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X-ORIGINAL-URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
X-WR-CALDESC:Events for CEPPA
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240404T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240404T173000
DTSTAMP:20260413T120848
CREATED:20230602T091045Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240401T153145Z
UID:10000404-1712246400-1712251800@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in person) - John Broome (Oxford)
DESCRIPTION:Location: Edgecliffe G03 \nTitle: The Continuum Argument Is Invalid \nAbstract: Derek Parfit argues by means of something he calls a ‘continuum argument’ that a particular appealing premise in population axiology implies a conclusion that he and many others consider repugnant. He treats this as a paradox\, and takes up the challenge of resolving it. He looks for a way to avoid the repugnant conclusion. The solution he offers depends on the existence of imprecision within the relation of betterness among populations. Other philosophers have taken up the same challenge\, following Parfit’s lead\, and offered similar solutions. I shall show that actually the repugnant conclusion is not implied by Parfit’s appealing principle. The continuum argument is invalid. There is therefore no paradox and no real challenge. Moreover\, the explanation of why this is so has nothing to do with imprecision\, incompleteness\, incommensurateness\, indeterminacy or vagueness in betterness. It is consistent with a sharp\, complete betterness ordering.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-john-broome-oxford/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03\, The Scores\, St Salvator's Quad\, KY16 9AL
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
ORGANIZER;CN="Luca Stroppa":MAILTO:ls330@st-andrews.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240411T143000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240411T153000
DTSTAMP:20260413T120848
CREATED:20240401T152743Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240408T110051Z
UID:10000454-1712845800-1712849400@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:This week we will discuss Dale Dorsey’s article “A Perfectionist Humean Constructivism’.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-6-2023-09-21-2023-10-05-5-3-11/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240411T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240411T173000
DTSTAMP:20260413T120848
CREATED:20240104T151442Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240408T110141Z
UID:10000444-1712851200-1712856600@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in person) - Michael Gill (Edinburgh)
DESCRIPTION:Title: The Formality of the Humean Authoritative Ought \nAbstract: There are different things we ought to do. There is what we ought to do insofar as we are seeking to advance our long-term interests. There is what we ought to do insofar as we are trying to do our job well. There is what we ought to do insofar as we are trying to be good friends. Different oughts can conflict with each other. There may be times when we think such conflict is irresolvable. But at least sometimes we think the conflict is resolvable. At least sometimes we think that one thing we ought to do overrides all others. You might think\, for instance\, that helping a friend in a particular situation is what you really ought to do\, even if it means neglecting your job and forgoing your own interests. Call the ought that overrides all others the authoritative ought. \nWhat makes it true that we authoritatively ought to perform an action? What I will call Humean views hold that what makes it true that we authoritatively ought to perform an action is that we would\, were we to reflect properly\, have a positive response toward performing the action. In this paper I elucidate a distinction within Humean views of the authoritative ought\, and argue for one side over the other. The distinction is between substantivism and formalism\, and the side I argue for is the formalist. \nHumean substantivists (such as Julia Driver and Dale Dorsey) believe that proper reflection will lead all of us to the same substantive practical principles—to principles with content\, to principles that prescribe particular types of action. According to substantivists\, because proper reflection would lead all of us to certain substantive principles\, we can identify the actions that fall under those principles as those we authoritatively ought to perform.  \nHumean formalists (such as W.D. Falk and Sharon Street) deny that we are warranted in thinking that proper reflection will lead everyone to the same substantive principles. According to formalists\, we can identify the form of authoritative oughts: what we authoritatively ought to do is what we would respond positively to when we reflect properly. But that is all we can do. We cannot identify the authoritative ought with any substantive content. \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03 \n 
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-michael-gill-edinburgh/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240425T143000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240425T153000
DTSTAMP:20260413T120848
CREATED:20240422T153408Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240422T153408Z
UID:10000467-1714055400-1714059000@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:This week we will meet to discuss Joel Joseph‘s work-in-progress paper ‘The Problem of Secondary Permissibility’ (email jj73@st-andrews.ac.uk for a copy of the paper) \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03 and Teams \nContact: ceppadirector@st-andrews.ac.uk
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-6-2023-09-21-2023-10-05-5-3-10-2/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240425T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240425T173000
DTSTAMP:20260413T120848
CREATED:20230602T091155Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240422T153549Z
UID:10000405-1714060800-1714066200@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in person) - Helen Frowe (Stockholm)
DESCRIPTION:Title: The Permissibility of Collective Defence Agreements \nAbstract: Collective defence agreements (CDAs)\, of the sort that exist between\, for example\, NATO members\, EU members\, and African Union members\, are a prime example of a prominent deterrence mechanism. They promise a degree of assistance that will make it almost impossible for an adversary to win an aggressive war against any member. On the face of it\, then\, such agreements seem obviously morally permissible and\, indeed\, morally desirable. However\, I suspect that the moral picture is in fact much more mixed. For example\, acting on a CDA is unlikely to minimise harm compared available alternatives. If\, as I believe\, states are usually subject to a duty to minimise harm when aiding\, then acting on CDAs is likely to be permissible only if doing so is exempt from this duty. This talk explores some of the moral issues raised by CDAs and deterrent mechanisms more broadly. \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-helen-frowe-stockholm/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03\, The Scores\, St Salvator's Quad\, KY16 9AL
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
ORGANIZER;CN="Joel Joseph":MAILTO:jj73@st-andrews.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240502T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240502T173000
DTSTAMP:20260413T120848
CREATED:20240104T151957Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240426T161227Z
UID:10000446-1714665600-1714671000@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in person) - Bridget Bradley (St Andrews)
DESCRIPTION:This talk is part of our series on Climate Ethics. \nTitle: Ethical births\, ethical deaths: Climate anxiety in Britain through the life course \nAbstract: This paper is based on anthropological research conducted with climate activists on the topic of climate anxiety in Britain. Drawing on themes of kinship and its relationship to mental health and activism\, the paper considers the ethical questions surrounding birth and death as significant moments in the life course. Through ethnographic and autoethnographic reflections\, this work reveals how climate anxiety re-frames expectations surrounding what counts as appropriate ways to enter and leave the world\, situated within the context of the cultural politics of contemporary Britain in a time of ecological crisis.\n \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03 \n 
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-bridget-bradley-st-andrews/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240509T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240509T173000
DTSTAMP:20260413T120848
CREATED:20230731T141757Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240509T090022Z
UID:10000410-1715270400-1715275800@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CANCELLED CEPPA Talk (in person) –  Victor Tadros (University of Warwick)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Consent\, Intent\, and Communication \nWhat is consent? I will assume that it is a normative power – a power to alter rights and duties directly. If this is right\, how is consent exercised? I will argue that consent is exercised through the execution of intentions to alter practical reasoning. Successful communication is not needed for valid consent. Even an attempt to communicate is not needed (though it is the central way of consenting). What is needed is an intention that the consentee understands that their practical reasoning is altered – their understanding that they are permitted to do what the consenter consents to. More precisely\, I defend: \nPermissive Intentions: X consents to Y aing where they execute their intention permit Y to a by intending that Y understands that X has permitted Y to a. \nThis View contrasts with familiar alternative views in four ways. \nFirst\, consent is concerned with altering the consentee’s practical reasoning\, and not just with altering the normative status of the consentee’s conduct. So\, a person cannot give consent where they believe that altering the consentee’s practical reasoning is impossible\, even where they wish the normative status of the target’s conduct to be altered. This contrasts with pure mentalist views that consent can be given just by having a mental state or performing a mental action without attempting to alter the consentee’s practical reasoning. Second\, consent can be given without external behaviour that is sufficient to give the consentee grounds to conclude that the consenter has permissive intentions. Consenters can try but fail to give others evidence of their intentions. This contrasts with one kind of externalist view that external evidence or signs of permissive intentions are necessary for consent. Third\, consent is given only if the consenter intends to permit the consentee’s conduct. This contrasts with another kind of externalist view that external evidence or signs of permissive intentions are sufficient for consent. Fourth\, consenters necessarily intend to permit consentees’ conduct. It is insufficient for consent that a person intends the recipient of their communication to believe that they intend to permit them to act. A person can pretend to consent by communicating that they intend to permit an act without actually intending to permit it. And sometimes this might result in the consenter forfeiting a right against the consentee acting. But consent is absent. This contrasts with the view that intending to communicate that one has permissive intentions is sufficient for consent whether or not the consenter has these intentions. \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-online-neil-sinhababu-national-university-of-singapore/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20240515
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20240516
DTSTAMP:20260413T120848
CREATED:20230731T142533Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240405T154339Z
UID:10000411-1715731200-1715817599@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Book Workshop (in person) - Daniel Muñoz (UNC Chapel Hill)
DESCRIPTION:Workshop on Daniel Muñoz’s forthcoming book What We Owe to Ourselves\n\nDate: 15 May 2024\nLocation: Edgecliffe 104\nRegistration required: email Theron Pummer (tgp4@st-andrews.ac.uk)\n \nProvisional Schedule \n945am: Coffee/tea\, welcome\n10am: Jordan MacKenzie (Virginia Tech)\n1115am: Thomas Schmidt (Humboldt University)\n1225pm: Lunch\n130pm: Quinn White (Harvard University)\n240pm: Coffee/tea\n300pm: Kerah Gordon-Solmon (Queen’s University)\n415pm: Joseph Bowen (University of Leeds)\n5:25pm: Walk around town or go to pub\n630pm: Dinner\n \nAbout the Workshop\nThis is a pre-read event. The book manuscript will be circulated to all participants by 15 April. There are 20 spaces available at the catered workshop\, and 10 spaces available at the dinner. Please let me (tgp4) know if you have any access requirements I should be aware of which will help you attend this event.\n \nAbout the Book\nWhat We Owe to Ourselves is under contract with OUP. The book aims to unify\, in a fresh and systematic way\, the two main concepts in deontological morality. “Restrictions” forbid us from harming others for the greater good; “prerogatives” permit us not to harm ourselves. Muñoz argues that both concepts share a source in obligations. Restrictions consist in unwaived obligations to others\, and prerogatives are waivable obligations we have to ourselves. Just as you owe it to me not to harm me for someone else’s greater good\, you owe it to yourself not to harm yourself.\n \nThe key to this project is a thesis that Muñoz calls the Self-Other Symmetry: we owe the same basic things to ourselves as to a relevantly similar other. In the past\, Symmetry has been criticized as being too restrictive\, since we clearly have extensive freedoms when it comes to our own bodies and things. For me to slap your arm would be morally wrong; for me to slap my own is merely foolish. But the right way to understand this issue\, Muñoz argues\, is not by invoking a mysterious moral asymmetry between self and other. There is a simpler explanation: when I harm others\, I might very well lack their consent\, but I am always a willing party to my own intentional choices. Rather than a moral anomaly\, our relation to ourselves is fundamentally like our relation to a consenting other. The limits of what I may do to myself can be derived from the limits of consent in general.\n \nWhat’s more\, the book is the first Self-Other Symmetric take on restrictions and prerogatives. The standard view is that prerogatives come from the special goodness of self-interest\, while restrictions come from the special nastiness of blood on one’s own hands. This makes the moral agent seem rather self-centered\, caring more about a good time and clean hands than about\, say\, reducing global poverty. Muñoz wants to turn this picture inside-out. You should care about everybody equally. But the choice of what happens to your body is still yours. This follows from the obligations that people owe you. I may not take your spare kidney (even if I need it more)\, since I am restricted by my obligations to you. You may keep the kidney if you wish\, since you owe this to yourself. But the optimal choice—the “supererogatory” deed beyond the call—is to waive the obligations that you are owed for the sake of someone else’s greater good. Equal concern for all beings is the ideal\, but when the sacrifice falls on you\, the choice belongs to no one else.\n \nFunding and Support\nFor supporting this workshop\, we are grateful to the Scots Philosophical Association\, the Society for Applied Philosophy\, the Department of Philosophy at the University of St Andrews\, and CEPPA.\n\n\n\nRegistration\nAgain\, to reserve a spot at the workshop\, please register by emailing Theron Pummer (tgp4).
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/book-workshop-in-person-daniel-munoz-unc-chapel-hill/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Workshop
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240516T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240516T173000
DTSTAMP:20260413T120848
CREATED:20240506T124545Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240513T150318Z
UID:10000524-1715875200-1715880600@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in person) – Neil Sinhababu (National University of Singapore)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Pleasure Fundamentalism \nAbstract: Pleasure fundamentalism is the view that moral value is the same thing as pleasure and this explains all other moral facts. This talk presents two arguments for pleasure fundamentalism and discusses the form of naturalism they arise from. According to the Reliability Argument\, all processes generating moral belief are unreliable\, except for phenomenal introspection which tells us that pleasure is good. According to the Universality Argument\, pleasure is universal moral value\, because of its qualitative identity with the pleasure in the minds of all possible perceivers of moral value. Both arguments are available within an Einsteinian naturalism combining empiricism with a spacetime ontology\, and avoiding behaviorism in favor of a more Humean psychology. \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-neil-sinhababu-national-university-of-singapore/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240521T171500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240521T184500
DTSTAMP:20260413T120848
CREATED:20230731T093630Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20241022T124934Z
UID:10000408-1716311700-1716317100@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:2024 Knox Lecture - Elizabeth Anderson (University of Michigan)
DESCRIPTION:Title: “Categorical Inequality and the Economy of Esteem”\n\n\nAbstract: Social theorists have had considerable empirical success in modeling social hierarchy in terms of “categorical inequality.” In this framework\, entire social groups enjoy superior power\, social esteem\, and wealth over other groups: aristocrats over commoners\, men over women\, blacks over whites in the U.S.\, Brahmins over Dalits in India\, etc. Theorists of “intersectionality” challenge such simple models by noting that everyone has multiple social identities that have non-additive interactions. This fact upsets attempts to reduce all inequalities to a linear system of social stratification. I shall argue that\, once we incorporate Rousseau’s argument that the desire for superior esteem drives the creation of social hierarchy\, even intersectional theories fail to capture the myriad ways social inequality resolves into much finer-grained social inequalities. I discuss some of the normative implications of these facts. Among these are that “privilege” frames (e.g.\, “white privilege”) are not just inaccurate and politically self-defeating\, but grant far too much credence to the inegalitarian ideologies deployed to rationalize the very hierarchies that privilege frames aim to discredit. Rousseau had a better idea: to persuade people that even the purported winners of hierarchical systems ultimately become losers\, because such systems have no internal brakes against ever-rising inequality.\n\n\nA recording is available here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_DflT8ty82I
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/2024-knox-lecture-elizabeth-anderson-university-of-michigan/
LOCATION:School III\, St Andrews\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:Knox Lecture
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/files/2023/07/Knox-2024-Poster-New_page-00011.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240522T110000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240522T120000
DTSTAMP:20260413T120848
CREATED:20230731T093740Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230731T093740Z
UID:10000409-1716375600-1716379200@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:2024 Knox Seminar - Elizabeth Anderson (University of Michigan)
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/2024-knox-seminar-elizabeth-anderson-university-of-michigan/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240523T110000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240523T193000
DTSTAMP:20260413T120848
CREATED:20240111T105703Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240111T105703Z
UID:10000464-1716462000-1716492600@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:2024 Ethics Cup Finals
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/2024-ethics-cup-finals/
LOCATION:United College\, St. Andrews\, KY16 9AL\, United Kingdom
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/files/2024/01/4-1-scaled.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20240529
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20240531
DTSTAMP:20260413T120848
CREATED:20240527T193806Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240527T193806Z
UID:10000529-1716940800-1717113599@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Workshop Climate Justice: Transdisciplinary and Cross-cultural Conversations
DESCRIPTION:How can the disparity between global climate impact and uneven responsibilities be squared\nwith the ideal of climate justice? How do epistemic infrastructures (such as: IPCC\, and global\nagenda and goal setting mechanisms) interact with communities on the global and local\nlevels? How are climate policies and priorities inflected by questions of distance (across space\nand time)? And how can we inspire action and responsibility-taking toward flourishing collective\n(human-nature and planetary) futures? \nYou can find the whole schedule here: http://stacees.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/files/2024/05/Climate-Justice-Final-Schedule.pdf
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/workshop-climate-justice-transdisciplinary-and-cross-cultural-conversations/
LOCATION:Younger Hall
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240529T170000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240529T183000
DTSTAMP:20260413T120848
CREATED:20240517T182925Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240517T183308Z
UID:10000525-1717002000-1717007400@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Public Lecture: Stephen Gardiner (University of Washington)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Beyond Institutional Denial: A Global Constitutional Convention for Future Generations \nAbstract: Humanity is in deep institutional denial. Current institutions are failing future generations\, in part because there is a governance gap when it comes to promoting intergenerational concern. This gap facilitates a tyranny of the contemporary that puts the young and other future generations at risk. Climate change is a prime example. To confront intergenerational tyranny\, humanity needs more than merely a Summit for the Future. It needs a global constitutional convention focused on future generations.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/public-lecture-steven-gardiner-university-of-washington/
LOCATION:School II (St. Salvator’s)
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/files/2024/05/Poster-Gardiner.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240530T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240530T173000
DTSTAMP:20260413T120848
CREATED:20240517T183207Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240517T183207Z
UID:10000526-1717084800-1717090200@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Public Lecture: Tahseen Jafry (Glasgow Caledonian University)
DESCRIPTION:Title: About Climate Justice: What Does it Mean and What Lies Ahead? \nAbstract: In July 2023\, Europe reached scorching milestones with relentless heatwaves and Scotland had its hottest June ever. Several regions grappled with unprecedented rainfall\, triggering ecological and socioeconomic upheaval. However\, impacts aren’t equally distributed\, those who contribute minimally to carbon emissions\, find themselves on the frontline of these erratic weather extremes.  \nDespite being on our doorstep\, the reality of climate disparities and injustices remains largely hidden. Scotland must prepare to connect with and apply a climate justice framework. This talk will explore how to embrace the changes we are witnessing in our climate and delve into a positive dialogue on what we needs to be made to combat climate inequality\, ensuring well-being and economic prosperity for all.  \n  \n The second lecture will be followed by a wine reception (location to be announced) – all are very welcome to attend!
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/public-lecture-tahseen-jafry-glasgow-caledonian-university/
LOCATION:School II (St. Salvator’s)
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/files/2024/05/Poster-Jafry.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240531T163000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240531T190000
DTSTAMP:20260413T120848
CREATED:20240527T193410Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250911T161115Z
UID:10000528-1717173000-1717182000@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Film Club: Children of Men
DESCRIPTION:We are proud to present the first session of CEPPA Film Club\, on Friday 31 May (also the last day of Climate Week)\, when we will gather from 4.30 onwards to watch and discuss Alfonso Cuarón’s classic dystopian film Children of Men (see trailer here). Miguel de la Cal Moreno is convening and will start us off with a short introduction over drinks and snacks from Luvians\, before the viewing begins. Afterwards the floor is open for discussion! \nSuggested prewatch/prereads (with spoiler alert!):\n\n\nchapter 1 of Mark Fisher’s Capitalist Realism\n\n\nThe short film ‘The possibility of Hope’\, which was a companion short directed by Cuarón featuring interviews with ‘thinkers’ (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5m1TNXIMTkw)\n\n\nŽižek on Children of men (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5m1TNXIMTkw)\n\n\nE. Ann Kaplan\, Climate Trauma: Foreseeing the Future in Dystopian Film and Fiction\, chapter 3: ‘Pretrauma Political Thrillers: Children of Men – with Reference to Soylent Green and The Handmaid’s Tale‘\n\n\nSamuel Scheffler\, ‘Afterlife’ lectures I and II\n\n\nP.D. James\, The Children of Men (the original novel\, arguably not as good as the movie though!
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-film-club-children-of-men/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Film Club
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/files/2024/05/Film-and-Philosophy-children-of-men_page-0001-scaled.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240605T100000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240605T170000
DTSTAMP:20260413T120848
CREATED:20240603T094911Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240603T094911Z
UID:10000530-1717581600-1717606800@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Fest
DESCRIPTION:Programme \n10.00 – 10.05 Welcome\n10.05 – 10.55 Justin Snedegar (St Andrews): Meddlesome Blame and Negotiating Standing\n10.55 – 11.15 Coffee\n11.15 – 12.05 Jacob Librizzi (St Andrews): Valuing and Classification\n12.10 – 13.00 Lisa Bastian (VU Amsterdam): What’s Wrong With Doxastic Wronging\n13.00 – 14.00 Catered lunch in Edgecliffe\n14.05 – 14.55 Jessica Brown (St Andrews): Bratman on Institutional Agency\n15.00 – 15.50 Joe Slater (Glasgow): Should You Befriend Bad People?\n15.50 – 16.10 Coffee\n16.10 – 17.00 Mark Schroeder (USC): Illusions of Ill Will\n17.00+ Drinks & pizza reception and Edgecliffe Party
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-fest-2/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240606T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240606T173000
DTSTAMP:20260413T120848
CREATED:20240603T095843Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240603T100749Z
UID:10000531-1717689600-1717695000@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Sophie Grace Chappell 'Trans figured' book launch.
DESCRIPTION:Sophie Grace Chappell will present her new book Trans Figured: On Being a Transgender Person in a Cisgender World – followed by bubbles to celebrate!
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/sophie-grace-chappell-trans-figured-book-launch/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03\, The Scores\, St Salvator's Quad\, KY16 9AL
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/files/2024/06/9781509561506.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240919T143000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240919T153000
DTSTAMP:20260413T120848
CREATED:20240912T182200Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240912T182200Z
UID:10000533-1726756200-1726759800@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:This week we will meet to discuss Koshka Duff’s article ‘Just Police Violence: Liberal ideology and the critique of violence from Walter Benjamin to Black Lives Matter’\, available here. \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-mprg/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03\, The Scores\, St Salvator's Quad\, KY16 9AL
CATEGORIES:Reading Group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240919T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240919T173000
DTSTAMP:20260413T120848
CREATED:20240912T181838Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240912T181903Z
UID:10000532-1726761600-1726767000@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (online) – Koshka Duff (Nottingham)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Strip-searching as Abjectification: Racism and Sexual Violence in British Policing \nAbstract: Co-authored with Tom Kemp (Criminology\, University of Nottingham)\, this paper examines police strip-searching practices in the UK. Drawing on newly acquired Freedom of Information data\, publicly available testimonies\, thematic analysis of official literature and media reports\, and first-hand experience\, we advance three arguments. First\, strip-searching is used systematically\, not exceptionally\, and targets young people and people of colour\, especially Black young men and boys. Second\, strip-searching in practice is demonstrably excessive when measured against its stated rationales of ‘crime’ detection and ‘caring’ for detainees; we unpick the circular logics through which it is legitimized in official and public discourse. Third\, drawing on Sharpe’s notion of the abject\, we argue that strip-searching\, as a form of normalized sexual violence folded into the rubric of ‘care’\, is part of a project of abjectification that aims to exclude the individuals and groups it targets from social and political subjecthood \nLocation: online & livestreamed from Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-online-koshka-duff-nottingham/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240926T143000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240926T153000
DTSTAMP:20260413T120848
CREATED:20240920T101253Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240920T101254Z
UID:10000535-1727361000-1727364600@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:This week the Moral Philosophy Reading Group will be discussing Kai Spiekermann’s paper ‘Irreversible Loss’. \nAbstract: This chapter offers three reasons for trying to avoid some irreversible losses. First\, there is a prudential reason for avoiding irreversible loss in order to keep options open in the future in the face of uncertainty. Second\, humans have reasons to care about the preservation of some goods\, even beyond their own life. Third\, present generations may have duties towards future generations to avoid some irreversible losses\, though spelling out such theories of intergenerational ethics or justice is challenging. Finally\, the chapter responds to the objection that – in a certain sense – all processes are irreversible and the notion therefore empty. A sensible conception of irreversibility is offered that avoids this concern. \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-9-2/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03\, The Scores\, St Salvator's Quad\, KY16 9AL
CATEGORIES:Reading Group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240926T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240926T173000
DTSTAMP:20260413T120848
CREATED:20240912T182503Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240920T101646Z
UID:10000545-1727366400-1727371800@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in-person & online) – Derek Ball (St Andrews) & Caroline Touburg (Umeå University)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Philosophical Foundations of Green-House Gas Accounting \nAbstract: International agreements such as the Kyoto protocol and the Paris agreement require countries to measure and track their greenhouse gas emissions.  Companies (as well as universities and other organisations) are required by governmental regulations or their own net-zero goals to do the same.  Greenhouse gas accounting is the project of measuring and tracking GHG emissions.  Although there are a range of standards and guidelines governing GHG accounting practice\, a number of issues remain unresolved in the literature\, including how to account for emissions of short-lived but potent GHGs such as methane\, and how (and indeed whether) to account for temporary storage of CO2 (for example\, in wood products); and standard approaches to these issues are\, in our view\, seriously flawed.   Our talk has two aims\, one technical\, the other theoretical.  The technical aim is to sketch a framework that provides a principled resolution of these issues.  The theoretical aim is to discuss the normative presuppositions of the framework.  Notably\, the framework relies on the idea that in some cases\, we should focus on the preservation of some valuable thing – avoiding loss and minimizing damage – rather than on some aggregable value (such as money\, or well-being).  This shift in focus puts us in a position to avoid some of the problems we see in extant approaches\, and has potential for application in other areas of moral philosophy. \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-derek-ball-st-andrews-caroline-touburg-umea-university/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20241003T143000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20241003T153000
DTSTAMP:20260413T120848
CREATED:20240927T115205Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240927T115550Z
UID:10000536-1727965800-1727969400@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:This week we are discussing Pamela Hieronymi’s ‘Of Metaethics and Motivation: The Appeal of Contractualism’.\nHere is the abstract: In his 1982 article\, T. M. Scanlon noted that\, despite the widespread attention to Rawls’ A Theory of Justice\, the appeal of contractualism as a moral theory had been under-appreciated. It seems to me that\, nearly thirty years later\, despite the widespread attention to Scanlon’s work\, this appeal is still largely under-appreciated. In this paper\, I try to present Scanlon’s appealing answer to what he once called “the question of motivation” and the relation of this answer to the more metaethical “question of subject matter.” I then defend Scanlon’s view against various\, standard objections\, which\, I claim\, typically misunderstand it. I close by considering what it would take to wed Scanlon’s attractive answer to the question of motivation to another\, non-contractualist\, theory. I conclude that\, even if the marriage could be arranged\, a good part of the appeal of contractualism would inevitably be lost. In particular\, the marriage would sacrifice the central place in Scanlon’s theory for what might be called liberty of conscience.\nLocation: Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-9-3/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03\, The Scores\, St Salvator's Quad\, KY16 9AL
CATEGORIES:Reading Group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20241003T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20241003T173000
DTSTAMP:20260413T120848
CREATED:20240912T183630Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240927T115012Z
UID:10000548-1727971200-1727976600@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in-person & online) – Barry Maguire (Edinburgh)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Two Moralities of Recognition \nAbstract: According to moralities of recognition\, fundamental moral norms are norms for living together. Moral norms explain how living in unity is possible despite being separate individuals\, they explain how we can relate to each other as persons that are more than mere sources of benefits and burdens\, obstacles and opportunities. Those who relate to each other according to these norms stand in relations of mutual recognition. By contrast\, some moral theories are atomistic — they deny that fundamental moral norms are communal norms. The paper explains the appeal of morality of recognition and elaborates a distinction between two kinds of moralities of recognition. Some envision a community founded on respect; according to these theories\, mutual recognition is mutual respect. Others offer a fundamentally different vision of the moral community\, namely\, one founded on concern; according to these theories\, mutual recognition is mutual concern. We examine T. M. Scanlon’s contractualism as a fully developed\, influential\, and relatively recent version of respect morality and argue that Scanlon’s morality of respect has certain distinctive structural features. We then articulate the contours of an alternative\, morality of concern\, which offers a different idea of moral community and has a distinctively different structure. Our goal is not to present an argument for morality of concern\, but to explain what makes it attractive and to make clear that choosing between the two kinds of moralities of recognition involves choosing between two substantively different visions of how to live together. \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-barry-maguire-edinburgh-2/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20241004T163000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20241004T200000
DTSTAMP:20260413T120848
CREATED:20240912T194538Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250911T161219Z
UID:10000555-1728059400-1728072000@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Film and Philosophy at CEPPA - Princess Mononoke
DESCRIPTION:We are proud to present the Second Session of Film and Philosophy at CEPPA (aka the CEPPA Film Club). This time we will gather from 4:30pm onwards to watch and discuss Studio Ghibli’s absolute classic ‘Princess Mononoke’ (see trailer here). \nThe movie will start SHARP at 5pm. \nPlease see below for some suggested prereads/prewatches\, suggested by Miguel. If you’d like to volunteer to lead a Film Club in the future\, please let our Film Club convenor Miguel (cc’d) know!\n\nVideos/movies:\n\n\nLady Eboshi is wrong by Ian Danskin: https://vimeo.com/357117766\n\n\nHayao Miyazaki – The Essence of Humanity by Lewis Bond: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eTq_D5aFy-M\n\n\nThe Kingdom of Dreams and Madness (2013\, dir. Mami Sunada)\n\n\nPapers:\n\n\nAnimated Nature: Aesthetics\, Ethics\, and Empathy in Miyazaki Hayao’s Ecophilosophy by Pamela Gossin (https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/10.5749/mech.10.2015.0209.pdf)\n\n\nAnimating child activism: Environmentalism and class politics in Ghibli’s Princess Mononoke (1997) and Fox’s Fern Gully (1992) by Michelle J. Smith & Elizabeth Parsons  (https://www-tandfonline-com.ezproxy.st-andrews.ac.uk/doi/full/10.1080/10304312.2012.630138#d1e255)\n\n\nBooks:\n\n\n185 to 188 of Anime A history by Jonathan Clements.\n\n\nIf you read Spanish: Biblioteca Studio Ghibli: La princesa Mononoke by Laura Montero Plata\n\n\nPodcasts:\n\n\nGhibliotheque – A Podcast About Studio Ghibli ep 5: Princess Mononoke (https://shows.acast.com/ghibliotheque/episodes/princessmononoke-ghibliotheque-5)
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/film-and-philosophy-club-princess-mononoke/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:Film and Philosophy Club
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/files/2024/09/Film-and-Philosophy-Posters.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20241010T143000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20241010T153000
DTSTAMP:20260413T120848
CREATED:20240912T182305Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20241108T140856Z
UID:10000537-1728570600-1728574200@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION: Location: Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-9/2024-10-10/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03\, The Scores\, St Salvator's Quad\, KY16 9AL
CATEGORIES:Reading Group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20241010T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20241010T173000
DTSTAMP:20260413T120848
CREATED:20240912T182924Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20241004T140307Z
UID:10000547-1728576000-1728581400@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in-person & online) – Adrian Walsh (University of New England)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Internal Validity\, External Validity and the Evaluation of Thought Experiments in Applied Ethics and Political Philosophy \nAbstract: Thought experiments clearly play a central role in much contemporary ethical theorising. In the recent literature on thought experiments\, some commentators (e.g. Wilson 2016; Dowding 2019) have criticised the lack of attention paid by moral philosophers to two ideas which are key notions in science. These are internal and external validity. Wilson argues that if thought experiments are indeed a kind of experiment\, then philosophers should begin any plausible search for rigour in the scientific literature on experimental research design. When designing a thought experiment\, Wilson suggests we consider the extent to which ethical judgements that are correct or endorsed in the world of the experiment generalise to the world beyond the experiment. This is an important question to consider. However\, I suggest that Wilson’s approach (i) overstates the connection between real-world scientific experiments and thought experiments (ii) focuses too readily on the formal structure of thought experiments at the expense of the argumentative context. With respect to the former claim\, I suggest that this points towards a more general thesis that it is a mistake to treat the reasoning involved in the use of thought experiments as a subset of scientific reasoning. I shall also consider\, towards the end of the talk\, a more moderate (and plausible) view of the positive role that the concepts of internal and external validity might play in evaluating and assessing the legitimacy of thought experiments. \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-adrian-walsh-university-of-new-england/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20241017T143000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20241017T153000
DTSTAMP:20260413T120848
CREATED:20240912T182305Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20241108T140856Z
UID:10000538-1729175400-1729179000@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION: Location: Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-9/2024-10-17/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03\, The Scores\, St Salvator's Quad\, KY16 9AL
CATEGORIES:Reading Group
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20241017T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20241017T173000
DTSTAMP:20260413T120848
CREATED:20240912T183831Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20241011T222115Z
UID:10000549-1729180800-1729186200@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (online) – Valerie Tiberius (Minnesota)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Happy Immoralists and Satisfied Loners: A Pragmatic Perspective on Disagreement about Well-being \nAbstract: Can a morally bad person live well? Can a person without friends achieve well-being? There is long-standing disagreement about the correct answers to these questions. I offer a diagnosis of the debate between those who answer “no” (objectivists about well-being) and those who answer “yes” (subjectivists about well-being). I suggest that the reason people are divided about this question is that the opposing answers represent two different perspectives on well-being that answer to two different sets of practical interests. Given this diagnosis\, the cure is to acknowledge the importance of both perspectives. I discuss different ways of doing this. \nLocation: online & livestreamed from Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-online-valerie-tiberius-minnesota/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20241028T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20241028T170000
DTSTAMP:20260413T120848
CREATED:20241009T150113Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20241009T150113Z
UID:10000557-1730131200-1730134800@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:In person Talk by Tom Angier (University of Cape Town)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Goodness as Natural Perfection. \nAbstract: In this paper I outline Aristotle’s conception of human functioning\, which I take to be a viable and illuminating ground for determining human goods. I then look at alternative schemata for the notion of ‘function’ – ones derived from evolutionary theory – and argue that they are not preferable to their Aristotelian rival. I finish the paper by looking at ‘neo-Aristotelian ethical naturalism’\, in particular that of Philippa Foot\, and argue that it is not Aristotelian enough.\n\nBio: Tom Angier is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Cape Town. He works on neo-Aristotelian ethical and political theory. He is currently completing a monograph entitled “Human Nature\, Human Goods: A Theory of Natural Perfectionism”. It is due to be published by Cambridge University Press in 2025.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/in-person-talk-by-tom-angier-university-of-cape-town/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR