BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//CEPPA - ECPv6.16.2//NONSGML v1.0//EN
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
X-WR-CALNAME:CEPPA
X-ORIGINAL-URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
X-WR-CALDESC:Events for CEPPA
REFRESH-INTERVAL;VALUE=DURATION:PT1H
X-Robots-Tag:noindex
X-PUBLISHED-TTL:PT1H
BEGIN:VTIMEZONE
TZID:Europe/London
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
TZOFFSETFROM:+0000
TZOFFSETTO:+0100
TZNAME:BST
DTSTART:20220327T010000
END:DAYLIGHT
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZOFFSETFROM:+0100
TZOFFSETTO:+0000
TZNAME:GMT
DTSTART:20221030T010000
END:STANDARD
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
TZOFFSETFROM:+0000
TZOFFSETTO:+0100
TZNAME:BST
DTSTART:20230326T010000
END:DAYLIGHT
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZOFFSETFROM:+0100
TZOFFSETTO:+0000
TZNAME:GMT
DTSTART:20231029T010000
END:STANDARD
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
TZOFFSETFROM:+0000
TZOFFSETTO:+0100
TZNAME:BST
DTSTART:20240331T010000
END:DAYLIGHT
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZOFFSETFROM:+0100
TZOFFSETTO:+0000
TZNAME:GMT
DTSTART:20241027T010000
END:STANDARD
END:VTIMEZONE
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20230406T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20230406T173000
DTSTAMP:20260615T231123
CREATED:20221207T205231Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230403T120413Z
UID:10000383-1680796800-1680802200@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (online only) – Catherine Elgin (Harvard)
DESCRIPTION:Location: Teams (online only) \nTitle: Epistemic Dynamics \nAbstract: Epistemic agents are finite and fallible.  Our range is limited and some of what we accept is\, no doubt\, flawed.  To achieve our epistemic and practical objectives\, we devise methods and practices that foster correction\, refinement\, and expansion of our current epistemic commitments. Traditional epistemology maintains that epistemic acceptability requires non-fortuitously justified true belief\, where non-fortuitousness insures that the justification and the truth maker align. If so\, reflective equilibrium is at best indicative of acceptability.  I argue otherwise.   Reflective equilibrium is constitutive of epistemic acceptability.  Because a network of cognitive commitments in reflective equilibrium is as reasonable as any available alternative in the epistemic circumstances\, it is worthy of acceptance.  That does not make it perfect or permanently acceptable.  Such a network is susceptible of and probably in need of improvement.  But it is the best we can currently do and provides a suitable platform for improvement.  I argue that such a network should be designed to foster\, not merely to allow for\, further gains.  It should support epistemic leveraging.  That requires that it enable critical reflection about its own ends and means\, enabling epistemic agents to recognize opportunities for and obstacles to improvement. \nCo-hosted with ECT.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-online-only-elgin/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
ORGANIZER;CN="Viviane Fairbank":MAILTO:vf45@st-andrews.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20230412T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20230412T140000
DTSTAMP:20260615T231123
CREATED:20221017T104741Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230412T072304Z
UID:10000376-1681304400-1681308000@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Special MPRG: Mattia Cecchinato
DESCRIPTION:Location: Edgecliffe G03 \nTitle: “The Mind that Matters: Degrees of Sentience and Moral Status”. \nAbstract: It is often argued that the capacity for conscious experience is necessary for a creature to morally matter for its own sake and thus have moral status. Entities that lack the capacity for consciousness\, such as chairs\, philosophical zombies\, or anencephalic infants\, seem to lack all subjectivity and welfare concerns—nothing can be good or bad for them. But is the morally relevant property the general fact of being (phenomenally) conscious as such\, or is it a particular kind of consciousness that matters? According to a long and widespread philosophical tradition\, Narrow Sentientism\, the ground of moral status is the capacity for affective consciousness (i.e. emotions\, pleasure\, and pain). David Chalmers (2022)\, however\, has recently challenged this view by arguing for Broad Sentientism\, according to which the capacity for phenomenal consciousness alone suffices for moral status\, even in cases where the capacity for affect is absent. \nIn this talk\, I examine both views in light of recent evolutionary and philosophical arguments concerning the possibility of degrees of consciousness (Tye 2021; Lee 2022). I propose that the most compelling understandings of Narrow and Broad Sentientism are scalar versions of each. But I also argue that if (i) we can distinguish between affective and phenomenal consciousness\, and if (ii) both are gradable\, then trade-offs reveal the inadequacy of Scalar-Broad Sentientism. A highly conscious creature with a low degree of affect would not score well in terms of moral status. The view of moral status that better tracks our intuitions across a range of cases\, I argue\, is a version of Scalar-Narrow Sentientism. It is a function of the degree of affect weighted by the size of the phenomenal repertoire possessed by the relevant conscious creature. Finally\, I investigate the practical implications of this novel view for our treatment of non-human animals\, our fellows humans\, and artificial sentience.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/special-mprg-mattia-cecchinato/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20230413T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20230413T173000
DTSTAMP:20260615T231123
CREATED:20221207T205510Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230406T051645Z
UID:10000384-1681401600-1681407000@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in person) – Daniel Muñoz (UNC Chapel Hill)
DESCRIPTION:Location: Edgecliffe G03 \nTitle: Values as Vectors \nAbstract: Often\, two things seem tied in value\, though slightly improving one would not break the tie. How can we model such ‘insensitivity to sweetening’? A leading answer is that overall values\, rather than being like precise numbers\, must be imprecise\, giving rise to a special nontransitive value relation\, which Chang calls parity. But parity is notoriously hard to pin down\, and imprecise values are neither necessary nor sufficient for modeling sweetening. I propose instead to model overall values as many-dimensional vectors. The result is a fresh and flexible framework for the stranger side of ethics—as well as an elegant definition of parity as a tie between things of nonfungible value.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-munoz/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20230419T080000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20230419T170000
DTSTAMP:20260615T231123
CREATED:20230419T181902Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230419T181902Z
UID:10000390-1681891200-1681923600@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:5th Annual CEPPA Graduate Conference (St Andrews) – 30-31 May\, 2023
DESCRIPTION:5th Annual CEPPA Graduate Conference  \n30-31 May\, 2023\, at the University of St Andrews  \n\nThe Centre for Ethics\, Philosophy\, and Public Affairs (CEPPA) is proud to host the 5th Annual CEPPA Graduate Conference at the University of St Andrews (UCO: School V). The event will be held in-person with the option for spectators to join online. Registration will open once the schedule has been finalised (hopefully\, by the end of April). A book of abstracts\, too\, will be made available on this page.  \n\nKeynote speakers:   \n\nDr Lucy McDonald (Research Fellow in Philosophy at St. John’s College\, University of Cambridge)\nDr Barry Maguire (Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at University of Edinburgh)\n\nThis page will be updated with a list of confirmed postgraduate speakers shortly. Please direct any inquiries to ceppaconference@st-andrews.ac.uk. \nBest wishes from the organisers\, \nPatrick J. Winther-Larsen and Katherine Crone\nPhD Students at the University of St Andrews & Stirling (SASP)
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/5th-annual-ceppa-graduate-conference-st-andrews-30-31-may-2023/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Conference
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/png:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/files/2016/04/CEPPA.png
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20230419T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20230419T140000
DTSTAMP:20260615T231123
CREATED:20230412T161357Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230412T161357Z
UID:10000389-1681909200-1681912800@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Special MPRG - Bart Streumer (Groningen)
DESCRIPTION:Location: Edgecliffe G03 \nTitle: QUASI-REALISM FOR REALISTS \nAbstract: Reductive realists think that normative properties are identical to descriptive properties. But they are often charged with being relativists: it is often argued that their view implies that when two people make conflicting normative judgements\, these judgements can both be true. I will argue that reductive realists can answer this charge by copying the quasi-realist moves that many expressivists make. \nIn §1 I will outline the two main versions of realism\, reductive realism and robust realism\, and I will explain why reductive realists are often charged with being relativists. In §2 I will outline the quasi-realist moves that many expressivists make. In §3 I will argue that if these moves work\, reductive realists can copy them in order to answer the charge that they are relativists. In §4 I will discuss the assumptions behind these moves. In §5 I will discuss robust realists’ doubts about these moves. In §6 I will show that if my arguments are sound\, expressivism is closer to relativism than is often assumed.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/special-mprg-bart-streumer-groningen/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20230420T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20230420T173000
DTSTAMP:20260615T231123
CREATED:20221207T205805Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230407T084853Z
UID:10000385-1682006400-1682011800@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in person) – Bart Streumer (University of Groningen)
DESCRIPTION:Location: Edgecliffe G03 \nTitle: “Superspreading the Word”.\n\nAbstract: Quasi-realists are expressivists who say much of what realists say. To avoid making their view indistinguishable from realism\, however\, they usually stop short of saying everything realists say. Many realists therefore think that something important is missing from quasi-realism. I will argue that quasi-realists can undermine this thought by defending a version of quasi-realism that I will call super-quasi-realism. This version seems indistinguishable from realism\, but I will argue that this is a mistaken impression that arises because we cannot believe super-quasi-realism.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-bart-streumer-university-of-groningen/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20230427T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20230427T173000
DTSTAMP:20260615T231124
CREATED:20221207T210146Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230420T200550Z
UID:10000386-1682611200-1682616600@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in person) – Jordan MacKenzie (Virginia Tech)
DESCRIPTION:Location: Edgecliffe G03 \nTitle: Humorlessness and Moral Recognition \nAbstract: We’re often quick to point fingers at people who fail to find humor in themselves. And our accusations have a moral tinge: we decry people for being sanctimonious buzzkills\, and command them to  ‘get over themselves’. But are these moralized reactions justified? And what\, if anything\, justifies them? In this paper I argue that humourlessness often is a moral failing. This is because humorlessness often involves a disrespectful failure or refusal to engage with other peoples’ perspectives. I’ll then explore what implication this account has for accusations of humorlessness in oppressive social contexts\, and I’ll argue that one of the harms of oppression is that it makes having a sense of humor towards oneself morally risky.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-jordan-mackenzie/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
ORGANIZER;CN="Ben Sachs":MAILTO:bas7@st-andrews.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR