5th Annual
CEPPA Graduate Conference

30-31 May, 2023

School V (UCO) & online

University of St Andrews

Book of Abstracts
About the conference

The Centre for Ethics, Philosophy and Public Affairs (CEPPA) is a premier research centre that focuses on ethics, social, and political philosophy as well as the ethical and philosophical dimensions of public affairs. The centre has, since its establishment in 1984, maintained a programme of research projects, seminars, fellowships, conferences, and publishing with resident and visiting fellows. This programme provides a forum for public discussion both within and outside the University, notably through the annual Sir Malcolm Knox Lecture.

The 5th Annual CEPPA Graduate Conference aims to bring students from outside St Andrews and Stirling to present high-quality research for criticism and discussion. Prior to a traditional Q&A session, all postgraduate speakers will receive comments from a member of CEPPA, thereby ensuring that they receive feedback from someone who is familiar with their research.

In accordance with the BPA/SWiP’s Good Practice Scheme and their Guidelines for Accessible Conferences, CEPPA strives to make the conference as inclusive as possible for all participants, not only with respect to the selection of speakers and commentators, but also with respect to participants’ conduct during the conference.

Funding & acknowledgements

This conference was made possible due to generous funding from the Aristotelian Society and CEPPA. Many thanks to our gracious director, Theron Pummer, for all his guidance during the planning of this conference. We’re grateful to members of CEPPA and others for serving as reviewers: I Xuan Chong, Nick Küspert, Colin McLean, Johannes Nickl, Theron Pummer, Jarred Snodgrass, Luca Stroppa, and Joe Wells. For help with logistics, we thank Lynn Hynd. Lastly, a thank you to the speakers, the commentators, and the audience!

The organisers,

Patrick J. Winther-Larsen & Katherine Crone

PhD students, University of St Andrews & Stirling (SASP)
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<td>Short Break</td>
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<td>16:30 - 17:45</td>
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<td>Nick Küspert, PhD student</td>
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<td>What Do Bedtime Stories Have to Do With It? Social Norms and Family Relationships</td>
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How to join

In-person participation

The main venue for the conference is School V (United College/UCO), an auditorium located in one of the buildings in St Salvator’s Quad (colloquially known as Sallies Quad), between North Street and The Scores. The quad can be accessed from multiple angles: for instance, from Butts Wynd (east of the Main Library), or from North Street via St Salvator’s Chapel.

Online participation via Microsoft Teams

To join the conference online, please register by emailing ceppaconference@st-andrews.ac.uk. You'll receive a link sometime before the start of the conference. If you’re joining us from abroad, please note that all times listed in the programme are given in GMT.
**Keynote: Fractal Solidarity**  
Dr. Barry Maguire  
*University of Edinburgh*

Some moral theories consider the question of how we should live together as the foundational question of morality. This approach sees morality as more than a set of requirements or prohibitions concerning the distribution of benefits and burdens. Rather, morality constitutes a set of standards bearing on how we should recognize one another and ourselves, individually and collectively. Most fundamentally, a *morality of recognition* consists in an aspiration to a kind of social harmony, to a valuable kind of unity between separate individuals.

We can contrast moralities of recognition with consequentialist approaches on which morality is about promoting prior goods rather than constituting ways of living together; with libertarian approaches centering on individual rights rather than collective structures; and with virtue theoretic approaches based on non-social views about individual perfection.

The most prominent moralities of recognition – from Kant, Rawls, and Scanlon – enjoin us to live together in ways that realise mutual respect. I wish to develop a morality of recognition based on the more substantive notion of mutual care. This ideal is inspired by work in the early Marx on alienation, by the Ethics of Care tradition in feminist theory, and the notion of human solidarity in Catholicism and recent social ontology. The moral theory I wish to develop is comprehensive in applying to individual choices, to massive political and economic structures, and to everything in between. On this approach, the single comprehensive moral injunction is this: Live in Solidarity!

In this talk, I will lay out some of the distinctive features of this approach, and discuss some implications for thinking about impartiality, reciprocity, egalitarianism, and non-ideal theory.
Suzie intentionally pushes Tom off the cliff path, and Tom falls on to the rocks below. Rachel accidentally slips on the cliff path and falls on to the rocks below. Jack could have, without any discomfort, prevented Rachel’s fall, but he intentionally chooses not to.

Intuitively, there seems to be a difference in both Suzie and Jack’s behaviour and in their moral responsibility for this behaviour. Suzie does something (she intentionally pushes Tom) whereas Jack allows something (he intentionally allows Rachel to fall). At the same time, there appears to be a difference in moral responsibility between Suzie and Jack – both are morally responsible for the harm, but Suzie seems more responsible than Jack.

One tempting way to explain the difference in moral responsibility between Suzie and Jack is to make use of a difference in causation. Suzie’s doing causes Tom to fall. Jack’s allowing does not cause Rachel to fall (the slippery path does that). Arguably, we are only responsible for what we cause, and there seems to be a clear difference in causation (and hence responsibility) between Suzie’s doing and Jack’s allowing.

But this argument soon runs into difficulties. We commonly claim that allowings do cause. We say that the failure of the gardener to water the plants caused them to die. We say that the failure of the doctor to treat the patient caused the patient to suffer. And many would argue that Jack’s failure to stop Rachel falling was at least part of the cause of her injuries. If it is the case that both doings and allowings cause, then it seems that the difference in moral responsibility cannot depend on a difference in causation. Hence, most accounts in the literature which attempt to explain a moral difference between doing and allowing do not incorporate ideas of causation (see for example, Woollard, F and Howard-Snyder, F. 2021)

In this paper, I argue that we are too quick to reject the role of causation in the moral distinction between doing and allowing harm. I claim that whilst doings do cause, allowings don’t. When we say that allowings cause, we are mistaken. Allowings are part of the causal explanation of an outcome, but they do not cause. And this difference (between causation and causal explanation) explains the moral difference between doing and allowing harm. Suzie caused Tom’s fall. Jack was only part of the causal explanation of Rachel’s fall.

Here’s how my argument will progress. I accept the traditional account of moral responsibility for doings – that a necessary condition of moral responsibility for doing harm is that the harm has been caused by the doer (no causation, no moral responsibility). Next, I argue that allowings, unlike...
doings, do not cause anything – so causation cannot be a necessary condition for the moral responsibility attributed to allowing harms. The claim that allowings do not cause anything is controversial and goes against common sense; we often think of allowings as having the ability to cause harm, as in the examples above.

I argue that there are three reasons why allowings do not cause. Firstly, I claim that the causal relata in causation are events; allowings are not events, therefore they cannot cause. Then, using Hall’s division of causation (Hall 2004) into ‘production’ causation and ‘dependence’ causation, I show that both sorts of causation are problematic for allowings of harm. Allowings cannot produce anything as they are not involved in transfer of energy or momentum. Furthermore, there are major difficulties in understanding causation due to allowings as a dependence relation. The most pressing of these difficulties is the problem of the profligacy of allowings. If allowings cause by counterfactual dependence, then there does not seem to be any principled way to exclude allowings that we do not want to call causal - but which do seem to have the right counterfactual relationship to a particular harm (we want to be able to say that the failure of the gardener to water the plants caused their death, but not that the failure of Pope Francis to water the plants caused their death – even though the gardener and the Pope have the same counterfactual relationship to the death of the plants). I discuss several ways that have been suggested to resolve this problem and argue that none of them are effective.

If allowings do not cause, how do we explain the common-sense view that allowings do appear to be causal? I argue, following Helen Beebee (2004), that common sense is simply mistaken. I introduce the idea of causal explanation and contrast this with causation. In short, when we say that the failure to water the plants caused the plants to die, we are mistaken; we actually mean that the failure to water was part of the causal explanation of the death of the plants. It may seem counter-intuitive to claim that causal explanations can explain without causing. I argue that causal explanation can explain in at least three ways – by excluding alternative hypotheses, by incorporating wide disjunction, and via allowings.

Finally, I introduce the idea of the salience of a causal explanation. Some causal explanations are salient (the gardener); others are non-salient (the Pope). I argue that a salient causal explanation is necessary for moral responsibility.

This allows us to differentiate between moral responsibility for doings and allowings of harm. The traditional story about moral responsibility for doing harm is correct; causal responsibility is necessary for moral responsibility. But for allowing harm this is not the case. Moral responsibility for allowing harm occurs because allowings feature in a salient causal explanation of the harmful outcome (but do not actually cause). The difference between causation (for doings) and causal
explanation (for allowings) thus makes it possible to create some conceptual space between doing and allowing harm. This in turn may lead to an explanation of differences in moral responsibility between doing and allowing harm.

References


People are typically time biased with respect to their well-being. For instance, we often display future bias, being more concerned with our future well-being than with our past well-being. In addition to future bias, many people also display near-future bias, being more concerned with their near-future well-being than with their distant-future well-being.

Our preferences are less clear when we consider what we want for other people. Our tendencies to display time bias typically vanish when it comes to the well-being of others. Caspar Hare\(^1\) argues that the temporal impartiality induced in us is the result of our failing to engage imaginatively with their present condition.

In this paper, I argue that just as we care more about our present and near future interests than our distant-future interests, if we engage imaginatively with others’ present condition, we will display the same near-future bias when it comes to their well-being. In other words, we would care more about their present and near future interests than their distant-future interests.

So, say that we display this kind of near-future bias, both regarding our own interests and that of others. It follows that, if my level of concern for the interests of others is above a particular threshold, there will be a point at which I will care more about other people’s present condition than about my distant-future condition. The following graph illustrates all this:

This graph shows that, even if I grant greater weight to my own interests than to the interests of strangers, so long as my concern for the stranger is above a certain threshold, there will be a future point in time, $T_n$, at which my concern for my wellbeing after this point will be equal to or less than my concern for the stranger’s current well-being. At $T_n$, I will be indifferent between giving an extra unit of well-being to myself and giving the same unit to the distant stranger. Beyond $T_n$, my concern for my well-being will, in fact, be less than my concern for the current well-being of the stranger. Since I morally ought to have a decent amount of concern for others, it seems to follow that, given my near-future bias, I morally ought to sacrifice my well-being beyond $T_n$ for the sake of the current well-being of distant strangers.

I then draw out a practical implication of this observation. The claim that we ought to sacrifice our distant-future well-being to relieve the current suffering of others is particularly relevant for the ethics of charitable giving. This is because the decision to give to charity usually leads not to a reduction in the agent’s immediate well-being but rather to a reduction in the agent’s distant-future well-being. For many, charitable giving does not entail that we sacrifice our current well-being for the sake of a distant stranger's current well-being. The decision to donate, however, will most likely affect her distant-future well-being in some way. This is because a lifestyle of giving added up over the years will mean that the agent’s distant-future well-being is compromised to a certain extent. For instance, the monthly donations added up over my lifetime may mean that I put less into my savings account, preventing me from enjoying a cushy retirement in my old age.

Whether we should give to charity, then, seems related to how much weight we should give to our future selves over the present suffering of others. Given that we discount the value of our distant-future well-being, if we care as much about the well-being of others as we should, there will be a point at which we will care more about the present well-being of others than about our distant-future well-being. So, if we are near-future biased, we morally ought to sacrifice our distant-future well-being in order to relieve the current suffering of others. This is the case even if we do not have strong obligations to alleviate poverty, and even if we are permitted to grant much more weight to our own interests than to the interests of others.

This calls into question the morality of saving up to secure our future when there are currently millions of people suffering around the world. Given that we discount our future well-being the way we do, if we have the level of concern for the well-being of distant strangers that we should, we morally ought to be more concerned about alleviating their present suffering than securing some extra unit of well-being for our distant-future self. If this is right, it follows that we morally ought to be directing our extra financial resources towards alleviating the present suffering of others rather than saving up for a cushy retirement or investing in our distant future.
Finally, I look at three potential objections to my argument: First, I address the objection that we are not morally obligated to be so concerned with the welfare of distant strangers as to require us to be more concerned for their well-being than our distant-future well-being or the well-being of our loved ones. Second, I address the objection that moral agents rationally ought to be temporally neutral rather than display time bias. Third, I address worries relating to economic facts about the world which may seem to undermine my argument.
Virtuous Moral Deliberation: 
Moral Knowledge through Oppression
Pyro Suarez
University Bristol & Southampton

I deal with two major philosophical inquiries within metaethics: a metaphysical one, and an epistemological one. First, I explore the thesis about the existence of fundamental features of the world constituting an irreducible mind-independent moral realm—i.e., Moral Non-naturalism. And, second, the question about our epistemic access to these entities. The systematic failure of (natural) reductionist accounts for moral facts and properties has dragged attention to non-naturalistic approaches. This sort of account has been labeled ‘Robust Moral Realism’ (Enoch 2011). However, I take it that lived experience is typically essential for the generation of moral knowledge which could initially suggest that our theories link our moral learning to our experiences in the natural world. Feminist standpoint epistemology highlights the idea that women, for instance, are in an epistemically better position for grasping some truths about our social and moral world by virtue of belonging to a socially oppressed group (Srinivasan 2017, Harding 1991). Robust Moral Realism (essentially, Moral Non-naturalism) has then the challenge of explaining this way of acquiring moral knowledge without appealing to a natural reduction. My goal is (1) to show how can Robust Moral Realism address this challenge, and (2) to show how Robust Moral Realism is in a position to help us build a characterization of the epistemic betterness oppressed people have. Although the opposite might strike as true, I argue that feminist standpoint epistemology opens an explanatory door for the Robust Moral Realist [RMR]. [RMR] could build a story that appeals to the following features. First, the set of epistemic virtues that the members of socially oppressed groups have by virtue of their oppressive conditions (Medina 2013, 2018). And, second, the explanation could appeal to the hybrid nature of thick terms and how these form part of the moral deliberation of the oppressed.

Pattern recognition is the human skill of abstracting resembling features from a set of events. Members of oppressed groups get *hit in the face* by their oppressive counterparts continuously (MacKinnon 1989: 123). Intersectional members of oppressed groups—e.g., black disabled women—get hit in the face by more than one source of oppression. Communication between members of the group paves the way for coining a concept and a word that refers to whatever resemblance there is in their experiences. Moreover, as suggested by Srinivasan (2017), a less distorted version of reality is grasped by members of this community (in comparison to members of oppressed groups). Finally, members of oppressed groups, by virtue of their conditions, have
the burden of proof of everything they say given the epistemic injustices that are typical of oppressive scenarios. As argued by Medina (2013), given the continuous revision of their statements because of internal and external questions, among other things, a set of epistemic virtues are deployed on them—like epistemic humility. That means that the patterns they recognize and use in their moral deliberation will face constant reformulations And this habit puts agents closer to the truth. As Medina puts it: “Having a humble and self-questioning attitude toward one’s cognitive repertoire can lead to many epistemic achievements and advantages”. Arguably, these epistemic advantages are not exclusive to descriptive explanations but are even clearer in moral deliberations. After all, moral deliberations are also sensitive to finer-grained discriminations and cognitive improvement. The members of oppressed groups are, then, in an epistemically better position both to characterize their oppressive condition and to morally deliberate about it—against it.

According to Enoch (2011), what makes us justified in believing that some entities exist is not only their indispensability in scientific explanations. What makes us justified in believing in their existence is their indispensability within an indispensable project. Scientific explanations are indispensable projects, but moral deliberations are too. Given that irreducible normative truths are indispensable for our project of moral deliberation, we are justified in believing that there are irreducible moral truths.

The key step in order to trace a story that helps us accommodate how members of oppressed groups develop some sort of epistemic advantage is the following. The first step is that members of oppressed groups are in a position to infer irreducible normative facts by virtue of their moral deliberation through thick, or hybrid, concepts: which is the nature of the oppression itself. Oppression is constituted by a set of prolonged coactive circumstances where members of a top—oppressive—group have some degree of control over members of a bottom—oppressed—group. Most of the features that constitute such oppression are fairly characterizable in nonmoral (perhaps even natural) features, but not all. Members of the oppressive group might even be in a position to grasp these partial features. In that respect, it could even be argued that, if the oppression is understood in nonmoral terms, the members of both oppressive and oppressed groups have no epistemic differences.

The second step relies on the differentiation between what oppressed people are presupposing in their moral deliberation (moral facts) and what their oppressive counterparts accept from that deliberation. Oppressed people are in a position to observe this difference. It seems acceptable that from the hybrid nature of oppression with both a normative and a (natural, perhaps) descriptive component (arguably, the sum of prolonged coaction and badness), non-oppressed people are in a
position to accept the existence of the latter once it’s presented to them. Such a phenomenon would explain the moral passivity we have under conditions of privilege. So, the ontological division of normative/descriptive that follows from [RMR] and, that hybrid concepts track down, might carve precisely where the epistemic betterness of oppressed people occurs.

In a nutshell: Can [RMR] help in the characterization of the epistemic betterness that oppressed people have? Yes, oppression can generate a set of epistemic virtues that participate in the quality of moral deliberation and acquaintance with the non-natural normative dimension of oppression

References


Keynote: Intimacy and Abuse
Dr. Lucy McDonald
University of Cambridge

Content warning: references to sexual violence

Though there is considerable work on neighbouring phenomena like love and friendship, intimacy itself, especially intimate interaction, has been relatively neglected in analytic philosophy. This is lamentable, given intimacy’s moral, political, and legal significance. In this talk, I take on two tasks. First, I offer an account of intimate interaction, arguing that in an intimate interaction we believe we are seeing another person’s ‘backstage’ self, and/or that they are seeing ours. Second, I suggest that a better understanding of intimacy will, perhaps surprisingly, help us better understand certain forms of wrongdoing, most notably sexual violence. Sexual violence is wrong for several familiar reasons: it is a violation of the victim’s autonomy, it causes considerable physical and emotional harm, and it often serves to reinforce oppressive social structures. Yet it is also, I will argue, a distinctively intimate kind of wrongdoing, which strikes at the victim’s very sense of self.
Higher-Order Judgment Aggregation: An Impossibility Result
Rutger van Oeveren
UT Austin

In judgment aggregation, we abstract a collective judgment from a group of individual judgments. Suppose there are three judges, who need to decide on whether there has been a breach of contract. The court ought to find against the defendant if and only if two conditions have been fulfilled: first, a valid contract must have been in place ($p$), and second, the defendant’s behavior constituted a breach of that type of contract ($q$). And suppose that Table 1 represents the judgments of the court:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>$p$</th>
<th>$q$</th>
<th>$p \land q$</th>
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<tr>
<td>$S_1$</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
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<td>$S_2$</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$S_3$</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group</td>
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Table 1

How to reach a group judgment on these propositions, and in particular, on $p \land q$? Should we first take a vote on the premises, and then see what follows? If so, we’ll get that the court judges there was a breach of contract. Or should we allow the judges to make up their own minds about whether there has been a breach of contract first, and then see what the court says? If so, the court will judge there to have been no breach of contract. Following List and Pettit (2002), call the former the premise-driven approach and the latter the conclusion-driven approach.

This problem is perfectly general: as List and Pettit show, any aggregation procedure runs into this issue (that is, any voting rule with any arbitrary cut-off point, be it majority voting, supermajority voting, etc.). More precisely, no complete, consistent, and deductively closed aggregation procedure can fulfil a set of requirements, requirements that would seem to be rather minimal: Universal Domain (which states we allow any individual set of judgments as input, as long as it is complete, consistent, and deductively closed), Anonymity (intuitively: for any particular proposition, no one’s vote counts more than anyone else’s vote), and Systematicity (the group judgment on any proposition is reached in the very same way as the group judgment on any other proposition).
This is a rather worrying result. In response, much of the subsequent debate has focused on various ways to relax these requirements. Here I focus on what may seem to be the most natural pair of responses: argue for the premise-driven or the conclusion-driven approach. In this paper, I show that these strategies are lacking in a very common and significant context, the context of higher-order judgment aggregation.

Start with the following thought: just as individuals exist in a larger context, that is, in groups of individuals, so groups often exist in a larger context, that is, in groups of groups. Think, for example, about several layers of government within an organization, a state, or a country. Department chairs vote in university-wide decisions based on department-internal votes; parties vote based on votes in a party congress; and countries vote in international decision-making bodies based on what their parliaments vote. Call this phenomenon higher-order aggregation: a stacked process of aggregating individual judgments, such that we first aggregate individual judgments into subgroup judgments, and subsequently aggregate sub-group judgments into group judgments. (For now, I’ll focus in particular on second-order judgment aggregation.) Second-order judgment aggregation (as I define it) can take one of two forms: premise-first second-order aggregation or conclusion-first second-order aggregation.

Premise-first second-order aggregation is a two-step process, first generating sets of subgroup-judgments using the premise-centered aggregation procedure and then generating a set of group-judgments from sets of subgroup-judgments either using the premise-centered or the conclusion-centered aggregation procedure.

Conclusion-first second-order aggregation is a two-step process, first generating sets of subgroup-judgments using the conclusion-centered aggregation procedure and then generating a set of group-judgments from sets of subgroup-judgments either using the premise-centered or the conclusion-centered aggregation procedure.

Higher-order aggregation stands in contrast to direct aggregation, which arrives at a set of group judgments by directly aggregating the judgments of all individuals in a given situation (be it through a premise-driven or a conclusion-driven approach).

In this paper, I prove the following theorem:

*There is no aggregation method s.t. second-order aggregation on a set of individual judgments guarantees consistency with direct aggregation on that set of individual judgments.*

For purposes of illustration, consider the following case. Say that a (sub)group assents to some \( \varphi \in \{p, q, p \land q\} \) iff the fraction of elements in that subgroup assenting to \( \varphi \geq \tau \). Take
five subgroups of five people, with the threshold for assent \( \tau = .8 \). The judgments of the individuals in the first four groups can be represented as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group ( n )</th>
<th>( p )</th>
<th>( q )</th>
<th>( p \land q )</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>( S_{n1} )</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>( S_{n2} )</td>
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<td>( S_{n3} )</td>
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<td>( S_{n4} )</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>( S_{n5} )</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2

(with \( \{ n \in N \mid 1 \leq n \leq 4 \} \)). The judgments of the individuals in the fifth group can be represented as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group ( 5 )</th>
<th>( p )</th>
<th>( q )</th>
<th>( p \land q )</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( S_{21} )</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>( S_{24} )</td>
<td>No</td>
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<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>( S_{25} )</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
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Table 3

First, suppose we used direct aggregation. In that case, since only 19 individuals assent to \( p \), and (by deductive closure) only 19 individuals assent to \( p \land q \), we get that the total group dissents to \( p \land q \) (since \( \frac{19}{25} \leq .8 \)).

But now suppose we used one of either of the second-order aggregation approaches to arrive at a set of judgments of the ‘big group’. Since 4 out of 5 groups assent to all propositions \( p, q, \) and \( p \land q \), it follows that the ‘big group’ assents to all three propositions.

Notice that all we need is just one subgroup and one individual in that subgroup such that the fraction of individuals in that last subgroup assenting to \( p \land q \) falls short of \( \tau \). This shows that the problem is not one of gerrymandering.
In the second part of the paper, I discuss some of the philosophical questions this result raises.

First, one might wonder why we should prefer that the outcome of stacked aggregation be consistent with direct aggregation in the first place. I point to two reasons: first, reasons of adequate representation of individual votes, and second, reasons of what we may call institutional coherence.

Second, one might suggest that we ought not to engage in higher-order aggregation in the first place. I consider two ways of construing the relevant ought, as a pragmatic ought and as a rational ought, and give some reasons for skepticism about either version of the suggestion.

References


Rebuke, Blame, and Internalism
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When a small child intentionally breaks a china vase, we typically do not think that the child is morally responsible for the breakage. The child simply could not have known that breaking the vase was something she ought not to do, and so, blaming the child for breaking the vase seems inappropriate. Of course, some will be loath to apply this same pattern of reasoning to violent psychopaths who do not seem to believe that hurting others is something they ought not do. In fact, some will be tempted to claim that it is the psychopath’s insensitivity to this fact (that they ought not to hurt others) that makes them worthy of blame. I think this claim is misguided. Insofar as our description of the psychopath is correct, if he really is incapable of forming the belief that hurting others is wrong, then he is not blameworthy for his actions: he is more akin to a lion or a tiger than a moral agent.

According to my proposed view of blameworthiness, the culpability of an agent for an action depends on standards that are internal to him: in particular, what he can and can’t believe about his conduct. My goal in this paper is to argue for this internalist view of blame. I do this by pursuing a strategy borrowed from communicative theories of blame (e.g. McKenna, 2011; 2016, McGeer, 2012, Macnamara, 2013, Fricker, 2014). The strategy is to understand what makes blame appropriate (that is what makes someone blameworthy) in terms of the conditions in which the communication of blame is appropriate, which depend, in turn, on the conditions in which an expression of an attitude of blame could be communicatively successful.

My argument goes something like this. It is only appropriate to blame someone if it would be appropriate to express one’s blame of him, to him: that is, to engage in the speech act I’ll call rebuke. Moreover, it is only appropriate to blame someone after he’s done the wrongdoing for which he is blamed, if it was appropriate to blame him while he was said wrongdoing. It follows from these two claims that it is only appropriate to blame someone for something, if, at the time of the wrongdoing, it would have been appropriate to rebuke him.

Now, it is only appropriate to rebuke someone if the rebuke could be communicatively successful. That is to say, an instance of rebuke is appropriate only if it could serve its illocutionary point. The illocutionary point of rebuke, I believe, is to evoke feelings of self-blame in the person who is blamed (the blamee), and this is only possible if the blamee can blame himself. It follows, then, that it is only appropriate to blame someone who was, at the time of his wrongdoing, capable of blaming himself for the wrongdoing.
The capacity to blame oneself for the wrongdoing one is perpetrating, however, depends on the capacity to form the belief that what one is doing is wrong, and whether or not one has this capacity depends on one’s epistemic reasons (namely, one’s reasons to believe that one ought not to do the thing one is doing). Hence, one is blameworthy for some action only if, at the time of the action, one had sufficient reason to believe it was an action one ought not to perform. Thus, the standards according to which an agent is blamed must, in some sense, be the agent’s perpetrating.

References


What Do Bedtime Stories Have to Do With It?
Social Norms and Family Relationships
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Loving and intimate parent-child relationships matter. They matter in particular because of the irreplaceable contribution they make to children’s development and flourishing. In light of this, there is an emerging consensus that these relationships, as well as the goods they produce, should fall under the scope of distributive justice (Brighouse and Swift, 2014; Macleod, 2018). In this paper, I aim to move this discussion forward. I start from the empirical observation that love and intimacy are unequally distributed amongst families and, crucially, that this distribution positively correlates with parents’ income (Cattan et al., 2022). I offer an account of this unjust distributive pattern and set the stage for a remedy. I start by discarding the most obvious explanations: this distributive pattern can neither be fully explained by considerations of time poverty, nor by the existence of some direct, unmediated relation between money and these relationship goods (one cannot simply “buy” love or intimacy). Instead, I argue, the unequal distribution of love and intimacy is also the upshot of existing social norms which – unjustifiably – single out certain activities that are less accessible to parents on lower incomes as paradigmatically loving and intimate. I distinguish love-related norms (norms concerning what parents ought to do for their children) from intimacy-related norms (norms concerning what parents ought to do with their children). I argue that love-related norms play an epistemic role, governing the ability of children to know that their parents love them. Inasmuch as those actions they single out as love-evidencing are less accessible to poorer parents than they are to richer ones, love-related norms render it relatively more difficult for poorer parents to make it known to their children that they love them.

By contrast, intimacy-related norms play a metaphysical role, bearing upon the existence of intimacy between parents and their children. Because intimacy-related norms single out as paradigmatically intimate certain actions which are less accessible to poorer parents than they are to richer ones, they endow poorer parents with relatively fewer opportunities for creating intimate relationships with their children. As such, existing love- and intimacy-related norms hamper, respectively, the ability of poorer children to know that their parents love them and the ability of poorer families to create intimate relationships. After having presented this diagnosis, I turn to suggesting a remedy. Before doing so, however, I show that the most obvious remedy, namely income redistribution, is inadequate for two reasons. Firstly, income redistribution would address the issue by giving poorer parents the means to imitate the behaviour of richer parents and, since
we have reasons for doubting the benignity of existing social norms, it seems an at least somewhat morally dubious strategy. Secondly, because we can also expect existing love- and intimacy-related norms to negatively affect the ability of families from other marginalised groups to benefit from loving and intimate relationships (I consider, in particular, their possible effects on religious minorities), income redistribution might be an incomplete strategy. Without, of course, denying the need for income redistribution on other grounds, I thus argue that the solution to the unfair distributive pattern with which this paper is concerned must be found elsewhere. I suggest that, rather than giving poorer parents the means to imitate the behaviour of richer parents, we should work together to create more accessible norms governing love and intimacy.

References