T104741Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230412T072304Z
UID:10000376-1681304400-1681308000@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Special MPRG: Mattia Cecchinato
DESCRIPTION:Location: Edgecliffe G03 \nTitle: “The Mind that Matters: Degrees of Sentience and Moral Status”. \nAbstract: It is often argued that the capacity for conscious experience is necessary for a creature to morally matter for its own sake and thus have moral status. Entities that lack the capacity for consciousness\, such as chairs\, philosophical zombies\, or anencephalic infants\, seem to lack all subjectivity and welfare concerns—nothing can be good or bad for them. But is the morally relevant property the general fact of being (phenomenally) conscious as such\, or is it a particular kind of consciousness that matters? According to a long and widespread philosophical tradition\, Narrow Sentientism\, the ground of moral status is the capacity for affective consciousness (i.e. emotions\, pleasure\, and pain). David Chalmers (2022)\, however\, has recently challenged this view by arguing for Broad Sentientism\, according to which the capacity for phenomenal consciousness alone suffices for moral status\, even in cases where the capacity for affect is absent. \nIn this talk\, I examine both views in light of recent evolutionary and philosophical arguments concerning the possibility of degrees of consciousness (Tye 2021; Lee 2022). I propose that the most compelling understandings of Narrow and Broad Sentientism are scalar versions of each. But I also argue that if (i) we can distinguish between affective and phenomenal consciousness\, and if (ii) both are gradable\, then trade-offs reveal the inadequacy of Scalar-Broad Sentientism. A highly conscious creature with a low degree of affect would not score well in terms of moral status. The view of moral status that better tracks our intuitions across a range of cases\, I argue\, is a version of Scalar-Narrow Sentientism. It is a function of the degree of affect weighted by the size of the phenomenal repertoire possessed by the relevant conscious creature. Finally\, I investigate the practical implications of this novel view for our treatment of non-human animals\, our fellows humans\, and artificial sentience.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/special-mprg-mattia-cecchinato/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220915T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220915T173000
DTSTAMP:20260829T031753
CREATED:20220704T085204Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20220909T151309Z
UID:10000276-1663257600-1663263000@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in person) – Ben Sachs-Cobbe (St Andrews)
DESCRIPTION:Location: Edgecliffe G03 and Teams \nTitle: What’s wrong with teaching our children to be good citizens? \nAbstract: Character education is a common part of schooling in the U.S. and U.K.\, and one popular argument in favour of character education is that it is conducive to producing citizens who have the virtues that make someone a good citizen.  But there is an oft-heard objection to the idea that educators should try to inculcate the virtues of citizenship\, namely that doing so serves a conservative agenda.  In this talk I investigate what separates a conservative from an anti-conservative theory of good citizenship\, and conclude that educating children for the virtues of citizenship cannot possibly serve a conservative agenda\, or for that matter any controversial political agenda at all.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-ben/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20220912
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20220913
DTSTAMP:20260829T031753
CREATED:20220520T094436Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20220911T054038Z
UID:10000270-1662940800-1663027199@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Book Workshop: Elizabeth Ashford's *Hunger’s Witting Executioners*
DESCRIPTION:One-day book workshop on Elizabeth Ashford’s Hunger’s Witting Executioners: Structural Violations of the Right to Subsistence \nPre-read: workshop participants will be expected to read the book manuscript distributed in advance. \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03 and Teams. \nSchedule: \n10:30am to noon: discussion \nLunch break (free time) \n1:30pm to 3pm: discussion \n 
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/book-workshop-elizabeth-ashfords-hungers-witting-executioners/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Workshop
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220908T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220908T173000
DTSTAMP:20260829T031753
CREATED:20220628T053818Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20220831T091553Z
UID:10000274-1662652800-1662658200@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in person) – Cécile Fabre (Oxford)
DESCRIPTION:Location: Edgecliffe G03 \nTitle: The Morality of Gossip \nAbstract: Gossip is pervasive and wide-ranging. It lubricates and wrecks social relationships. Many people openly confess to loving it yet acknowledge that gossiping\, while often gratifying\, is\, if not morally wrong\, at least not quite right. Gossip has not received much attention in moral philosophy. In this paper\, I argue that notwithstanding the fact that gossip often has beneficial effects\, it is often wrong\, on Kantian grounds. To that end\, I first provide an account of the phenomenon of gossip and of its value. I then argue that two fairly standard arguments against gossip do capture some morally problematic features of gossip (to do with breach of trust and deception) but are under inclusive. The deeper underlying worry about gossip\, I go on to claim\, is that it amounts to a particular kind of failure to treat others – be they gossipees or gossipers – as persons.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-cecile-fabre-oxford/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220525T143000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220525T160000
DTSTAMP:20260829T031753
CREATED:20220321T173710Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20220525T062903Z
UID:10000347-1653489000-1653494400@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in person) – Matthew Adler (Duke University)
DESCRIPTION:Location: Edgecliffe G03 and Teams \nTitle: “Person-Affecting Consequentialism: Equity-Regarding\, Desert-Neutral\, Repugnant” \nAbstract: \nThe philosophical literature on consequentialism regularly distinguishes between “person-affecting” and “impersonal” moral justifications or accounts.   The “person-affecting”/”impersonal” distinction can be interpreted in various ways.  I understand it as follows.  A person-affecting justificatory framework sees individuals’ well-being gains and losses—well-being effects on persons—as the fundamental moral considerations that underlie the moral goodness of outcomes. \nMy research has investigated the implications of the person-affecting framework\, using the concept of “claims-across-outcomes”—a concept that seeks to make the framework more rigorous and to draw clear implications from it. This talk will present and synthesize the results of this research program. \nIn a nutshell: the claims-across-outcomes framework argues for a moral-goodness ranking that satisfies an equity axiom (the Pigou-Dalton axiom)\, as opposed to utilitarianism; is neutral to individual differences in desert; and (extended to the variable-population context) implies the Repugnant Conclusion.  In short\, person-affecting consequentialism is equity-regarding\, desert-neutral\, and repugnant.  Surprisingly\, perhaps\, the simple idea that moral goodness is grounded on well-being gains and losses has these upshots.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-matthew-adler-duke-university/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220331T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220331T173000
DTSTAMP:20260829T031753
CREATED:20220315T213313Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20220315T213527Z
UID:10000346-1648742400-1648747800@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in person) – Thomas Schmidt (Humboldt-University)
DESCRIPTION:Location: Edgecliffe G03 \nTitle: Ought and the Transmission of Reasons \nAbstract: According to the widely held Weightiest Reasons view about how reasons for action and the practical ought are related to one another\, \n(WR)  an agent ought to φ if\, and only if\, the reasons for φ are weightier than the reasons for every incompatible alternative to φ. \nI show that complementing (WR) in a way that results in an extensionally adequate account is surprisingly difficult and compromises intuitive plausibility. In particular\, it turns out that (WR) only returns correct results when it is combined with principles of reasons transmission some of which entail an implausible proliferation of reasons. Even so\, the theoretical package that friends of (WR) must accept is to be preferred over competing views.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-thomas-schmidt/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211201T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211201T160000
DTSTAMP:20260829T031753
CREATED:20210830T180836Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210830T181258Z
UID:10000336-1638370800-1638374400@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:Moral Philosophy Reading Group\nDescription: This group reads and discusses an article per week\, chosen by a different member each time. \nDay/time: Wednesdays 3pm to 4pm on Teams. \nOrganizer: Theron Pummer (tgp4).
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-4/2021-12-01/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211124T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211124T160000
DTSTAMP:20260829T031753
CREATED:20210830T180836Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210830T181258Z
UID:10000335-1637766000-1637769600@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:Moral Philosophy Reading Group\nDescription: This group reads and discusses an article per week\, chosen by a different member each time. \nDay/time: Wednesdays 3pm to 4pm on Teams. \nOrganizer: Theron Pummer (tgp4).
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-4/2021-11-24/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211117T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211117T160000
DTSTAMP:20260829T031753
CREATED:20210830T180836Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210830T181258Z
UID:10000334-1637161200-1637164800@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:Moral Philosophy Reading Group\nDescription: This group reads and discusses an article per week\, chosen by a different member each time. \nDay/time: Wednesdays 3pm to 4pm on Teams. \nOrganizer: Theron Pummer (tgp4).
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-4/2021-11-17/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211110T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211110T160000
DTSTAMP:20260829T031753
CREATED:20210830T180836Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210830T181258Z
UID:10000333-1636556400-1636560000@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:Moral Philosophy Reading Group\nDescription: This group reads and discusses an article per week\, chosen by a different member each time. \nDay/time: Wednesdays 3pm to 4pm on Teams. \nOrganizer: Theron Pummer (tgp4).
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-4/2021-11-10/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211103T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211103T160000
DTSTAMP:20260829T031753
CREATED:20210830T180836Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210830T181258Z
UID:10000332-1635951600-1635955200@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:Moral Philosophy Reading Group\nDescription: This group reads and discusses an article per week\, chosen by a different member each time. \nDay/time: Wednesdays 3pm to 4pm on Teams. \nOrganizer: Theron Pummer (tgp4).
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-4/2021-11-03/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211027T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211027T160000
DTSTAMP:20260829T031753
CREATED:20210830T180836Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210830T181258Z
UID:10000331-1635346800-1635350400@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:Moral Philosophy Reading Group\nDescription: This group reads and discusses an article per week\, chosen by a different member each time. \nDay/time: Wednesdays 3pm to 4pm on Teams. \nOrganizer: Theron Pummer (tgp4).
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-4/2021-10-27/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211020T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211020T160000
DTSTAMP:20260829T031753
CREATED:20210830T180836Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210830T181258Z
UID:10000330-1634742000-1634745600@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:Moral Philosophy Reading Group\nDescription: This group reads and discusses an article per week\, chosen by a different member each time. \nDay/time: Wednesdays 3pm to 4pm on Teams. \nOrganizer: Theron Pummer (tgp4).
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-4/2021-10-20/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211013T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211013T160000
DTSTAMP:20260829T031753
CREATED:20210830T180836Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210830T181258Z
UID:10000329-1634137200-1634140800@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:Moral Philosophy Reading Group\nDescription: This group reads and discusses an article per week\, chosen by a different member each time. \nDay/time: Wednesdays 3pm to 4pm on Teams. \nOrganizer: Theron Pummer (tgp4).
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-4/2021-10-13/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211006T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211006T160000
DTSTAMP:20260829T031753
CREATED:20210830T180836Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210830T181258Z
UID:10000328-1633532400-1633536000@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:Moral Philosophy Reading Group\nDescription: This group reads and discusses an article per week\, chosen by a different member each time. \nDay/time: Wednesdays 3pm to 4pm on Teams. \nOrganizer: Theron Pummer (tgp4).
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-4/2021-10-06/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210929T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210929T160000
DTSTAMP:20260829T031753
CREATED:20210830T180836Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210830T181258Z
UID:10000327-1632927600-1632931200@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:Moral Philosophy Reading Group\nDescription: This group reads and discusses an article per week\, chosen by a different member each time. \nDay/time: Wednesdays 3pm to 4pm on Teams. \nOrganizer: Theron Pummer (tgp4).
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-4/2021-09-29/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210922T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210922T160000
DTSTAMP:20260829T031753
CREATED:20210830T180836Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210830T181258Z
UID:10000326-1632322800-1632326400@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:Moral Philosophy Reading Group\nDescription: This group reads and discusses an article per week\, chosen by a different member each time. \nDay/time: Wednesdays 3pm to 4pm on Teams. \nOrganizer: Theron Pummer (tgp4).
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-4/2021-09-22/
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR