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X-ORIGINAL-URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
X-WR-CALDESC:Events for CEPPA
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DTSTART:20220327T010000
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20231123T143000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20231123T153000
DTSTAMP:20260405T021927
CREATED:20231121T121337Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231121T121337Z
UID:10000421-1700749800-1700753400@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:This week we will discuss Guy Kahane‘s article ‘Our Cosmic Insignificance‘ \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03 and Teams \nContact: ceppadirector@st-andrews.ac.uk
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-6-2023-09-21-2023-10-05-5-2/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20231123T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20231123T173000
DTSTAMP:20260405T021927
CREATED:20230920T221438Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231121T121239Z
UID:10000433-1700755200-1700760600@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in person) – Oskari Sivula (Turku)
DESCRIPTION:Location: Edgecliffe G03 \nTitle: Is the future a utility monster? \nAbstract: I will revisit Nozick’s utility monster thought experiment and draw an analogy between imagined utility monsters and the long-term future. I argue that the far future can be seen as a real-life utility monster. This is the case if the three premises that form the basis of long-termism are true: 1) the future is vast\, 2) morally speaking\, the future matters\, and 3) current people can (in expectation) positively impact the far future. Following that\, I consider a couple of apparent disanalogies between the original utility monster and the far future utility monster. Lastly\, I discuss some possible reactions to the argument made.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-barry-maguire-edinburgh/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20231130T143000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20231130T153000
DTSTAMP:20260405T021927
CREATED:20231113T101934Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231113T101934Z
UID:10000422-1701354600-1701358200@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:Location: Edgecliffe G03 and Teams \nContact: ceppadirector@st-andrews.ac.uk
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-6-2023-09-21-2023-10-05-5/2023-11-30/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20231207T143000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20231207T153000
DTSTAMP:20260405T021927
CREATED:20231113T101934Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231113T101934Z
UID:10000423-1701959400-1701963000@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:Location: Edgecliffe G03 and Teams \nContact: ceppadirector@st-andrews.ac.uk
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-6-2023-09-21-2023-10-05-5/2023-12-07/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20231212T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20231214T130000
DTSTAMP:20260405T021927
CREATED:20221109T115136Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230801T134443Z
UID:10000377-1702371600-1702558800@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:The Future of Work and Income Conference
DESCRIPTION:The Future of Work and Income Research Network    (fwistandrews@gmail.com) \nCentre for Ethics\, Philosophy\, and Public Affairs \nDepartment of Philosophy\, University of St Andrews \nWorkshop to be held in person \nFree to attend \nConfirmed Speakers: \nAnca Gheaus\, Central Europea University \nAndrea Veltman\, James Madison University \nPhilippe Van Parijs\, University of Leuven
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/the-future-of-work-and-income-conference/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20231214T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20231214T173000
DTSTAMP:20260405T021927
CREATED:20230602T090519Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231128T193827Z
UID:10000400-1702569600-1702575000@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (online) - Matthew Liao (NYU)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Threshold Deontology: Some Lessons from Vagueness \nAbtract: Threshold Deontology is the view that the positive consequences of an act do not normally override moral constraints\, but when the positive balance of the consequences of an act is sufficiently great\, it may be morally permitted\, and possibly required to engage in an act that is otherwise morally prohibited. While many people find Threshold Deontology attractive\, there are a number of issues regarding its nature and its structure that are under explored.  For instance\, suppose that there is a threshold above which a moral constraint against killing an innocent person becomes overridden.  Where is this threshold?  How do we identify it?  In addition\, what happens after one crosses this threshold?  Does one become a full-on act-consequentialist?  Drawing on the literature on vagueness\, I shall argue that there is a sharp threshold for killing and that it is difficult for us to know where this threshold lies because in a certain range of cases\, our moral faculty is not sufficiently reliable to be able to weigh competing moral values.  I shall also explain why one does not become a consequentialist once one crosses the threshold for killing. \nLocation: Teams (online only)
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-online-matthew-liao-nyu/
LOCATION:Microsoft Teams
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
ORGANIZER;CN="Enrico Galvagni":MAILTO:eg240@st-andrews.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240118T143000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240118T153000
DTSTAMP:20260405T021927
CREATED:20240112T083703Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240112T083703Z
UID:10000459-1705588200-1705591800@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:This week we will be discussing Selim Berker\, ‘The Deontic\, the Evaluative\, and the Fitting”. ahead of their CEPPA talk right after this reading group. \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03 and Teams \nContact: ceppadirector@st-andrews.ac.uk
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-6-2023-09-21-2023-10-05-5-3-3/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240118T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240118T173000
DTSTAMP:20260405T021927
CREATED:20230602T090653Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240104T164052Z
UID:10000401-1705593600-1705599000@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (online) - Selim Berker (Harvard)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Is There Anti-Fittingness?” \nAbstract: The permissible and the forbidden are privative opposites: each is a lack of the other. The good and the bad are\, by contrast\, polar opposites: badness is anti-goodness\, not non-goodness. What about the fitting and the unfitting\, the appropriate and the inappropriate\, the apt and the inapt\, the warranted and the unwarranted? Is unfittingness non-fittingness or anti-fittingness\, inappropriateness non-appropriateness or anti-appropriateness? In this talk I will argue that each of these “aptic” categories—as I call them—stands in a privative rather than a polar relation to its opposite. More generally\, there is no coherent notion of anti-fittingness\, no inversely charged flipside to aptness\, to be found. In order to establish these claims\, a taxonomy of different types of oppositeness will be proposed\, and several tests for distinguishing distinct varieties of opposites will be developed. What will emerge is a better appreciation of the structural characteristics of fittingness and the other aptic categories\, as well as an argument for taking up the nature of oppositeness as a serious philosophical topic that is ripe for further exploration. \nLocation: Teams (online only)
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-online-selim-berker-harvard/
LOCATION:Microsoft Teams
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240125T143000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240125T153000
DTSTAMP:20260405T021927
CREATED:20240111T113045Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240111T113045Z
UID:10000460-1706193000-1706196600@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:This week we will be reading Sarah Fine’s paper ‘Migration‘ from The Oxford Handbook of Distributive Justice. \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03 and Teams \nContact: ceppadirector@st-andrews.ac.uk
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-6-2023-09-21-2023-10-05-5-3-2/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240125T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240125T173000
DTSTAMP:20260405T021927
CREATED:20230711T085210Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240108T171624Z
UID:10000407-1706198400-1706203800@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in person) - Thom Brooks (Durham)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Justice and the Problem of Alienation \nAbstract: I will focus on why alienation is a problem for many of our major theories of justice (discussing political liberalism\, capabilities approach and republicanism) and what might be done about it. \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-thom-brooks-durham/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240201T143000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240201T153000
DTSTAMP:20260405T021927
CREATED:20240129T181751Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240129T181757Z
UID:10000465-1706797800-1706801400@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:This week we will be discussing the first chapter from Jonathan Birch “The Edge of Sentience” called ‘A walk along the edge’. Jonathan will be there as well. \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03 and Teams \nContact: ceppadirector@st-andrews.ac.uk
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-8/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240201T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240201T173000
DTSTAMP:20260405T021927
CREATED:20240104T145621Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240109T141826Z
UID:10000439-1706803200-1706808600@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in person) - Jonathan Birch  (LSE)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Debating proportionality at the edge of sentience \nAbstract: Can octopuses feel pain and pleasure? What about crabs\, shrimps\, insects or spiders? How do we tell whether a person unresponsive after severe brain injury might be suffering? When does a fetus in the womb start to have conscious experiences? Could there even be rudimentary feelings in miniature models of the human brain\, grown from human stem cells? And what about AI? These are questions about the “edge of sentience”\, and they are subject to enormous\, disorienting uncertainty. The stakes are immense\, and neglecting the risks can have terrible costs. We need to err on the side of caution in these cases\, yet it’s often far from clear what ‘erring on the side of caution’ should mean in practice. When are we going too far? When are we not doing enough? My forthcoming book The Edge of Sentience: Risk and Precaution in Humans\, Other Animals\, and AI constructs a precautionary framework designed to help us reach ethically sound\, evidence-based decisions despite our uncertainty. This talk will introduce some of the main ideas\, zooming in on the role I think citizens’ assemblies can appropriately play in assessing proportionality. \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03 \n 
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-jonathan-birch-lse/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03\, The Scores\, St Salvator's Quad\, KY16 9AL
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240208T143000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240208T153000
DTSTAMP:20260405T021927
CREATED:20240205T115954Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240205T115954Z
UID:10000462-1707402600-1707406200@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:This week we will be discussing Byron Williston’s article Climate Change and Radical Hope \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03 and Teams \nContact: ceppadirector@st-andrews.ac.uk
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-6-2023-09-21-2023-10-05-5-3-4/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240208T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240208T173000
DTSTAMP:20260405T021927
CREATED:20240104T145953Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240205T120221Z
UID:10000440-1707408000-1707413400@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in person) - Mark Rowlands  (Miami)
DESCRIPTION:Title: World on Fire: Climate\, Extinction\, Pandemic \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03 \n 
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-mark-rowlands-miami/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240215T143000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240215T153000
DTSTAMP:20260405T021927
CREATED:20240212T114402Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240212T114403Z
UID:10000463-1708007400-1708011000@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:This week\, our visiting scholar B.V.E. Hyde (Leeds) will convene a special Work-in-Progress session on the topic of “Ethical Debates on Human Challenge Trials”. Hyde will present for around 5 minutes\, providing a short explainer on some of the ethical debates surrounding controlled human infection models\, which are a type of clinical trial in which patients are directly infected with a pathogen. The intention is mainly to discuss rather than listening to a lengthy presentation. There will be no reading: Hyde’s short explainer will cover all the required information. Location: Edgecliffe G03 and Teams \nContact: ceppadirector@st-andrews.ac.uk
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-6-2023-09-21-2023-10-05-5-3-5/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240215T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240215T173000
DTSTAMP:20260405T021927
CREATED:20240104T150205Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240212T114147Z
UID:10000441-1708012800-1708018200@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in person) - Andreas Mogensen (Oxford)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Welfare and Felt Duration \nAbtract: How should we understand the duration of a pleasant or unpleasant sensation\, insofar as its duration modulates how good or bad the experience is overall? Given that we seem able to distinguish between subjective and objective duration and that how well or badly someone’s life goes is naturally thought of as something to be assessed from her own perspective\, it seems intuitive that it is subjective duration that modulates how good or bad an experience is from the perspective of an individual’s welfare. However\, I argue that we know of no way to make sense of what subjective duration consists in on which this claim turns out to be plausible. Moreover\, some plausible theories of what subjective duration consists in strongly suggest that subjective duration is irrelevant in itself. \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03 \n 
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-andreas-mogensen-oxford/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240222T143000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240222T153000
DTSTAMP:20260405T021927
CREATED:20240219T104308Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240219T104309Z
UID:10000447-1708612200-1708615800@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:This week we will discuss Tyler Cowen’s ‘What Do We Learn From The Repugnant Conclusion?’. Luca notes that if people find Section 3 hard to read\, he is very happy to explain it at the MPRG. Additionally\, he mentions that ‘(1) section 5 is not essential (but it is extremely fun) and (2) it is absolutely unnecessary to read the appendix.’ That leaves just 17 pages of moral philosophy! \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03 and Teams \nContact: ceppadirector@st-andrews.ac.uk
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-6-2023-09-21-2023-10-05-5-3-6/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240222T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240222T173000
DTSTAMP:20260405T021927
CREATED:20240104T150314Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240219T104221Z
UID:10000442-1708617600-1708623000@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in person) - Luca Stroppa (St Andrews & Turin)
DESCRIPTION:This talk is part of our series on Climate Ethics \nTitle: The Ranked Range View \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03 \nAbstract: The bad effects of climate change will affect\, and be affected by\, the number of people who will exist\, and their quality of life. Thus\, when evaluating our climate policies and actions\, we need to know which population is best to choose when the number of people and their quality of life varies. However\, several powerful arguments show that no theory ranking populations can respect some set of very compelling adequacy conditions (the most famous being to avoid the so-called “Repugnant Conclusion”. In this talk\, I introduce the Structured Range View\, a theory for ranking populations that respects all adequacy conditions\, except one\, called “Non-Anti-Egalitarianism”. I however argue that the way the Structured Range View violates “Non-Anti-Egalitarianism” in unproblematic. We should accept the Structured Range View when choosing between populations. (If I have time) I conclude by sketching the impact of the Structured Range View on climate policies.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-luca-stroppa-st-andrews-turin/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240307T143000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240307T153000
DTSTAMP:20260405T021927
CREATED:20240304T135334Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240304T135548Z
UID:10000449-1709821800-1709825400@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:this week will have a Work in Progress session discussing Bradley Hillier-Smith’s draft paper\, ‘The Egalitarian Case for Open Borders: Moral Arbitrariness’. \nAbstract: This paper argues that recent debates on egalitarian objections to immigration restrictions overlook a crucial\, powerful normative principle that underpins objections to inequalities: any inequalities between morally equal persons – whether in goods\, resources\, welfare but also in powers\, statuses\, rights\, and freedoms – that arise from morally arbitrary factors are undeserved and thereby pro tanto unjust. This Principle of Moral Arbitrariness is fundamental to both luck and relational egalitarianism yet is often missing from debates that apply such theories to migration ethics. The result of this omission is that certain arguments that purportedly reject Luck Egalitarian Cases for Open Borders in fact fail since they fail to recognise the normative force of the Principle of Moral Arbitrariness; yet\, simultaneously\, Relational Egalitarian Cases for Open Borders are not fully successful since they fail to recognise that the Principle of Moral Arbitrariness is required to distinguish immigration restrictions as unjust where other (relational) inequalities may not be unjust. Hence\, the overall argument of this paper is that the recognition of the Principle of Moral Arbitrariness is essential for the success of both the luck and relational egalitarian cases for open borders\, and thus a proper recognition of (the full normative force and implications of) this principle entails the egalitarian case for open borders indeed succeeds. \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03 and Teams \nContact: ceppadirector@st-andrews.ac.uk
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-6-2023-09-21-2023-10-05-5-3-7/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240307T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240307T173000
DTSTAMP:20260405T021927
CREATED:20230602T090811Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240304T135228Z
UID:10000402-1709827200-1709832600@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (online) - Renee Jorgensen (Michigan)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Encroachment and epistemic negligence \nAbstract: In this talk\, I argue that the moral duty of non-negligence is a fruitful way to understand and motivate the claim that moral reasons can ‘encroach’ on epistemic norms. More forcefully: we should readily affirm that on the epistemic norms governing agents like us—that is\, who have limited cognitive resources\, conduct inquiries with widely varying practical and moral stakes\, and who rely on belief to simplify and structure their practical deliberation—the strength of evidential warrant necessary to justify belief is responsive to the gravity of the costs of being mistaken. I suggest that a ‘purism’ about doxastic justification that denies this faces a dilemma: either a belief’s being justified suffices to license using it to structure inference and inquiry\, or it isn’t. If it is\, then being insensitive to non-truth-conducive factors leaves the standard for justified belief unresponsive to relevant risks. If it isn’t\, then it is unclear what theoretical value the notion justified belief has\, and we still need something to fill the role of licensing the relevant epistemic moves (which will be responsive to the risks.) \nLocation: Teams (online only)\, we will bee streaming it from Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-online-renee-jorgensen-michigan/
LOCATION:Microsoft Teams
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
ORGANIZER;CN="Jessica Brown":MAILTO:jab30@st-andrews.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240312T173000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240312T190000
DTSTAMP:20260405T021927
CREATED:20231013T121011Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240311T190825Z
UID:10000436-1710264600-1710270000@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:1st Sarah Broadie Memorial Lecture - Ursula Coope
DESCRIPTION:Title: Contingency and the Present \nLocation: School V
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/1st-sarah-broadie-memorial-lecture-ursula-coope/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240314T143000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240314T153000
DTSTAMP:20260405T021927
CREATED:20240311T191026Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240311T191027Z
UID:10000450-1710426600-1710430200@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:Location: Edgecliffe G03 and Teams \nContact: ceppadirector@st-andrews.ac.uk \nWe will meet in a hybrid format (online and in Edgecliffe G03) to discuss Eric Marcus’s article ‘Wanting and willing’ \nEric Marcus\, ‘Wanting and Willing’\, abstract: \nHow homogenous are the sources of human motivation? Textbook Humeans hold that every human action is motivated by desire\, thus any heterogeneity derives from differing objects of desire. Textbook Kantians hold that although some human actions are motivated by desire\, others are motivated by reason. One question in this vicinity concerns whether there are states such that to be in one is at once take the world to be a certain way and to be motivated to act: the state question. My question here is different: whether passion and reason constitute distinct sources of human motivation: the source question. In this essay\, I defend an affirmative answer to the source question while remaining neutral on the state question. I distinguish between what I call orectic desires\, which are associated with the appetites\, and anorectic desires\, which are associated with judgments of the good. I argue that the two sorts of desires constitute distinct sources of motivation initially on the basis of their differing epistemological profiles. Specifically\, self-attributions of anorectic desires are governed by the transparency condition; self-attributions of orectic desires are not. It emerges from this discussion that the motivation for performing an action arises in very different ways from each sort of desire.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-6-2023-09-21-2023-10-05-5-3-8/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240314T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240314T173000
DTSTAMP:20260405T021927
CREATED:20230602T090934Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240311T191045Z
UID:10000403-1710432000-1710437400@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (online) - Sergio Tenenbaum (Toronto)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Practical Reason and the Satisfaction of Desire \nLocation: Teams (online only) \nAbstract: I have a desire for dulce de leche ice-cream (or that I myself eat ice-cream) but there’s no ice-cream nearby. A heavenly angel takes pity on me and decides she will help me out. She conjures the ice-cream and quickly shoves it through my mouth at a temperature that burns my taste buds just as I had finished eating a whole watermelon. She then tells me: “Smile away my dear mortal; your desire has been satisfied!”. This vignette illustrates a well-known issue in understanding the nature of desire: the problem of under-specification. This problem has been recently debated mostly in the context of philosophy of language as a problem for a standard theory of propositional attitudes. My interest here is not to settle the dispute in the philosophy of language\, but to understand better how the satisfaction of desire is determined in the context of practical reason. That is\, in the above vignette\, I certainly failed to procure what I wanted. But if not in the mismatch between the proposition (or the common noun\, or the infinitival) that I use to express my desire and the facts on the ground\, in virtue of what has my desire failed to find satisfaction? After all\, the world seems to have conformed to the content of my will. \nIn this paper\, I first investigate the different ways in which desire finds no satisfaction. I then argue that a certain understanding of how desire relates to the good explains\, better than any other alternative\, how what is represented in my desire can fail to find satisfaction in the world despite its content being made true. In fact\, I will argue that this phenomenon provides an important argument for the guise of the good; since “satisfaction” seems to be the major potential alternative as the formal object of desire and intentional action\, the fact that satisfaction is inseparable from at least the apparent good\, shows that these are not rival aims of agency but one and the same formal object of our practical attitudes. I will end with a potential difficulty for this argument; namely\, that some cases of failure of satisfaction seem to require a “guise of the pleasant” above and beyond the “guise of the good”. I briefly sketch how on a Kantian view of human agency the guise of the pleasant is incorporated into the guise of the good and even more briefly try to explain how a similar account might be available to those less sympathetic to the Kantian conception of agency.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-online-sergio-tenenbaum-toronto/
LOCATION:Microsoft Teams
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
ORGANIZER;CN="Johannes Nickl":MAILTO:jmn20@st-andrews.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240321T143000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240321T153000
DTSTAMP:20260405T021927
CREATED:20240319T113048Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240319T113049Z
UID:10000451-1711031400-1711035000@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:This week we will be reading C. Thi Nguyen’s ‘Value Capture?’. \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03 and Teams \nContact: ceppadirector@st-andrews.ac.uk
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-6-2023-09-21-2023-10-05-5-3-9/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240321T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240321T173000
DTSTAMP:20260405T021927
CREATED:20230620T081028Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240319T112928Z
UID:10000406-1711036800-1711042200@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in person) - Elad Uzan (Oxford)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Compromises and Lesser-Evil Compromises in Ending Wars. \nAbstract: Contemporary conflicts often lack a clear end-state\, posing challenges to the traditional notion of victory in just wars. This ambiguity calls for a revaluation of war’s objectives\, suggesting that wars should end without a clear victory. In this paper\, I will explore various moral and non-moral considerations that structure the duty to reach war-ending compromises. I will assess whether a defender has a duty to seek a compromise peace before fully achieving its objectives and address the tension between achieving a just peace and a lasting peace. The conclusion of a war often necessitates accepting moral hazards: the just side may need to make sacrifices and relinquish certain entitlements and the unjust side may secure wrongful gains. I will also examine the potential moral risks of prematurely terminating just wars. Lastly\, I will discuss the duty to enter negotiations and the moral complexities of negotiating the conclusion of wars. \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-elad-uzan-oxford/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240328T154500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240328T170000
DTSTAMP:20260405T021927
CREATED:20240104T151109Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240325T110740Z
UID:10000443-1711640700-1711645200@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in person) - Quân Nguyen (Edinburgh)
DESCRIPTION:This talk is part of our series on Climate Ethics \nTitle: Is despair about climate breakdown rational? \nAbstract: Both within the wider climate and environmentalist movement as well as in academic circles\, it has become a common assumption that\, in order to maintain and sustain actions against the climate crisis\, we need to avoid despair. Despair about the climate crisis\, so philosophers and environmentalists alike\, is the opposite of hope\, and should be avoided on grounds of both rational aptness and pragmatic considerations. Despair about climate breakdown is only rationally apt if it is impossible for our actions to make a difference – as our actions do make a difference\, despair is not a fitting response to climate change (McKinnon 2014). Further\, we have pragmatic or strategic reasons to avoid despair as it leads to apathy and inaction about climate change by hindering our agency and our capacity for moral imagination (Malm 2021\, Huber 2023\, Thaler 2022). In this paper\, I argue that this consensus has moved too fast\, and that despair even in its fundamental form is a rationally apt response to the climate crisis. Despair is a fitting response to the structural features of the climate crisis in terms of fragmentation of agency and moral corruption (Gardiner 2006)\, making despair an accurate representation of a situation lacking agency. Despair is thereby an important source of moral knowledge about the structure of the climate crisis\, which in itself is not automatically outweighed by pragmatic reasons of counterproductivity (Hutton 2022\, Srinivasan 2017)\, and a demand to avoid despair can lead to affective injustice for young people\, climate activists\, climate scientists and anyone concerned with the climate crisis. The paper closes with considerations whether despair hinders moral imagination\, arguing that in several paradigmatic cases\, despair can spurn radical militant action just as much as hope can \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03 \n 
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-quan-nguyen-edinburgh/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240404T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240404T173000
DTSTAMP:20260405T021927
CREATED:20230602T091045Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240401T153145Z
UID:10000404-1712246400-1712251800@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in person) - John Broome (Oxford)
DESCRIPTION:Location: Edgecliffe G03 \nTitle: The Continuum Argument Is Invalid \nAbstract: Derek Parfit argues by means of something he calls a ‘continuum argument’ that a particular appealing premise in population axiology implies a conclusion that he and many others consider repugnant. He treats this as a paradox\, and takes up the challenge of resolving it. He looks for a way to avoid the repugnant conclusion. The solution he offers depends on the existence of imprecision within the relation of betterness among populations. Other philosophers have taken up the same challenge\, following Parfit’s lead\, and offered similar solutions. I shall show that actually the repugnant conclusion is not implied by Parfit’s appealing principle. The continuum argument is invalid. There is therefore no paradox and no real challenge. Moreover\, the explanation of why this is so has nothing to do with imprecision\, incompleteness\, incommensurateness\, indeterminacy or vagueness in betterness. It is consistent with a sharp\, complete betterness ordering.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-john-broome-oxford/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03\, The Scores\, St Salvator's Quad\, KY16 9AL
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
ORGANIZER;CN="Luca Stroppa":MAILTO:ls330@st-andrews.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240411T143000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240411T153000
DTSTAMP:20260405T021927
CREATED:20240401T152743Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240408T110051Z
UID:10000454-1712845800-1712849400@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:This week we will discuss Dale Dorsey’s article “A Perfectionist Humean Constructivism’.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-6-2023-09-21-2023-10-05-5-3-11/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240411T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240411T173000
DTSTAMP:20260405T021927
CREATED:20240104T151442Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240408T110141Z
UID:10000444-1712851200-1712856600@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in person) - Michael Gill (Edinburgh)
DESCRIPTION:Title: The Formality of the Humean Authoritative Ought \nAbstract: There are different things we ought to do. There is what we ought to do insofar as we are seeking to advance our long-term interests. There is what we ought to do insofar as we are trying to do our job well. There is what we ought to do insofar as we are trying to be good friends. Different oughts can conflict with each other. There may be times when we think such conflict is irresolvable. But at least sometimes we think the conflict is resolvable. At least sometimes we think that one thing we ought to do overrides all others. You might think\, for instance\, that helping a friend in a particular situation is what you really ought to do\, even if it means neglecting your job and forgoing your own interests. Call the ought that overrides all others the authoritative ought. \nWhat makes it true that we authoritatively ought to perform an action? What I will call Humean views hold that what makes it true that we authoritatively ought to perform an action is that we would\, were we to reflect properly\, have a positive response toward performing the action. In this paper I elucidate a distinction within Humean views of the authoritative ought\, and argue for one side over the other. The distinction is between substantivism and formalism\, and the side I argue for is the formalist. \nHumean substantivists (such as Julia Driver and Dale Dorsey) believe that proper reflection will lead all of us to the same substantive practical principles—to principles with content\, to principles that prescribe particular types of action. According to substantivists\, because proper reflection would lead all of us to certain substantive principles\, we can identify the actions that fall under those principles as those we authoritatively ought to perform.  \nHumean formalists (such as W.D. Falk and Sharon Street) deny that we are warranted in thinking that proper reflection will lead everyone to the same substantive principles. According to formalists\, we can identify the form of authoritative oughts: what we authoritatively ought to do is what we would respond positively to when we reflect properly. But that is all we can do. We cannot identify the authoritative ought with any substantive content. \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03 \n 
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-michael-gill-edinburgh/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240425T143000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240425T153000
DTSTAMP:20260405T021927
CREATED:20240422T153408Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240422T153408Z
UID:10000467-1714055400-1714059000@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:This week we will meet to discuss Joel Joseph‘s work-in-progress paper ‘The Problem of Secondary Permissibility’ (email jj73@st-andrews.ac.uk for a copy of the paper) \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03 and Teams \nContact: ceppadirector@st-andrews.ac.uk
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-6-2023-09-21-2023-10-05-5-3-10-2/
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR