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X-ORIGINAL-URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
X-WR-CALDESC:Events for CEPPA
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211103T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211103T160000
DTSTAMP:20260520T123114
CREATED:20210830T180836Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210830T181258Z
UID:10000332-1635951600-1635955200@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:Moral Philosophy Reading Group\nDescription: This group reads and discusses an article per week\, chosen by a different member each time. \nDay/time: Wednesdays 3pm to 4pm on Teams. \nOrganizer: Theron Pummer (tgp4).
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-4/2021-11-03/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211028T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211028T173000
DTSTAMP:20260520T123114
CREATED:20210830T151914Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20211018T201129Z
UID:10000318-1635436800-1635442200@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk – Elizabeth Barnes (University of Virginia)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Ameliorative Skepticism and the Nature of Health \nAbstract: In this talk\, I’ll give a brief overview of the project I call ‘ameliorative skepticism’. Sally Haslanger has argued that\, in doing social ontology\, we can sometimes approach the question ‘what is x?’ by asking question ‘what do we want x to be?’. I argue that sometimes the only way to answer this question is to answer it skeptically: that what we want x to be is something it can’t be. But I suggest that there’s a version of skepticism we can bring to questions like this that is substantially weaker than error theory or eliminativism. I use the case of health as an example.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-elizabeth-barnes-university-of-virginia/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211027T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211027T160000
DTSTAMP:20260520T123114
CREATED:20210830T180836Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210830T181258Z
UID:10000331-1635346800-1635350400@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:Moral Philosophy Reading Group\nDescription: This group reads and discusses an article per week\, chosen by a different member each time. \nDay/time: Wednesdays 3pm to 4pm on Teams. \nOrganizer: Theron Pummer (tgp4).
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-4/2021-10-27/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211021T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211021T173000
DTSTAMP:20260520T123114
CREATED:20210830T151648Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20211009T130910Z
UID:10000317-1634832000-1634837400@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk – Rachel Fraser (University of Oxford)
DESCRIPTION:Title: ‘The limits of ideology critique’ \nAbstract: The tradition of ideology critique promises a lot. It promises to be critical of the existing social order. (Good!) But it promises to generate this critique without appealing to ‘external’ normative standards. In this talk I argue on meta-normative grounds that ideology critique cannot make good on these promises.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-rachel-fraser-university-of-oxford/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211020T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211020T160000
DTSTAMP:20260520T123114
CREATED:20210830T180836Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210830T181258Z
UID:10000330-1634742000-1634745600@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:Moral Philosophy Reading Group\nDescription: This group reads and discusses an article per week\, chosen by a different member each time. \nDay/time: Wednesdays 3pm to 4pm on Teams. \nOrganizer: Theron Pummer (tgp4).
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-4/2021-10-20/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211013T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211013T160000
DTSTAMP:20260520T123114
CREATED:20210830T180836Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210830T181258Z
UID:10000329-1634137200-1634140800@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:Moral Philosophy Reading Group\nDescription: This group reads and discusses an article per week\, chosen by a different member each time. \nDay/time: Wednesdays 3pm to 4pm on Teams. \nOrganizer: Theron Pummer (tgp4).
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-4/2021-10-13/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211007T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211007T173000
DTSTAMP:20260520T123114
CREATED:20210830T151408Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210930T155324Z
UID:10000316-1633622400-1633627800@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk – Thi Nguyen (University of Utah)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Value Capture \nAbstract: Value capture occurs when an agent enters a social environment which presents external expressions of value — which are often simplified\, standardized\, and quantified — and those external versions come to dominate our reasoning and motivations. Examples include becoming motivated by Twitter Likes and Retweets\, citation rates\, ranked lists of best schools\, and Grade Point Averages. We are vulnerable to value capture because of the competitive advantage that such pre-packaged value expressions have in our reasoning and our communications. But when we internalize such metrics\, we damage our own autonomy. In value capture\, we outsource the process of deliberating on our values. And that outsourcing cuts off one of the key benefits of personal deliberation. When we tailor our values to ourselves\, we can fine-tune them to fit our own particular psychology and place in the world. But in value capture\, we buy our values off the rack.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-thi-nguyen-university-of-utah/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211006T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211006T160000
DTSTAMP:20260520T123114
CREATED:20210830T180836Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210830T181258Z
UID:10000328-1633532400-1633536000@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:Moral Philosophy Reading Group\nDescription: This group reads and discusses an article per week\, chosen by a different member each time. \nDay/time: Wednesdays 3pm to 4pm on Teams. \nOrganizer: Theron Pummer (tgp4).
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-4/2021-10-06/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210929T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210929T160000
DTSTAMP:20260520T123114
CREATED:20210830T180836Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210830T181258Z
UID:10000327-1632927600-1632931200@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:Moral Philosophy Reading Group\nDescription: This group reads and discusses an article per week\, chosen by a different member each time. \nDay/time: Wednesdays 3pm to 4pm on Teams. \nOrganizer: Theron Pummer (tgp4).
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-4/2021-09-29/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210923T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210923T173000
DTSTAMP:20260520T123114
CREATED:20210830T151007Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210907T080137Z
UID:10000315-1632412800-1632418200@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk – Lisa Herzog (University of Groningen)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Big Data and the Risk of Misguided Responsibilization\n \nAbstract: The arrival of “big data” promises new degrees of precision in understanding human behavior. Could it also make it possible to draw a finer line between individual choices and circumstances that operate in the background? In a culture in which individual responsibility continues to be celebrated\, this raises questions about new opportunities for institutional design with a stronger focus on individual responsibility. But what is it that can be drawn from big data? In this paper I argue that we should not expect a “god’s eye’s view” on choice and circumstances from big data. “Responsibility” is a social construct that depends on the logic of different social situations\, as well as our epistemic access to certain counterfactuals (e.g. whether an agent “could have acted differently”). It is this epistemic dimension that changes with the arrival of big data. But while it might help overcome some epistemic barriers\, it might also create new problems\, e.g. because of polluted data. This is not just a theoretical problem; it is directly connected to questions about the regulation of the insurance industry\, for which “big data” has been described as a “game changer.” I argue that this development forces us to directly confront questions about mutualist versus solidaristic forms of insurance\, and more generally speaking about how much weight to ascribe to individual responsibility\, given all we know about unequal background circumstances.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-lisa-herzog-university-of-groningen/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210922T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210922T160000
DTSTAMP:20260520T123114
CREATED:20210830T180836Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210830T181258Z
UID:10000326-1632322800-1632326400@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:Moral Philosophy Reading Group\nDescription: This group reads and discusses an article per week\, chosen by a different member each time. \nDay/time: Wednesdays 3pm to 4pm on Teams. \nOrganizer: Theron Pummer (tgp4).
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-4/2021-09-22/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20210922
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20210924
DTSTAMP:20260520T123114
CREATED:20210125T125602Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210830T174547Z
UID:10000304-1632268800-1632441599@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Wild Animal Ethics Conference
DESCRIPTION:Wild Animal Ethics Conference
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/wild-animal-ethics-conference/
ORGANIZER;CN="Ben Sachs":MAILTO:bas7@st-andrews.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210916T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210916T173000
DTSTAMP:20260520T123114
CREATED:20210830T150635Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210831T091657Z
UID:10000314-1631808000-1631813400@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk – Kimberley Brownlee (University of British Columbia)
DESCRIPTION:TITLE: ‘Interactional Wrongs and Vices’\n\nABSTRACT: This paper explores a domain of action that we often regard as a minor moral matter\, the domain of ordinary interactions. Yet\, ordinary interactions are morally significant for two reasons: they are the primary vehicle through which 1) we show respect and disrespect for each other\, and 2) we either grease the wheels or put a spanner in the wheels of healthy human sociability. Interactional ethics concerns both our first-order conduct within a given interaction and our second-order management of our interactional lives. At both levels\, we can act well or badly and thereby do great good\, harm\, justice\, and injustice. This paper homes in on first-order and second-order interactional wrongs. It isolates distinct wrongs that we can do at each of the three key stages of an interaction – the initiation stage\, execution stage\, and conclusion stage – including\, notably\, engage in interactional outsourcing. It then examines specific second-order patterns of wrongdoing – interactional vices – that we can display as we manage our interactional lives.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-kimberley-brownlee-university-of-british-columbia/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20210916
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20210919
DTSTAMP:20260520T123114
CREATED:20210601T173927Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210913T135724Z
UID:10000311-1631750400-1632009599@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:All Work and No Play
DESCRIPTION:A workshop on the philosophy of work and time-allocation \n  \n16-18 September \, 2021 \nThe Future of Work and Income Research Network    (fwistandrews@gmail.com) \nCentre for Ethics\, Philosophy\, and Public Affairs \nDepartment of Philosophy\, University of St Andrews \nWorkshop to be held entirely online \nThursday 16th September \n\n\n\n10.30am\nWelcome and introdution to the Future of Work and Income Research Network\n\n\n11am – 12:30pm\nJonathan Wolff (Oxford University): Working at Home\, Socialising at Work\n\n\n2:30 – 4pm\nLisa Herzog (Groningen University): Bodies at Work\n\n\n\nFriday 17th September \n\n\n\n11am – 12:30pm\nDiana-Elena Popescu (Edinburgh University): Leisure for Every Body: Disability and the Four Day Workweek\n\n\n2:30 – 4pm\nJoe Ryle (4 Day Week Campaign): Has the time come for a four-day week?\n\n\n\nSaturday 18th September \n\n\n\n11am – 12:30pm\nOtto Lehto (KCL): The Technological Unemployment Hypothesis in the UBI Debate: A Critique\n\n\n12:30 – 2pm\nSimeon Goldstraw (Oxford University) Free Time Isn’t Working\n\n\n3 – 4:30pm\nBertrand Rossert (World Bank): Defining Work\n\n\n\n“8 hours labour\, 8 hours recreation\, 8 hours rest!” This was the slogan adopted by many labour movements in the nineteenth century\, when 16-hour working days were not uncommon. Marx believed that only part of the working day was required to supply workers’ consumption needs\, the rest going to support the consumption of idle capitalists. John Maynard Keynes predicted in 1930 that a fifteen-hour working week was a close possibility\, requiring only that work was spread more evenly across the population. \n  \nAlthough less extreme than Keynes’s vision\, some activists today are campaigning for a four-day working week. The campaign has won some victories\, with the Spanish government launching an experiment with mid-sized companies last year and the Scottish government promising to try something similar. Besides economic questions about labour productivity and marginal returns\, there are deep philosophical questions around the allocation of time to work. We hope to address these in this workshop. Some examples are: \n  \n\nHow do we distinguish labour\, recreation\, and rest?\nShould time spend recuperating between physically exhausting tasks count as rest or part of labour?\nShould activities undertaken to ‘decompress’ after mentally or emotionally taxing work count as recreation?\nAre there important differences between relaxation activities and leisure activities?\nIn his 1966 essay\, “The Abolition of Work”\, Bob Black distinguished work from play in terms of the latter being voluntary – but what is the relevant category of “voluntariness” here?\nWhat about the allocation of domestic and caring labour? How does this play into patterns of gender inequality and other forms of social imbalance?\nIs time the right measure of the balance between work\, leisure\, and rest? What about intensity\, satisfaction\, etc.?\nIs flexibility in working time always a blessing\, or can it be a hidden curse?\nHow should we think about the allocation of working time among the population? Can some groups “steal time” from others? What about the allocation of time across generations?\n\nFor More Information\nAlex Douglas (axd@st-andrews.ac.uk)
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/all-work-and-no-play/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Workshop
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210915T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210915T160000
DTSTAMP:20260520T123114
CREATED:20210830T180836Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210830T181258Z
UID:10000325-1631718000-1631721600@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:Moral Philosophy Reading Group\nDescription: This group reads and discusses an article per week\, chosen by a different member each time. \nDay/time: Wednesdays 3pm to 4pm on Teams. \nOrganizer: Theron Pummer (tgp4).
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-4/2021-09-15/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20210616
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20210617
DTSTAMP:20260520T123114
CREATED:20210111T100500Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210111T100500Z
UID:10000302-1623801600-1623887999@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:JS Mill Cup
DESCRIPTION:https://millcup.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/ \n  \n 
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/js-mill-cup/
ORGANIZER;CN="Ben Sachs":MAILTO:bas7@st-andrews.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210610T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210610T170000
DTSTAMP:20260520T123114
CREATED:20210527T190401Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210527T190401Z
UID:10000310-1623340800-1623344400@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Knox Seminar with Tim Scanlon (Harvard)
DESCRIPTION:This will be a one-hour discussion of Scanlon’s Knox Lecture\, which can be viewed here: \nhttps://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/events/2021-knox-lecture-tim-scanlon-harvard-university/
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/knox-seminar-with-tim-scanlon-harvard/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210527T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210527T173000
DTSTAMP:20260520T123114
CREATED:20200819T120825Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210520T173053Z
UID:10000269-1622131200-1622136600@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk - Renee Bolinger (Princeton University)
DESCRIPTION:Title: ‘Are We Entitled to Be Believed?’ \nAbstract: Discussions in a variety of contexts (including at least epistemic injustice\, moral encroachment\, epistemic obligations of friendship) sometimes assume that speakers have a right or moral entitlement to be believed when they assert or testify that p: that they are wronged if their audience fails to believe them. It is controversial whether rights of this kind are intelligible\, or precisely what their basis is. This talk aims to get clearer on what a “right to be believed” is a right to by working backward: sifting through the various ways of characterizing the justifications we might give for such an entitlement\, and the wrongs suffered when it is violated. I suggest that the best candidate is a claim to appropriate epistemic policies\, which I unpack and sketch at the end of the talk.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talks-renee-bolinger-princeton-university/
ORGANIZER;CN="Katharina Bernhard":MAILTO:kb242@st-andrews.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210526T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210526T173000
DTSTAMP:20260520T123114
CREATED:20200709T164951Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210429T164219Z
UID:10000261-1622044800-1622050200@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk - Jonathan Quong (University of Southern California)
DESCRIPTION:Title: The Permissibility of Lesser Evil \nAbstract: \nFlood:   Flood water is headed toward a cave where five innocent people are trapped and will be killed if the water reaches them. The water can be diverted into a mineshaft\, but innocent Betty is trapped in the mineshaft and will be killed if the water is redirected. Albert is a bystander who has seen and understood the whole situation\, and he stands next to a switch that can divert the flood. He can easily flip the switch. \nWhen considering cases like this\, some people believe that Albert is morally required to save the five at the cost of Betty’s life (the requirement thesis). Others believe that Albert is permitted but not required to save the five (the permissive thesis). I argue in favor of the permissive thesis and against the requirement thesis. I conclude by considering some further implications for the ethics of self-defense and war.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-2020-10-01-2021-04-29/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210521T171500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210521T184500
DTSTAMP:20260520T123114
CREATED:20200821T141720Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210511T201600Z
UID:10000275-1621617300-1621622700@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:2021 Knox Lecture - Tim Scanlon (Harvard University)
DESCRIPTION:2021 Knox Lecture (online via Teams) \nKnox Lecturer: Tim Scanlon (Harvard University) \nTitle: Further Reflections on Tolerance and its Difficulty \nAbstract: The paper revisits the account of tolerance discussed in the author’s paper\, “The Difficulty of Tolerance\,” with the aim of clarifying (1) the reasons people have to care about the character of their society and (2) the range of others to whom the duties of tolerance are owed. \nPlease email Theron Pummer <tgp4@st-andrews.ac.uk> for the Teams link.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/2021-knox-lecture-tim-scanlon-harvard-university/
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/files/2020/08/faculty_scanlon.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210520T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210520T173000
DTSTAMP:20260520T123114
CREATED:20210327T054545Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210513T164943Z
UID:10000307-1621526400-1621531800@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk – Rima Basu (Claremont McKenna College)
DESCRIPTION:Title: ‘Normative Expectations’ \nAbstract: In supplementing the familiar ways that our interpersonal relationships are morally fraught\, recent work in epistemology on doxastic wronging has highlighted how these relationships can be epistemically fraught as well. However\, in focusing predominantly on beliefs— mental states that arguably constitute a small fraction of our mental lives—these theories have their own theoretical blindspots. In this paper\, I expand the scope of analysis to expectations. Typically\, we notice the failures of expectations when we’re the targets of them: when we let our loved ones down. Key indicators of the presence of normative expectations are feelings of disappointment and betrayal. Contexts in which these feelings manifest most vividly involve parents and their hopes and dreams for our lives. Focusing on these contexts\, I argue that normative expectations play three distinctive roles: a predictive role\, a prescriptive role\, and a proleptic role. Each role\, I conjecture\, comes with its own avenue for moral\, epistemic\, and conceptual failure. Ultimately\, in precisifying the heterogeneous class of attitudes that constitute normative expectations\, I reveal just how expansive the ‘doxastic’ in doxastic wronging ought be. \n  \n*** \nThis event is co-hosted with the Feminist Philosophy and Social Theory Seminar.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-rima-basu-claremont-mckenna-college/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
ORGANIZER;CN="Emilia Wilson":MAILTO:ew58@st-andrews.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210513T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210513T173000
DTSTAMP:20260520T123114
CREATED:20210327T053856Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210506T165448Z
UID:10000306-1620921600-1620927000@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk – Emmalon Davis (Michigan)
DESCRIPTION:Title: ‘Challenging the Pursuit of Novelty’ \nAbstract: Novelty—understood as the value of saying something new—appears to be a good-making feature of a philosophical contribution. Beyond this\, however\, novelty functions as a marker of philosophical success: contributions that say something new are considered successful\, while contributions that do not say something new are considered unsuccessful. When novelty serves as a marker and metric of success\, the pursuit of novelty becomes an aspirational ideal. This paper challenges the presumption and expectation that a successful philosophical contribution will be a novel one. \nTo do so\, I distinguish two constituent components—novelty as ingenuity/originality and novelty as discovery/priority—which\, taken together\, comprise the aspirational ideal of novelty. I outline a series of traps or pitfalls associated with the practical pursuit of each component part and show that efforts to avoid traps associated with one render philosophers vulnerable to traps associated with the other. I argue that an aspirational ideal of novelty should be rejected\, as the pursuit of each component part is in tension with the other. Throughout my analysis\, I demonstrate that the greatest risks accompanying the pursuit of novelty are unevenly distributed and that an aspirational ideal of novelty disadvantages certain practitioners disproportionately. I conclude that an aspirational ideal of novelty is less desirable and less feasible than it appears. \n*** \nThis event is co-hosted with the Feminist Philosophy and Social Theory Seminar. \n 
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-emmalon-davis-michigan/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
ORGANIZER;CN="Emilia Wilson":MAILTO:ew58@st-andrews.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210512T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210512T163000
DTSTAMP:20260520T123114
CREATED:20201021T194054Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210507T133601Z
UID:10000293-1620831600-1620837000@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk – Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Lok Chan (Duke University)
DESCRIPTION:Title: ‘Should Responsibility Affect Who Gets a Kidney?’ \nAbstract: About 98\,000 people in the US are waiting for a kidney transplant\, but only around 20\,000 kidneys become available each year. As a result\, doctors sometimes have to decide who gets a kidney. Many people (though few medical providers) hold that\, when two patients need the only available kidney\, and one but not the other is responsible for their own kidney disease\, then the patient who is not responsible should get the kidney\, other things being equal. We report two experiments that reveal what people hold patients responsible for and how responsibility affects how people allocate fault and kidneys. We also discuss some theoretical and practical implications of these empirical studies.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-walter-sinnott-armstrong-and-lok-chan-duke-university/
ORGANIZER;CN="Ben Sachs":MAILTO:bas7@st-andrews.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210506T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210506T173000
DTSTAMP:20260520T123114
CREATED:20200819T145440Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230703T152453Z
UID:10000271-1620316800-1620322200@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk - Jesse Tomalty (University of Bergen)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Discrimination at the Border\nAbstract: In selecting among prospective immigrants\, it is widely accepted that states are morally permitted to differentiate on the basis of skill. By contrast\, differentiating among prospective immigrants on the basis of (perceived) traits such as race\, ethnicity\, or religion is widely held to amount to wrongful discrimination. I argue that these views are in tension. This is because the strongest account of why race\, ethnicity\, and religion are not morally acceptable criteria for selecting immigrants also rules out selection based on skill. What all of these criteria have in common is that their application fails to respect the moral equality of prospective immigrants. Given that states are obligated to respect the moral equality of all persons\, I argue that this implies that the set of morally acceptable criteria for selecting immigrants is narrower than many currently accept.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-jesse-tomalty-university-of-bergen/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210505T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210505T173000
DTSTAMP:20260520T123114
CREATED:20210305T184003Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210428T193345Z
UID:10000305-1620230400-1620235800@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Joe Slater Talk
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/joe-slater-talk/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210428T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210428T170000
DTSTAMP:20260520T123114
CREATED:20210409T065718Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210409T065718Z
UID:10000309-1619625600-1619629200@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:MPRG
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/mprg-2/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210422T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210422T173000
DTSTAMP:20260520T123114
CREATED:20200819T120411Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210415T171751Z
UID:10000268-1619107200-1619112600@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk - Macalester Bell (Bryn Mawr College)
DESCRIPTION:Title: On Photographic Wrongs \nAbstract: While ethicists have had little to say on the subject\, people often feel wronged by the creation and dissemination of their photographic image. After describing several cases in which people have felt wronged by a photograph\, I’ll go on to offer a taxonomy for thinking about these cases. Many of these purported wrongs can be easily accommodated by dominant ethical theories as tokens of recognized types of wrongdoing. However\, I think some of these testimonies point to the existence of a sui generis type of wrongdoing which I will refer to as a photographic wrong. I will then attempt to make the case that photographic wrongs are genuine moral wrongs\, and I will offer an account of what grounds this wrong.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-macalaster-bell-bryn-mawr-college/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210415T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210415T173000
DTSTAMP:20260520T123114
CREATED:20200819T120202Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210408T112538Z
UID:10000267-1618502400-1618507800@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk - Zofia Stemplowska (Oxford)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Distributing Commemorative Attention \nAbstract: Some of us get a lot of attention and some of us very little. This continues after we die. Some of our commemorative decisions are private but some of our commemorative attention is public: we are directed by monuments\, commemorative plaques and scheduled occasions towards those we should commemorate. Much of the vast literature on commemoration focuses on which figures or events are worthy of commemoration. But knowing if someone or something is worthy of commemoration does not solve the problem of the scarcity of our commemorative attention. When it comes to public commemoration\, how to allocate our commemoration between\, say\, those who achieved great things and those who suffered? I will consider by which standards we should judge whether the overall distribution of commemorative attention is just. I will suggest that we can allocate attention justly by aggregating people’s preferences for remembrance through a two-stage test: the constrained auction test.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-zofia-stemplowska-oxford/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210414T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210414T160000
DTSTAMP:20260520T123114
CREATED:20210409T065649Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210409T065649Z
UID:10000308-1618412400-1618416000@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:MPRG
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/mprg/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20210409
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20210412
DTSTAMP:20260520T123114
CREATED:20201005T211300Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210406T100311Z
UID:10000291-1617926400-1618185599@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Workshop on Blame and Responsibility (UT Austin/St Andrews)
DESCRIPTION:Online Workshop Schedule\nPlease email Matthew Vermaire <matthew.vermaire@gmail.com> if you’d like the Zoom link. \n\nFriday April 9th:  \nJustin Snedegar (University of St Andrews) [9:00am – 10:15am Central Daylight Time] / [3pm – 4:15pm UK Time] \n“Dismissing Blame”\nAbstract: When someone blames you\, you might accept the blame or you might reject it\, challenging the blamer’s interpretation of the facts\, or providing a justification or excuse. Either way\, there are opportunities for edifying moral discussion and moral repair. But another common response is to simply dismiss the blame\, refusing to engage with the blamer even by rejecting the blame. This talk aims to make sense of this kind of response: what are we doing\, when we dismiss blame? This is important for understanding when and why such a response is or is not legitimate\, and should shed light on questions both about blame itself and about the standing to blame. My answer is that when we dismiss blame\, we dismiss a demand or expectation that we express our remorse to the blamer in a way that lets them witness that remorse. \nAdam Etinson (University of St Andrews) [10:30am – 11:45am Central Daylight Time] / [4:30pm – 5:45pm UK Time] \n“Anger and Remorse”\nAbstract: We know that remorse\, on the part of offenders\, has a powerful capacity to abate anger\, on the part of victims (and third parties). What this suggests is that anger is rooted\, not just in perceived wrongdoing\, but in concern that an offender fails to recognize and take responsibility for their wrongdoing. It also suggests that anger seeks the satisfaction of remorse itself. If that is right\, then anger is fundamentally about recognition\, not revenge – a discovery of significant psychological\, social\, and political importance. \n\nSaturday April 10th: \nErik Encarnacion (University of Texas\, Austin) [9:00am – 10:15am Central Daylight Time] / [3pm – 4:15pm UK Time] \n“Two Conceptions of Repair: Restoration or Resilience”\nAbstract: Legal philosophers\, especially those who explain tort law in terms of corrective justice\, often assert that if A wrongfully harms B\, then A owes B a duty of repair. But what does this duty require? Some specify it in terms of the object of repair—i.e.\, the thing needing repair. Courts\, for example\, traditionally award compensation to repair harms to a plaintiff’s body and property. Others focus instead on repairing frayed relationships between victim and wrongdoer. But this paper explores an overlooked\, cross-cutting way of distinguishing the duty’s content based on the standard of repair rather than its object. That is\, regardless of the underlying “thing” needing repair\, we can ask what normative ideal should govern the reparative task. More specifically\, I defend a distinction between restorative repair and resilient repair. The former seeks to make things as though the injury never happened; the latter makes no effort to pretend than an injury never occurred. Instead\, resilient repair involves transformative changes that acknowledge that certain injuries cannot be undone\, while allowing injured victims to live dignified lives that in some respects may be better than before the injury. I argue that\, although judicial rhetoric makes it appear as though compensatory damages seek only restorative repair\, certain aspects of compensatory damages—like hedonic damages—are better justified in light of the ideal of resilience articulated here. \nDaniela Dover (University of California\, Los Angeles) and Jonathan Gingerich (King’s College London) [10:30am – 11:45am Central Daylight Time] / [4:30pm – 5:45pm UK Time] \n“Beauvoir’s Groundwork”\nAbstract: In The Ethics of Ambiguity\, Simone de Beauvoir set out to create a systematic existentialist ethical theory. Like Kant’s Groundwork\, The Ethics of Ambiguity posits a close connection between one’s own freedom and one’s ethical obligations to others\, arguing that in order to will your own freedom\, you must also will the freedom of everyone else. Immoral action\, for Beauvoir as well as for Kant\, is unfree. There is very little secondary literature on The Ethics of Ambiguity\, and yet we believe the text has much to offer contemporary moral philosophy. Our talk will be a brief introduction to Beauvoir’s ethics and metaethics\, meant to stimulate an open-ended discussion of what Beauvoir can contribute to contemporary debates about moral motivation and moral responsibility.\n\n\n\n\nSunday April 11th: \nConnie Rosati (University of Texas\, Austin) [9:00am – 10:15am Central Daylight Time] / [3pm – 4:15pm UK Time] \n“The Value of Accepting Responsibility”\nAbstract: Much of our talk about blame and responsibility concerns third parties; it involves our laying the blame and placing responsibility on others. But our talk also concerns\, though\, unfortunately\, less often\, our taking the blame and accepting responsibility. I undertake herein to explore the nature and value of agents taking responsibility for their actions—for what they do and what they say. I shall explain and argue for the moral value of taking the blame and accepting responsibility\, but I shall also explain and argue for the prudential value of being and becoming—making oneself into—an accepter. Being an accepter is\, or so I hope to show\, good for you. \nZoë Johnson King (University of Southern California) [10:30am – 11:45am Central Daylight Time] / [4:30pm – 5:45pm UK Time] \n“Varieties of Moral Mistake”\nAbstract: Some philosophers think that if someone acts wrongly while falsely believing that her action is permissible\, though she is aware of the non-moral facts that ground her action’s wrongness\, then her moral mistake cannot excuse her wrongdoing. And some think that this is because it is morally blameworthy to fail to appreciate the moral significance of non-moral features of an action of which one is aware\, such that mistakenly believing that one’s action is permissible when it is in fact wrong is itself morally blameworthy. Here I challenge the view that it is blameworthy to fail to appreciate the moral significance of non-moral features of an action of which one is aware. This view seems okay if we focus on examples of people mistakenly believing that their wrongful actions are permissible. But it is not remotely plausible when we consider other varieties of moral mistake – such as believing that one’s action is required when it is in fact supererogatory\, believing that one’s action is wrong when it is in fact permissible\, and believing false things about the moral properties of other people’s actions and of merely possible actions. The upshot is that those who maintain that moral mistakes cannot excuse are sent back to the drawing board; we need a new explanation of why this would be the case. \n\nPlease email Matthew Vermaire <matthew.vermaire@gmail.com> if you’d like the Zoom link.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/workshop-on-blame-and-responsibility/
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/files/2019/04/IMG-0340.jpg
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END:VCALENDAR