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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240425T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240425T173000
DTSTAMP:20260625T115828
CREATED:20230602T091155Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240422T153549Z
UID:10000405-1714060800-1714066200@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in person) - Helen Frowe (Stockholm)
DESCRIPTION:Title: The Permissibility of Collective Defence Agreements \nAbstract: Collective defence agreements (CDAs)\, of the sort that exist between\, for example\, NATO members\, EU members\, and African Union members\, are a prime example of a prominent deterrence mechanism. They promise a degree of assistance that will make it almost impossible for an adversary to win an aggressive war against any member. On the face of it\, then\, such agreements seem obviously morally permissible and\, indeed\, morally desirable. However\, I suspect that the moral picture is in fact much more mixed. For example\, acting on a CDA is unlikely to minimise harm compared available alternatives. If\, as I believe\, states are usually subject to a duty to minimise harm when aiding\, then acting on CDAs is likely to be permissible only if doing so is exempt from this duty. This talk explores some of the moral issues raised by CDAs and deterrent mechanisms more broadly. \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-helen-frowe-stockholm/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03\, The Scores\, St Salvator's Quad\, KY16 9AL
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
ORGANIZER;CN="Joel Joseph":MAILTO:jj73@st-andrews.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20230914T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20230914T173000
DTSTAMP:20260625T115828
CREATED:20230602T084940Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230907T152733Z
UID:10000394-1694707200-1694712600@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (online) - Frances Kamm (Rutgers)
DESCRIPTION:Location: Teams (online only) \nTitle: Superogation \nAbstract: This paper considers the relation between supererogation and duties (also here referred to as obligations) from a nonconsequentialist point of view. It first considers whether supererogation may sometimes take precedence over positive and negative duties and how this relates to personal costs (including efforts) required to perform one’s duty. It then considers how acquiescence to having large costs imposed on one (even permissibly) can be supererogatory. Finally\, it considers how what are usually duties can become supererogatory and how what is usually supererogatory can become dutiful. The relation between these topics and the trolley problem and the so-called “all or nothing problem” are examined.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-online-frances-kamm-rutgers/
LOCATION:Microsoft Teams
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
ORGANIZER;CN="Joel Joseph":MAILTO:jj73@st-andrews.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20221103T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20221103T173000
DTSTAMP:20260625T115828
CREATED:20220704T090429Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20221012T204502Z
UID:10000294-1667491200-1667496600@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (online only) – David Boonin (University of Colorado Boulder)
DESCRIPTION:Location: Teams (online only) \nTitle: Two Puzzles About the Ethics of Divestment \nAbstract: Suppose you own stock in Acme Corp. and you learn that it consistently acts in seriously immoral ways. What should you do? A common answer maintains that owning stock in Acme Corp. makes you complicit in its immoral behavior and that you should therefore divest yourself of it. But as Steven M. Cahn has argued\, there seems to be something puzzling about this answer. If you sell your stock to someone\, then they will own it. If it’s wrong to own the stock\, then they’ll be doing something wrong. So if you divest yourself of the stock\, you’ll be helping someone do something wrong. But it seems wrong to help someone do something wrong. So how can a company’s immoral behavior make it wrong for you to own stock in the company but not make it wrong for you to get rid of the stock by selling it to someone else? In this talk\, I will present two versions of Cahn’s divestment puzzle and explain the reasoning that leads to each of them. I will then discuss the published responses that have appeared since Cahn first presented the puzzle and argue that none of them succeed as solutions to either version. I will conclude by defending an alternative response to the puzzle.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-online-david-boonin-university-of-colorado-boulder/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
ORGANIZER;CN="Joel Joseph":MAILTO:jj73@st-andrews.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20221013T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20221013T173000
DTSTAMP:20260625T115828
CREATED:20220704T085835Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20220930T083250Z
UID:10000290-1665676800-1665682200@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (online only) – Shelly Kagan (Yale)
DESCRIPTION:Location: Teams (online only) \nTitle: “Death\, Deprivation\, and Rational Regret” \nAbstract:  Is death a bad thing? According to the deprivation account\, death is bad because the dead don’t get the various goods that they would have if only they were still alive. But it’s not normally a misfortune when a merely possible good doesn’t come your way. Bill Gates didn’t write you a check for a million dollars today\, but it would be silly to be upset at that. So how can death actually be bad? This talk will explore a promising answer.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-online-shelly-kagan-yale/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
ORGANIZER;CN="Joel Joseph":MAILTO:jj73@st-andrews.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220512T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220512T173000
DTSTAMP:20260625T115828
CREATED:20220302T121057Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20220509T151523Z
UID:10000345-1652371200-1652376600@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (online only) – Jeff McMahan (Oxford University)
DESCRIPTION:Title: “Compensation for Wrongful Life” \nAbstract: In a recent case in the UK\, a 20-year-old woman with spina bifida brought an action against her mother’s physician for failing to advise her to take folic acid supplements for several months before becoming pregnant. The court ruled in the woman’s favor\, accepting her claim that\, had the physician not acted negligently\, the mother would have had a healthy child. Yet this healthy child would have been a different child. So the physician’s omission was not worse\, or on balance bad\, for the plaintiff\, who has a life that is well worth living. If anything\, it benefited her. So on what basis can she claim a right to compensation\, or damages? I consider whether the court might have justified its decision by appealing to Parfit’s “No-Difference View\,” which asserts that it makes no moral difference whether a bad effect is worse for anyone. I will consider as well whether there is a requirement to cause a better-off individual to exist rather than a different\, less well-off individual\, or whether it might be permissible to cause the less well-off individual to exist. Also\, do an agent’s intentions matter to whether the agent is liable to pay damages in a case of wrongful life? Finally\, is a claim of wrongful life better grounded if the explanation of why the individual ought not to have been caused to exist concerns suffering in the individual’s life rather than a comparative lack of benefits?
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-jeff-mcmahan-oxford-university/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
ORGANIZER;CN="Joel Joseph":MAILTO:jj73@st-andrews.ac.uk
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