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X-ORIGINAL-URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
X-WR-CALDESC:Events for CEPPA
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240404T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240404T173000
DTSTAMP:20260528T084933
CREATED:20230602T091045Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240401T153145Z
UID:10000404-1712246400-1712251800@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in person) - John Broome (Oxford)
DESCRIPTION:Location: Edgecliffe G03 \nTitle: The Continuum Argument Is Invalid \nAbstract: Derek Parfit argues by means of something he calls a ‘continuum argument’ that a particular appealing premise in population axiology implies a conclusion that he and many others consider repugnant. He treats this as a paradox\, and takes up the challenge of resolving it. He looks for a way to avoid the repugnant conclusion. The solution he offers depends on the existence of imprecision within the relation of betterness among populations. Other philosophers have taken up the same challenge\, following Parfit’s lead\, and offered similar solutions. I shall show that actually the repugnant conclusion is not implied by Parfit’s appealing principle. The continuum argument is invalid. There is therefore no paradox and no real challenge. Moreover\, the explanation of why this is so has nothing to do with imprecision\, incompleteness\, incommensurateness\, indeterminacy or vagueness in betterness. It is consistent with a sharp\, complete betterness ordering.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-john-broome-oxford/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03\, The Scores\, St Salvator's Quad\, KY16 9AL
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
ORGANIZER;CN="Luca Stroppa":MAILTO:ls330@st-andrews.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20230511T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20230511T173000
DTSTAMP:20260528T084933
CREATED:20221207T210436Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230504T103852Z
UID:10000387-1683820800-1683826200@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in person) – Guy Fletcher (Edinburgh)
DESCRIPTION:Location: Edgecliffe G03 \nTitle: All’s Well that Ends Well? \nAbstract: Distinguish how well someone’s life is going at a particular point — their momentary well-being — from how well their life went as a whole\, their lifetime well-being. How are these related? \nThe simplest answer is that lifetime well-being is just aggregate momentary well-being. Theories that deny this are forms of holism about lifetime well-being. Recent discussions of holism\, inspired by David Velleman\, have focused mainly on one particular species of it\, the so-called “shape of a life” hypothesis. This is the claim that having an “uphill” distribution of momentary well-being contributes to lifetime well-being and does so over and above the instrumental effects that such a distribution might have upon momentary well-being. In this paper I discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the shape of a life hypothesis before introducing an alternative view\, one which avoids those weaknesses\, and argue for its independent plausibility.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-guy-fletcher-edinburgh/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
ORGANIZER;CN="Luca Stroppa":MAILTO:ls330@st-andrews.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20221215T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20221215T173000
DTSTAMP:20260528T084933
CREATED:20221207T201729Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20221213T060843Z
UID:10000379-1671120000-1671125400@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (online only) – Tyler Cowen (George Mason University)
DESCRIPTION:Location: Teams (online only) \nTitle: The Philosophy of Effective Altruism \nAbstract: What are the strengths and weaknesses of Effective Altruism as both a moral philosophy and practical guide to action? Is it best thought of as an optimizing approach? How important is existential risk\, especially relative to maximizing economic growth? How does the new form of Effective Altruism differ from standard utilitarianism?
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-online-only-tyler-cowen-george-mason-university/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
ORGANIZER;CN="Luca Stroppa":MAILTO:ls330@st-andrews.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220601T143000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220601T160000
DTSTAMP:20260528T084933
CREATED:20220322T174603Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230703T152539Z
UID:10000348-1654093800-1654099200@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Enrico Galvagni – CEPPA Work-In-Progress Talk (in person)
DESCRIPTION:Location: Edgecliffe G03 \nTitle: Hume’s Account of Virtue and Its Place in the History of Ethics \nAbstract: Hume’s account of virtue is notoriously puzzling. On the one hand\, he claims that the virtues are qualities useful or agreeable to oneself or to others. On the other\, he says that they are qualities which give a pleasing sentiment of approbation to a spectator. In this paper\, I argue that these two claims are part of one unified definition of virtue and that Hume’s apparently idiosyncratic account is best explained historically. To do so\, I show that Hume inherited from Natural Law theorists (such as Pufendorf and Locke) the problem of squaring the existence of morality with the belief that physical entities have\, in themselves\, no moral relevance. The solution offered by his predecessors\, however\, was not available to Hume who refused to ground morality in the authoritative command of God. I claim that Hume’s account of virtue has to be explained as an attempt to introduce a naturalistic and secular solution to this central problem in the history of ethics.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/enrico-galvagni-ceppa-work-in-progress-talk/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
ORGANIZER;CN="Luca Stroppa":MAILTO:ls330@st-andrews.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220210T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220210T173000
DTSTAMP:20260528T084933
CREATED:20210930T163726Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210930T163726Z
UID:10000337-1644508800-1644514200@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk – Michael Huemer (University of Colorado Boulder)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Justice Before Role Obligations \nAbstract: Many believe that agents in the justice system are morally constrained to follow certain assigned roles\, understood as excluding the exercise of moral judgement: lawyers to serve the interests of their clients\, judges to enforce the law as written by the legislature\, and juries to assess the factual evidence and apply the law as directed by the judge. These roles\, however\, often entail knowingly bringing about serious\, unjust harms. I argue that agents in the justice system should ignore putative role obligations that conflict with justice.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-michael-huemer-university-of-colorado-boulder/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
ORGANIZER;CN="Luca Stroppa":MAILTO:ls330@st-andrews.ac.uk
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