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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20201022T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20201022T173000
DTSTAMP:20260418T012907
CREATED:20200819T114110Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20201015T190052Z
UID:10000262-1603382400-1603387800@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk - Hallie Liberto (University of Maryland)
DESCRIPTION:Title: ‘Consent and the Question of Dynamics’ \nAbstract: In this paper\, I first argue that “rights-waiving” is not an accurate\, general description of the operation persons perform when they grant permissive consent. It fails to describe the change to the structure of the normative world that I call authority-retaining permissive consent. This is the kind of permissive consent we use in cases of sexual consent\, medical consent\, consent to a visitor in the home\, consent to another reading one’s diary or manuscript – any type of consent wherein the consenting agent retains the normative power to withdraw consent throughout the event. “Rights-waiving” gets the operation wrong\, obscuring the real dynamics of rights. Second\, I argue that the inaccurate account of the operation of consent gives rise to a variety of other misconceptions about how consent works and what it means for an act to be nonconsensual\, especially in the realm of sexual ethics.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-hallie-liberto-university-of-maryland/
ORGANIZER;CN="Ben Sachs":MAILTO:bas7@st-andrews.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20201028T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20201028T140000
DTSTAMP:20260418T012907
CREATED:20200709T165128Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20201105T085334Z
UID:10000281-1603890000-1603893600@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-2-2020-09-23/2020-10-28/
ORGANIZER;CN="Ben Sachs":MAILTO:bas7@st-andrews.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20201029T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20201029T143000
DTSTAMP:20260418T012907
CREATED:20201027T155841Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20201027T155841Z
UID:10000295-1603976400-1603981800@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:ECT Talk - Jessica Brown (St Andrews)
DESCRIPTION:Title: ‘Group Motivation’ \nAbstract: We routinely treat groups\, including governments and corporations\, as agents with beliefs and aims who are morally responsible for their actions. For instance\, we might blame an oil company for an oil spill pointing out that they knew the risk of their profits-first policies. In this paper I discuss a key issue for group moral responsibility\, namely whether we can make sense of a group acting for one reason rather than another. The notion of acting for one reason rather than another is central to standard accounts of individual agency and responsibility; and also determines whether an individual is blameworthy or praiseworthy for an action. For instance\, whether a grandson is praiseworthy for looking after his dying grandmother may depend on whether he does it out of love or for the inheritance. Thus if we model group responsibility on individual responsibility\, we need to be able to make sense of a group acting for one reason rather than another. Despite the importance of the notion of acting for a reason\, most of the literature on group responsibility has focused on other issues such as what it is for a group to have a mental state and to act. Here\, I offer a new account of how to understand group motivation for action.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ect-talk-jessica-brown-st-andrews/
ORGANIZER;CN="Katharina Bernhard":MAILTO:kb242@st-andrews.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20201029T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20201029T173000
DTSTAMP:20260418T012907
CREATED:20200709T164951Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20201105T101044Z
UID:10000254-1603987200-1603992600@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk - Katharine Jenkins (Glasgow)
DESCRIPTION:Title: ‘How To Be a Pluralist About Gender’ \nAbstract: There are various of attractive accounts of gender kinds on offer (Haslanger 2012\, Asta 2018)\, as well as accounts of the ontology of human social kinds (or social groups) more broadly (Mallon 2016\, Ritchie 2020) that are much more conducive to feminist aims than a lot of previous work in social ontology. As metaphysicians of gender\, we are spoilt for choice! In this talk\, I argue that we do not have to choose a single account of gender kinds\, but can adopt a principled pluralism about gender kinds: there are many different varieties of social kinds that can be understood as gender kinds\, and which ones we need to use in our theorising and practices depend on our explanatory and practical goals. Although many philosophers appear willing to entertain pluralism about gender kinds\, little has been said about how this would work\, and it is important to fend off the worry that pluralism would entail an ontological ‘free-for-all’. I offer a framework for systematising these different gender kinds\, the ‘Constraints and Enablements Framework’ and show how it fends off the free-for-all worry\, revealing gender pluralism as a metaphysically manageable and politically appealing position. \n  \n 
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-2020-10-29/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
ORGANIZER;CN="Ben Sachs":MAILTO:bas7@st-andrews.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20201104T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20201104T140000
DTSTAMP:20260418T012907
CREATED:20200709T165128Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20201105T085334Z
UID:10000282-1604494800-1604498400@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-2-2020-09-23/2020-11-04/
ORGANIZER;CN="Ben Sachs":MAILTO:bas7@st-andrews.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20201111T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20201111T140000
DTSTAMP:20260418T012907
CREATED:20200709T165128Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20201105T085334Z
UID:10000283-1605099600-1605103200@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-2-2020-09-23/2020-11-11/
ORGANIZER;CN="Ben Sachs":MAILTO:bas7@st-andrews.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20201112T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20201112T173000
DTSTAMP:20260418T012907
CREATED:20200709T164951Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20201106T193613Z
UID:10000255-1605196800-1605202200@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk - Robert Talisse (Vanderbilt University)
DESCRIPTION:Title: ‘The Problem of Polarization’ \nAbstract: “The cure for democracy’s ills is more democracy.” This popular adage is false. Contemporary democracy faces problems that have their source in otherwise laudable forms of political participation. In short\, enactments of democratic citizenship heighten our exposure to polarization\, which in turn erodes our capacities to perform well as citizens. This talk examines the phenomenon of polarization\, identifies the problem that polarization poses to democracy\, and proposes a strategy for addressing that problem. Perhaps surprisingly\, if we aim to nurture our democratic capacities\, we need to sometimes engage together in nonpolitical cooperative activities.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-2020-10-01-2020-11-12/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20201116T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20201116T160000
DTSTAMP:20260418T012907
CREATED:20200925T051625Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20201112T193434Z
UID:10000287-1605538800-1605542400@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Cover to Cover Reading Group (Kamm's *Almost Over*)
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/cover-to-cover-reading-group-kamms-almost-over/2020-11-16/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20201118T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20201118T140000
DTSTAMP:20260418T012907
CREATED:20200709T165128Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20201105T085334Z
UID:10000284-1605704400-1605708000@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-2-2020-09-23/2020-11-18/
ORGANIZER;CN="Ben Sachs":MAILTO:bas7@st-andrews.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20201119T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20201119T173000
DTSTAMP:20260418T012907
CREATED:20200709T164951Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20201112T221204Z
UID:10000256-1605801600-1605807000@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk - Mark Schroeder (University of Southern California)
DESCRIPTION:Title: ‘Conflict\, Discord\, and Strife’ \nAbstract: Given that interpersonal relationships are relationships between persons\, we might hold out hope that a better philosophical understanding of the nature of persons can help us to better understand the structure and dynamics of interpersonal relationships. In this talk I will argue that this thought is correct. In particular\, I will argue that the right kind of philosophical theory about the nature of persons can help us to recognize the possibility of an underappreciated form of silencing that can lead us to misunderstand one another\, explain why these forms of misunderstanding can often be symmetric\, and illustrate how such symmetric forms of misunderstanding can drive and perpetuate good-faith conflicts even between perfectly well-meaning parties.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-2020-10-01-2020-11-19/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20201203T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20201203T173000
DTSTAMP:20260418T012907
CREATED:20200819T114814Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20201203T201738Z
UID:10000263-1607011200-1607016600@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:ECT/CEPPA Talk - Sarah Moss (University of Michigan)
DESCRIPTION:Title: ‘How to Be a Clever Contextualist’ \nAbstract: This talk defends a contextualist theory of ‘knowledge’ ascriptions. I argue that in some sentences\, the implicit argument of ‘knows’ is bound by a quantifier. The natural readings of these sentences can be generated by contextualist theories\, but not by competing interest-relative theories of knowledge. In addition\, I argue that the contextualist can explain distinctive patterns in our judgments about sentences in which ‘knows’ is embedded under change-of-state verbs. Along the way\, I argue that the most common definitions of ‘encroachment’ and ‘interest relativity’ are seriously flawed. \n 
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-sarah-moss-university-of-michigan/
ORGANIZER;CN="Nick Kuespert":MAILTO:nk94@st-andrews.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20201210T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20201210T173000
DTSTAMP:20260418T012907
CREATED:20200819T115017Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20201210T152552Z
UID:10000264-1607616000-1607621400@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk - Elizabeth Harman (Princeton University)
DESCRIPTION:Title: ‘Does Morality Speak within the Realm of the Morally Permissible?’ \nAbstract: You hear that your next-door neighbor Alicia is sick with COVID-19. You’re new to the neighborhood and haven’t met Alicia yet. You’re overwhelmed with working from home and overseeing your kids’ remote schooling. You could reach out to Alicia and ask whether she needs someone to pick up medicine or groceries for her; that would be a nice thing to do. Morality doesn’t require you to do it\, and you know that. You think it over. “I don’t have to offer to help\, but I should\,” you think\, and you are right. You offer to help. \nThis could be a true story. Sometimes\, there is a way that you could help someone; you don’t have to help; but all things considered\, you should help. This means that morality speaks within the realm of the morally permissible. Moral reasons can win out within the realm of the morally permissible to settle that you should do something morally good that you don’t have to do. Sometimes\, a supererogatory action should be done. If one fails to act\, then one makes a moral mistake that isn’t morally wrong: it turns out that some moral mistakes are not morally wrong. \nI will argue for this view and then discuss an objection from multiply satisfiable moral requirements. Sometimes you don’t have to do a particular thing because it is just one way of fulfilling a moral requirement; there are other ways you could also fulfill that requirement. This appears to be something that you should do that you don’t have to do. But doing it is not supererogatory—it’s just a way of fulfilling a moral requirement. The objection holds that the cases I use to argue for my view all involve multiply satisfiable moral requirements\, such as the general moral obligation to help some people sometimes. I pursue two lines of response to the objection: the more concessive line of response concedes that my argument needs to be revised in light of the objection\, but shows that this can be done; the less concessive line of response holds that my original argument survives the objection. \nHarman St Andrews Talk Handout December 2020
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-elizabeth-harman-princeton-university/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210128T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210128T173000
DTSTAMP:20260418T012907
CREATED:20200709T164951Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210122T091619Z
UID:10000257-1611849600-1611855000@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk - Lara Buchak (Princeton University)
DESCRIPTION:TITLE: RISK AND AMBIGUITY IN ETHICAL DECISION-MAKING \nABSTRACT: Some of my choices are primarily guided by the interests of others: for example\, which charities to give to or which political policies to vote for. Other of my choices have at least a significant component where I must take others’ interests into account\, though perhaps I can weigh them against my own interests: for example\, which environment-protecting measures to adopt in my personal life. This talk is about how to evaluate the other-affecting component of my decisions. In cases in which all of the empirical facts are known\, it may be easy to say which decision is best for another person. But in cases of risk—we don’t know how the world will turn out—or ambiguity—we don’t even know the probability of the world turning out in various ways—things are less simple. This is particularly the case given the wide range of attitudes towards risk and towards ambiguity that a person could rationally take. After laying out a framework for thinking about these choices\, I will argue for some principles that should govern them.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-2020-10-01-2021-01-28/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210203T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210203T160000
DTSTAMP:20260418T012907
CREATED:20201120T090404Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210116T113802Z
UID:10000296-1612364400-1612368000@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:CEPPA’s Moral Philosophy Reading Group reads and discusses an article per week\, chosen by a different member each time. \nSemester 2 schedule: \nWednesdays 3pm – 4pm\, beginning 3 February and ending 28 April. We will skip the following Wednesdays: 10 Feb\, 24 Mar\, 31 Mar\, 21 Apr. (Due to staff meetings and spring break.) \nOrganizer: Theron Pummer (tgp4). Teams link will be circulated in January 2021.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-3/2021-02-03/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210204T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210204T173000
DTSTAMP:20260418T012907
CREATED:20200819T115311Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210129T204937Z
UID:10000265-1612454400-1612459800@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk - Gwen Bradford (Rice University)
DESCRIPTION:TITLE: Uniqueness\, Intrinsic Value\, and Reasons \n  \nABSTRACT: Uniqueness appears to enhance intrinsic value. A unique stamp sells for millions of dollars; Stradivarius violins are all the more precious because they are unlike any others. This observation has not gone overlooked in the value theory literature: uniqueness plays a starring role recalibrating the dominant Moorean understanding of the nature of intrinsic value. But the thesis that uniqueness enhances intrinsic value is in tension with another deeply plausible and widely-held thesis\, namely the thesis that there is a pro tanto reason to promote the good. It is argued that there is a second\, distinct type of uniqueness that plays a more interesting and important axiological role: uniqueness imparts irreplaceable value. This gives occasion to develop the surprisingly undertheorized notion of irreplaceable value. While one might think the irreplaceable value of persons can now be explained\, it turns out that there is yet a third sense of uniqueness.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-gwen-bradford-rice-university/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20210215
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20210217
DTSTAMP:20260418T012907
CREATED:20210116T121521Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210127T093621Z
UID:10000303-1613347200-1613519999@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Graduate Conference
DESCRIPTION:3rd Annual CEPPA Graduate Conference
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-graduate-conference/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Conference
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210217T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210217T160000
DTSTAMP:20260418T012907
CREATED:20201120T090404Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210116T113802Z
UID:10000297-1613574000-1613577600@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:CEPPA’s Moral Philosophy Reading Group reads and discusses an article per week\, chosen by a different member each time. \nSemester 2 schedule: \nWednesdays 3pm – 4pm\, beginning 3 February and ending 28 April. We will skip the following Wednesdays: 10 Feb\, 24 Mar\, 31 Mar\, 21 Apr. (Due to staff meetings and spring break.) \nOrganizer: Theron Pummer (tgp4). Teams link will be circulated in January 2021.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-3/2021-02-17/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210218T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210218T173000
DTSTAMP:20260418T012907
CREATED:20200709T164951Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210209T130436Z
UID:10000258-1613664000-1613669400@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Works-in-Progress Talk – Lara Jost (St Andrews)
DESCRIPTION:The Epistemic Value of Affective Intentional Experience \nIn this paper\, I argue that despite risks of falsehood\, theorists should recognize that affective intentional experience (AIE)\, which includes emotions\, pains/pleasures and some gut feelings\, can be a source of knowledge and justification. Indeed\, AIE provides the best explanation for how we know certain things. I will focus the analysis on two such cases: pain in patients with endometriosis and microaggressions. I will then discuss points of resistance against the conclusion that AIE is epistemically valuable and why one might defend that it is not a genuine source of knowledge and justification. I will then offer some responses those challenges and explain how such resistance towards AIE impoverishes our epistemological theories and how it contributes to the silencing of marginalized agents\, in particular women and people of colour.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-2020-10-01-2021-02-18/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210224T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210224T160000
DTSTAMP:20260418T012907
CREATED:20201120T090404Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210116T113802Z
UID:10000298-1614178800-1614182400@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:CEPPA’s Moral Philosophy Reading Group reads and discusses an article per week\, chosen by a different member each time. \nSemester 2 schedule: \nWednesdays 3pm – 4pm\, beginning 3 February and ending 28 April. We will skip the following Wednesdays: 10 Feb\, 24 Mar\, 31 Mar\, 21 Apr. (Due to staff meetings and spring break.) \nOrganizer: Theron Pummer (tgp4). Teams link will be circulated in January 2021.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-3/2021-02-24/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210225T100000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210226T170000
DTSTAMP:20260418T012908
CREATED:20200710T111413Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210315T164010Z
UID:10000260-1614247200-1614358800@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Online Workshop: Universal Basic Income and the Meaning of Work
DESCRIPTION:The Centre for Ethics\, Philosophy\, and Public Affairs \nUniversity of St. Andrews \n  \nThis workshop took place 25-26 February\, 2021.  The four presented papers were: \nDeryn Thomas – University of St. Andrews/University of Stirling: “Basic Income and The Collective Benefits of Work”. Paper here and slides here. \nMaria Koumenta – Queen Mary University of London: “The Case Against UBI”. Session video here. \nTom Parr – University of Warwick: “The Significance of Employment”. Session video here. \nAngie O’Sullivan — University of Edinburgh: “Work as Just Compensation: What Nietzschean Genealogy Teaches Us about UBI”. Paper here. \n  \nThis workshop was a prelude to a larger project\, an AHRC-funded Research Network called “The Future of Work and Income”. To join the network and be kept up-to-date on its activities\, please contact the workshop’s organiser. \n  \n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n With gratefully acknowledged support from the
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/workshop-universal-basic-income-and-the-meaning-of-work/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Workshop
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/files/2020/07/pexels-photo-3943746.jpg
ORGANIZER;CN="Ben Sachs":MAILTO:bas7@st-andrews.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210303T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210303T160000
DTSTAMP:20260418T012908
CREATED:20201120T090404Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210116T113802Z
UID:10000299-1614783600-1614787200@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:CEPPA’s Moral Philosophy Reading Group reads and discusses an article per week\, chosen by a different member each time. \nSemester 2 schedule: \nWednesdays 3pm – 4pm\, beginning 3 February and ending 28 April. We will skip the following Wednesdays: 10 Feb\, 24 Mar\, 31 Mar\, 21 Apr. (Due to staff meetings and spring break.) \nOrganizer: Theron Pummer (tgp4). Teams link will be circulated in January 2021.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-3/2021-03-03/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210304T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210304T173000
DTSTAMP:20260418T012908
CREATED:20200709T164951Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210210T152854Z
UID:10000259-1614873600-1614879000@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk - Sara Bernstein (University of Notre Dame)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Biased Evaluative Descriptions \nAbstract: In 2008\, Joseph Biden called Barack Obama “an African-American who is articulate and bright and clean and a nice-looking guy.” Though intended as a compliment\, such a description would not be applied to a non-African-American leader in the same context. Such biased evaluative descriptions\, roughly\, well-intended descriptions whose apparently positive surface meanings are inflected with implicit bias or benevolent discrimination\, are the focus of this talk. After giving several different kinds of examples of biased evaluative descriptions\, I distinguish them from similar linguistic concepts\, including backhanded compliments\, slurs\, insults\, epithets\, pejoratives\, and dog-whistles. I discuss some challenges to the distinctiveness and evaluability of BEDs\, including intersectional social identities. I conclude by discussing the social significance and moral status of BEDs. Identifying BEDs is important for a variety of social contexts\, from the very general and broad (political speeches) to the very particular and small (bias in academic hiring).
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-2020-10-01-2021-03-04/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210310T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210310T163000
DTSTAMP:20260418T012908
CREATED:20201120T090404Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230703T153613Z
UID:10000301-1615388400-1615393800@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Working with Policymakers: A Practical Guide
DESCRIPTION:Microsoft Teams Link \nPart 1. 3-3:30. In the first half hour\, Rowan Cruft\, Professor of Philosophy at Stirling University and CEPPA Member\, recounts his involvement with the Leveson Inquiry into the conduct of the British media\, which made use of his work on human rights. \nPart 2. 3:30-4:30. Researchers in all fields can have an influence on policy in various ways\, but it sometimes seems as if only a select few get to do so. The last hour of the event will offer some tricks of the trade as to how to get your research noticed by the policy community and what pitfalls to avoid. This hour will be led by Nick Bibby\, who is a policy engagement professional. With a background in political journalism and higher education communications\, Nick led the creation of the Scottish Policy & Research Exchange (SPRE) before becoming its director in 2019. SPRE encourages and supports collaboration between the policy and academic communities and has a particular focus on encouraging new voices to provide academic analysis and expertise. It offers training and digital resources for researchers and creates opportunities for them to meet with policy professionals.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-3-2021-03-10/
ORGANIZER;CN="Ben Sachs":MAILTO:bas7@st-andrews.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210311T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210311T173000
DTSTAMP:20260418T012908
CREATED:20200819T115753Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210304T175814Z
UID:10000266-1615478400-1615483800@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk - Jonathan Wolff (Oxford)
DESCRIPTION:Title: ‘The Point Is To Change It’ \nAbstract: Many political philosophers happily repeat Karl Marx’s 11th Thesis on Feuerbach (inscribed on his gravestone) ‘The Philosophers have only interpreted the world. The point is to change it.’ Marx had a theory of change: proletariat revolution. But what theory of change is appropriate in current circumstances? In this talk I will consider the steps that typically foreshadow and lead to policy change and the potential for philosophy and philosophers to contribute. \nTeams link: https://teams.microsoft.com/l/meetup-join/19%3ameeting_ZGVlZmIzMWMtODY1Zi00NzNjLWIzNmYtNjhkYjU2YjliM2Zj%40thread.v2/0?context=%7b%22Tid%22%3a%22f85626cb-0da8-49d3-aa58-64ef678ef01a%22%2c%22Oid%22%3a%22af5d8a3f-611f-454d-ba4b-63510191e14e%22%7d \n 
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-jonathan-wolff-oxford-2/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210317T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210317T160000
DTSTAMP:20260418T012908
CREATED:20201120T090404Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210116T113802Z
UID:10000300-1615993200-1615996800@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:CEPPA’s Moral Philosophy Reading Group reads and discusses an article per week\, chosen by a different member each time. \nSemester 2 schedule: \nWednesdays 3pm – 4pm\, beginning 3 February and ending 28 April. We will skip the following Wednesdays: 10 Feb\, 24 Mar\, 31 Mar\, 21 Apr. (Due to staff meetings and spring break.) \nOrganizer: Theron Pummer (tgp4). Teams link will be circulated in January 2021.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-3/2021-03-17/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210318T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210318T173000
DTSTAMP:20260418T012908
CREATED:20201005T111626Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210311T195956Z
UID:10000289-1616083200-1616088600@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Works-in-Progress Talk – James Harris (St Andrews)
DESCRIPTION:Title: “Some people and the people” \nAbstract: When is an action\, or a choice\, or a desire\, an action or choice or desire of the people\, as opposed to being an action\, or choice\, or desire of some people? In this talk I consider eight possible answers to this question. I focus in particular on the idea that the will of the people is the will of the majority\, and on the idea the will of the people is the will of representative institutions of government. My goal is to motivate the idea that it is never appropriate to describe a preference or policy as the will of the\, as opposed to some\, people. \nTeams link: https://teams.microsoft.com/l/meetup-join/19%3ameeting_ZGVlZmIzMWMtODY1Zi00NzNjLWIzNmYtNjhkYjU2YjliM2Zj%40thread.v2/0?context=%7b%22Tid%22%3a%22f85626cb-0da8-49d3-aa58-64ef678ef01a%22%2c%22Oid%22%3a%22af5d8a3f-611f-454d-ba4b-63510191e14e%22%7d
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-works-in-progress-talk-james-harris-st-andrews/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20210409
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20210412
DTSTAMP:20260418T012908
CREATED:20201005T211300Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210406T100311Z
UID:10000291-1617926400-1618185599@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Workshop on Blame and Responsibility (UT Austin/St Andrews)
DESCRIPTION:Online Workshop Schedule\nPlease email Matthew Vermaire <matthew.vermaire@gmail.com> if you’d like the Zoom link. \n\nFriday April 9th:  \nJustin Snedegar (University of St Andrews) [9:00am – 10:15am Central Daylight Time] / [3pm – 4:15pm UK Time] \n“Dismissing Blame”\nAbstract: When someone blames you\, you might accept the blame or you might reject it\, challenging the blamer’s interpretation of the facts\, or providing a justification or excuse. Either way\, there are opportunities for edifying moral discussion and moral repair. But another common response is to simply dismiss the blame\, refusing to engage with the blamer even by rejecting the blame. This talk aims to make sense of this kind of response: what are we doing\, when we dismiss blame? This is important for understanding when and why such a response is or is not legitimate\, and should shed light on questions both about blame itself and about the standing to blame. My answer is that when we dismiss blame\, we dismiss a demand or expectation that we express our remorse to the blamer in a way that lets them witness that remorse. \nAdam Etinson (University of St Andrews) [10:30am – 11:45am Central Daylight Time] / [4:30pm – 5:45pm UK Time] \n“Anger and Remorse”\nAbstract: We know that remorse\, on the part of offenders\, has a powerful capacity to abate anger\, on the part of victims (and third parties). What this suggests is that anger is rooted\, not just in perceived wrongdoing\, but in concern that an offender fails to recognize and take responsibility for their wrongdoing. It also suggests that anger seeks the satisfaction of remorse itself. If that is right\, then anger is fundamentally about recognition\, not revenge – a discovery of significant psychological\, social\, and political importance. \n\nSaturday April 10th: \nErik Encarnacion (University of Texas\, Austin) [9:00am – 10:15am Central Daylight Time] / [3pm – 4:15pm UK Time] \n“Two Conceptions of Repair: Restoration or Resilience”\nAbstract: Legal philosophers\, especially those who explain tort law in terms of corrective justice\, often assert that if A wrongfully harms B\, then A owes B a duty of repair. But what does this duty require? Some specify it in terms of the object of repair—i.e.\, the thing needing repair. Courts\, for example\, traditionally award compensation to repair harms to a plaintiff’s body and property. Others focus instead on repairing frayed relationships between victim and wrongdoer. But this paper explores an overlooked\, cross-cutting way of distinguishing the duty’s content based on the standard of repair rather than its object. That is\, regardless of the underlying “thing” needing repair\, we can ask what normative ideal should govern the reparative task. More specifically\, I defend a distinction between restorative repair and resilient repair. The former seeks to make things as though the injury never happened; the latter makes no effort to pretend than an injury never occurred. Instead\, resilient repair involves transformative changes that acknowledge that certain injuries cannot be undone\, while allowing injured victims to live dignified lives that in some respects may be better than before the injury. I argue that\, although judicial rhetoric makes it appear as though compensatory damages seek only restorative repair\, certain aspects of compensatory damages—like hedonic damages—are better justified in light of the ideal of resilience articulated here. \nDaniela Dover (University of California\, Los Angeles) and Jonathan Gingerich (King’s College London) [10:30am – 11:45am Central Daylight Time] / [4:30pm – 5:45pm UK Time] \n“Beauvoir’s Groundwork”\nAbstract: In The Ethics of Ambiguity\, Simone de Beauvoir set out to create a systematic existentialist ethical theory. Like Kant’s Groundwork\, The Ethics of Ambiguity posits a close connection between one’s own freedom and one’s ethical obligations to others\, arguing that in order to will your own freedom\, you must also will the freedom of everyone else. Immoral action\, for Beauvoir as well as for Kant\, is unfree. There is very little secondary literature on The Ethics of Ambiguity\, and yet we believe the text has much to offer contemporary moral philosophy. Our talk will be a brief introduction to Beauvoir’s ethics and metaethics\, meant to stimulate an open-ended discussion of what Beauvoir can contribute to contemporary debates about moral motivation and moral responsibility.\n\n\n\n\nSunday April 11th: \nConnie Rosati (University of Texas\, Austin) [9:00am – 10:15am Central Daylight Time] / [3pm – 4:15pm UK Time] \n“The Value of Accepting Responsibility”\nAbstract: Much of our talk about blame and responsibility concerns third parties; it involves our laying the blame and placing responsibility on others. But our talk also concerns\, though\, unfortunately\, less often\, our taking the blame and accepting responsibility. I undertake herein to explore the nature and value of agents taking responsibility for their actions—for what they do and what they say. I shall explain and argue for the moral value of taking the blame and accepting responsibility\, but I shall also explain and argue for the prudential value of being and becoming—making oneself into—an accepter. Being an accepter is\, or so I hope to show\, good for you. \nZoë Johnson King (University of Southern California) [10:30am – 11:45am Central Daylight Time] / [4:30pm – 5:45pm UK Time] \n“Varieties of Moral Mistake”\nAbstract: Some philosophers think that if someone acts wrongly while falsely believing that her action is permissible\, though she is aware of the non-moral facts that ground her action’s wrongness\, then her moral mistake cannot excuse her wrongdoing. And some think that this is because it is morally blameworthy to fail to appreciate the moral significance of non-moral features of an action of which one is aware\, such that mistakenly believing that one’s action is permissible when it is in fact wrong is itself morally blameworthy. Here I challenge the view that it is blameworthy to fail to appreciate the moral significance of non-moral features of an action of which one is aware. This view seems okay if we focus on examples of people mistakenly believing that their wrongful actions are permissible. But it is not remotely plausible when we consider other varieties of moral mistake – such as believing that one’s action is required when it is in fact supererogatory\, believing that one’s action is wrong when it is in fact permissible\, and believing false things about the moral properties of other people’s actions and of merely possible actions. The upshot is that those who maintain that moral mistakes cannot excuse are sent back to the drawing board; we need a new explanation of why this would be the case. \n\nPlease email Matthew Vermaire <matthew.vermaire@gmail.com> if you’d like the Zoom link.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/workshop-on-blame-and-responsibility/
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/files/2019/04/IMG-0340.jpg
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210414T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210414T160000
DTSTAMP:20260418T012908
CREATED:20210409T065649Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210409T065649Z
UID:10000308-1618412400-1618416000@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:MPRG
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/mprg/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210415T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210415T173000
DTSTAMP:20260418T012908
CREATED:20200819T120202Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210408T112538Z
UID:10000267-1618502400-1618507800@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk - Zofia Stemplowska (Oxford)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Distributing Commemorative Attention \nAbstract: Some of us get a lot of attention and some of us very little. This continues after we die. Some of our commemorative decisions are private but some of our commemorative attention is public: we are directed by monuments\, commemorative plaques and scheduled occasions towards those we should commemorate. Much of the vast literature on commemoration focuses on which figures or events are worthy of commemoration. But knowing if someone or something is worthy of commemoration does not solve the problem of the scarcity of our commemorative attention. When it comes to public commemoration\, how to allocate our commemoration between\, say\, those who achieved great things and those who suffered? I will consider by which standards we should judge whether the overall distribution of commemorative attention is just. I will suggest that we can allocate attention justly by aggregating people’s preferences for remembrance through a two-stage test: the constrained auction test.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-zofia-stemplowska-oxford/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210422T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210422T173000
DTSTAMP:20260418T012908
CREATED:20200819T120411Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210415T171751Z
UID:10000268-1619107200-1619112600@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk - Macalester Bell (Bryn Mawr College)
DESCRIPTION:Title: On Photographic Wrongs \nAbstract: While ethicists have had little to say on the subject\, people often feel wronged by the creation and dissemination of their photographic image. After describing several cases in which people have felt wronged by a photograph\, I’ll go on to offer a taxonomy for thinking about these cases. Many of these purported wrongs can be easily accommodated by dominant ethical theories as tokens of recognized types of wrongdoing. However\, I think some of these testimonies point to the existence of a sui generis type of wrongdoing which I will refer to as a photographic wrong. I will then attempt to make the case that photographic wrongs are genuine moral wrongs\, and I will offer an account of what grounds this wrong.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-macalaster-bell-bryn-mawr-college/
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END:VCALENDAR