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X-WR-CALDESC:Events for CEPPA
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DTSTART:20191027T010000
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20200916T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20200916T140000
DTSTAMP:20260414T072906
CREATED:20200709T165128Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20200822T181547Z
UID:10000250-1600261200-1600264800@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-2/
ORGANIZER;CN="Ben Sachs":MAILTO:bas7@st-andrews.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20200917T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20200917T173000
DTSTAMP:20260414T072906
CREATED:20200709T164951Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20200715T093322Z
UID:10000249-1600358400-1600363800@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk - Tom Parr (Warwick)
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
ORGANIZER;CN="Ben Sachs":MAILTO:bas7@st-andrews.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20200923T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20200923T140000
DTSTAMP:20260414T072906
CREATED:20200709T165128Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20201105T085334Z
UID:10000277-1600866000-1600869600@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-2-2020-09-23/2020-09-23/
ORGANIZER;CN="Ben Sachs":MAILTO:bas7@st-andrews.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20200924T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20200924T173000
DTSTAMP:20260414T072907
CREATED:20200709T164951Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20200918T112423Z
UID:10000251-1600963200-1600968600@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Works-in-Progress Talk - Julia Driver (UT Austin and St Andrews)
DESCRIPTION:Title: ‘Blame and the Suberogatory’ \nAbstract: In this paper the claim that some actions are blameworthy even if they are not wrong is defended. Suberogatory actions\, which generally involve people standing on their rights in ways that display inadequate quality of the will\, are examples. I defend this claim against a strategy of assimilating these cases to the “right to do wrong” category and then sketch out a picture of the sorts of norm violations these actions represent. \nHandout: Handout_Blame and the Suberogatory
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-2020-09-24/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20200930T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20200930T140000
DTSTAMP:20260414T072907
CREATED:20200709T165128Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20201105T085334Z
UID:10000278-1601470800-1601474400@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-2-2020-09-23/2020-09-30/
ORGANIZER;CN="Ben Sachs":MAILTO:bas7@st-andrews.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20201001T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20201001T173000
DTSTAMP:20260414T072907
CREATED:20200709T164951Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20200924T201107Z
UID:10000252-1601568000-1601573400@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk - Olúfẹ́mi O. Táíwò (Georgetown University)
DESCRIPTION:Title: ‘Being-in-the-Room: Epistemic Deference and Elite Capture’ \nAbstract: Standpoint epistemology refers to a set of contentions: that knowledge is socially situated\, that marginalized people have some positional advantages in gaining some forms of knowledge\, and that research programs ought to reflect these facts. These seem to me to be entirely unobjectionable\, and indeed to follow from any minimally plausible story about the epistemic consequences of social structure. Yet this theory is often the subject of controversy. I take the problem to be related to the norms of putting the theory into practice\, particularly their reliance on schedules of deference\, and considering the political consequences of this approach (elite capture) and also consequences I take to be morally corrosive. I propose an alternative\, which I call the “constructive” approach to giving standpoint epistemology practical expression\, and try to motivate adopting it.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-2020-10-01/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20201007T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20201007T140000
DTSTAMP:20260414T072907
CREATED:20200709T165128Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20201105T085334Z
UID:10000279-1602075600-1602079200@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-2-2020-09-23/2020-10-07/
ORGANIZER;CN="Ben Sachs":MAILTO:bas7@st-andrews.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20201008T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20201008T173000
DTSTAMP:20260414T072907
CREATED:20200709T164951Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20201001T190314Z
UID:10000253-1602172800-1602178200@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk - Martin Smith (Edinburgh)
DESCRIPTION:Title: ‘Lexical Priority\, Decision Theory and De Minimis Risk’ \nAbstract: Say that one moral requirement takes lexical priority over another just in case violations of the former can never be outweighed or counterbalanced by violations of the latter. While lexical priority is arguably a feature of many ethical systems\, attempts to model it within the framework of decision theory have led to a series of difficulties – a fact which is sometimes spun as a ‘decision theoretic critique’ of lexical priority. In this paper\, I will develop an enriched decision theoretic framework that is capable of overcoming one of the major obstacles to modelling lexical priority. The key move is to introduce\, into decision theory\, a non-probabilistic conception of risk known as normic risk.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-2020-10-08/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
ORGANIZER;CN="Ben Sachs":MAILTO:bas7@st-andrews.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20201014T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20201014T140000
DTSTAMP:20260414T072907
CREATED:20200709T165128Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20201105T085334Z
UID:10000280-1602680400-1602684000@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-2-2020-09-23/2020-10-14/
ORGANIZER;CN="Ben Sachs":MAILTO:bas7@st-andrews.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20201015T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20201015T173000
DTSTAMP:20260414T072907
CREATED:20200821T131009Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20201015T150745Z
UID:10000273-1602777600-1602783000@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk - Kieran Setiya (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
DESCRIPTION:Title: ‘What is Morality?’ \nAbstract: In “Modern Moral Philosophy\,” Anscombe argued that the moral vocabulary does not correspond to any concept of Aristotelian ethics\, that it derives from a confused response to the ethics of divine of command\, and that it is literally meaningless. This essay contends that Anscombe was wrong. Morality corresponds to Aristotle’s general sense of “justice\,” which is complete virtue in relation to another. But Anscombe’s question remains: what is it for an action to be morally wrong\, not merely something one should not do? The answer is not that wrongness warrants blame or that an action is wrong when it wrongs another person\, but that an action is morally wrong when it is something one should not do that one has no right to do. In the absence of rights\, Anscombe’s question has no answer. \nMorality-Handout
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-kieran-setiya-massachusetts-institute-of-technology/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20201022T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20201022T173000
DTSTAMP:20260414T072907
CREATED:20200819T114110Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20201015T190052Z
UID:10000262-1603382400-1603387800@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk - Hallie Liberto (University of Maryland)
DESCRIPTION:Title: ‘Consent and the Question of Dynamics’ \nAbstract: In this paper\, I first argue that “rights-waiving” is not an accurate\, general description of the operation persons perform when they grant permissive consent. It fails to describe the change to the structure of the normative world that I call authority-retaining permissive consent. This is the kind of permissive consent we use in cases of sexual consent\, medical consent\, consent to a visitor in the home\, consent to another reading one’s diary or manuscript – any type of consent wherein the consenting agent retains the normative power to withdraw consent throughout the event. “Rights-waiving” gets the operation wrong\, obscuring the real dynamics of rights. Second\, I argue that the inaccurate account of the operation of consent gives rise to a variety of other misconceptions about how consent works and what it means for an act to be nonconsensual\, especially in the realm of sexual ethics.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-hallie-liberto-university-of-maryland/
ORGANIZER;CN="Ben Sachs":MAILTO:bas7@st-andrews.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20201028T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20201028T140000
DTSTAMP:20260414T072907
CREATED:20200709T165128Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20201105T085334Z
UID:10000281-1603890000-1603893600@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-2-2020-09-23/2020-10-28/
ORGANIZER;CN="Ben Sachs":MAILTO:bas7@st-andrews.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20201029T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20201029T143000
DTSTAMP:20260414T072907
CREATED:20201027T155841Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20201027T155841Z
UID:10000295-1603976400-1603981800@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:ECT Talk - Jessica Brown (St Andrews)
DESCRIPTION:Title: ‘Group Motivation’ \nAbstract: We routinely treat groups\, including governments and corporations\, as agents with beliefs and aims who are morally responsible for their actions. For instance\, we might blame an oil company for an oil spill pointing out that they knew the risk of their profits-first policies. In this paper I discuss a key issue for group moral responsibility\, namely whether we can make sense of a group acting for one reason rather than another. The notion of acting for one reason rather than another is central to standard accounts of individual agency and responsibility; and also determines whether an individual is blameworthy or praiseworthy for an action. For instance\, whether a grandson is praiseworthy for looking after his dying grandmother may depend on whether he does it out of love or for the inheritance. Thus if we model group responsibility on individual responsibility\, we need to be able to make sense of a group acting for one reason rather than another. Despite the importance of the notion of acting for a reason\, most of the literature on group responsibility has focused on other issues such as what it is for a group to have a mental state and to act. Here\, I offer a new account of how to understand group motivation for action.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ect-talk-jessica-brown-st-andrews/
ORGANIZER;CN="Katharina Bernhard":MAILTO:kb242@st-andrews.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20201029T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20201029T173000
DTSTAMP:20260414T072907
CREATED:20200709T164951Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20201105T101044Z
UID:10000254-1603987200-1603992600@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk - Katharine Jenkins (Glasgow)
DESCRIPTION:Title: ‘How To Be a Pluralist About Gender’ \nAbstract: There are various of attractive accounts of gender kinds on offer (Haslanger 2012\, Asta 2018)\, as well as accounts of the ontology of human social kinds (or social groups) more broadly (Mallon 2016\, Ritchie 2020) that are much more conducive to feminist aims than a lot of previous work in social ontology. As metaphysicians of gender\, we are spoilt for choice! In this talk\, I argue that we do not have to choose a single account of gender kinds\, but can adopt a principled pluralism about gender kinds: there are many different varieties of social kinds that can be understood as gender kinds\, and which ones we need to use in our theorising and practices depend on our explanatory and practical goals. Although many philosophers appear willing to entertain pluralism about gender kinds\, little has been said about how this would work\, and it is important to fend off the worry that pluralism would entail an ontological ‘free-for-all’. I offer a framework for systematising these different gender kinds\, the ‘Constraints and Enablements Framework’ and show how it fends off the free-for-all worry\, revealing gender pluralism as a metaphysically manageable and politically appealing position. \n  \n 
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-2020-10-29/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
ORGANIZER;CN="Ben Sachs":MAILTO:bas7@st-andrews.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20201104T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20201104T140000
DTSTAMP:20260414T072907
CREATED:20200709T165128Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20201105T085334Z
UID:10000282-1604494800-1604498400@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-2-2020-09-23/2020-11-04/
ORGANIZER;CN="Ben Sachs":MAILTO:bas7@st-andrews.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20201111T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20201111T140000
DTSTAMP:20260414T072907
CREATED:20200709T165128Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20201105T085334Z
UID:10000283-1605099600-1605103200@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-2-2020-09-23/2020-11-11/
ORGANIZER;CN="Ben Sachs":MAILTO:bas7@st-andrews.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20201112T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20201112T173000
DTSTAMP:20260414T072907
CREATED:20200709T164951Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20201106T193613Z
UID:10000255-1605196800-1605202200@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk - Robert Talisse (Vanderbilt University)
DESCRIPTION:Title: ‘The Problem of Polarization’ \nAbstract: “The cure for democracy’s ills is more democracy.” This popular adage is false. Contemporary democracy faces problems that have their source in otherwise laudable forms of political participation. In short\, enactments of democratic citizenship heighten our exposure to polarization\, which in turn erodes our capacities to perform well as citizens. This talk examines the phenomenon of polarization\, identifies the problem that polarization poses to democracy\, and proposes a strategy for addressing that problem. Perhaps surprisingly\, if we aim to nurture our democratic capacities\, we need to sometimes engage together in nonpolitical cooperative activities.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-2020-10-01-2020-11-12/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20201116T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20201116T160000
DTSTAMP:20260414T072907
CREATED:20200925T051625Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20201112T193434Z
UID:10000287-1605538800-1605542400@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Cover to Cover Reading Group (Kamm's *Almost Over*)
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/cover-to-cover-reading-group-kamms-almost-over/2020-11-16/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20201118T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20201118T140000
DTSTAMP:20260414T072907
CREATED:20200709T165128Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20201105T085334Z
UID:10000284-1605704400-1605708000@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-2-2020-09-23/2020-11-18/
ORGANIZER;CN="Ben Sachs":MAILTO:bas7@st-andrews.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20201119T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20201119T173000
DTSTAMP:20260414T072907
CREATED:20200709T164951Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20201112T221204Z
UID:10000256-1605801600-1605807000@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk - Mark Schroeder (University of Southern California)
DESCRIPTION:Title: ‘Conflict\, Discord\, and Strife’ \nAbstract: Given that interpersonal relationships are relationships between persons\, we might hold out hope that a better philosophical understanding of the nature of persons can help us to better understand the structure and dynamics of interpersonal relationships. In this talk I will argue that this thought is correct. In particular\, I will argue that the right kind of philosophical theory about the nature of persons can help us to recognize the possibility of an underappreciated form of silencing that can lead us to misunderstand one another\, explain why these forms of misunderstanding can often be symmetric\, and illustrate how such symmetric forms of misunderstanding can drive and perpetuate good-faith conflicts even between perfectly well-meaning parties.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-2020-10-01-2020-11-19/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20201203T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20201203T173000
DTSTAMP:20260414T072907
CREATED:20200819T114814Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20201203T201738Z
UID:10000263-1607011200-1607016600@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:ECT/CEPPA Talk - Sarah Moss (University of Michigan)
DESCRIPTION:Title: ‘How to Be a Clever Contextualist’ \nAbstract: This talk defends a contextualist theory of ‘knowledge’ ascriptions. I argue that in some sentences\, the implicit argument of ‘knows’ is bound by a quantifier. The natural readings of these sentences can be generated by contextualist theories\, but not by competing interest-relative theories of knowledge. In addition\, I argue that the contextualist can explain distinctive patterns in our judgments about sentences in which ‘knows’ is embedded under change-of-state verbs. Along the way\, I argue that the most common definitions of ‘encroachment’ and ‘interest relativity’ are seriously flawed. \n 
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-sarah-moss-university-of-michigan/
ORGANIZER;CN="Nick Kuespert":MAILTO:nk94@st-andrews.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20201210T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20201210T173000
DTSTAMP:20260414T072907
CREATED:20200819T115017Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20201210T152552Z
UID:10000264-1607616000-1607621400@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk - Elizabeth Harman (Princeton University)
DESCRIPTION:Title: ‘Does Morality Speak within the Realm of the Morally Permissible?’ \nAbstract: You hear that your next-door neighbor Alicia is sick with COVID-19. You’re new to the neighborhood and haven’t met Alicia yet. You’re overwhelmed with working from home and overseeing your kids’ remote schooling. You could reach out to Alicia and ask whether she needs someone to pick up medicine or groceries for her; that would be a nice thing to do. Morality doesn’t require you to do it\, and you know that. You think it over. “I don’t have to offer to help\, but I should\,” you think\, and you are right. You offer to help. \nThis could be a true story. Sometimes\, there is a way that you could help someone; you don’t have to help; but all things considered\, you should help. This means that morality speaks within the realm of the morally permissible. Moral reasons can win out within the realm of the morally permissible to settle that you should do something morally good that you don’t have to do. Sometimes\, a supererogatory action should be done. If one fails to act\, then one makes a moral mistake that isn’t morally wrong: it turns out that some moral mistakes are not morally wrong. \nI will argue for this view and then discuss an objection from multiply satisfiable moral requirements. Sometimes you don’t have to do a particular thing because it is just one way of fulfilling a moral requirement; there are other ways you could also fulfill that requirement. This appears to be something that you should do that you don’t have to do. But doing it is not supererogatory—it’s just a way of fulfilling a moral requirement. The objection holds that the cases I use to argue for my view all involve multiply satisfiable moral requirements\, such as the general moral obligation to help some people sometimes. I pursue two lines of response to the objection: the more concessive line of response concedes that my argument needs to be revised in light of the objection\, but shows that this can be done; the less concessive line of response holds that my original argument survives the objection. \nHarman St Andrews Talk Handout December 2020
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-elizabeth-harman-princeton-university/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210128T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210128T173000
DTSTAMP:20260414T072907
CREATED:20200709T164951Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210122T091619Z
UID:10000257-1611849600-1611855000@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk - Lara Buchak (Princeton University)
DESCRIPTION:TITLE: RISK AND AMBIGUITY IN ETHICAL DECISION-MAKING \nABSTRACT: Some of my choices are primarily guided by the interests of others: for example\, which charities to give to or which political policies to vote for. Other of my choices have at least a significant component where I must take others’ interests into account\, though perhaps I can weigh them against my own interests: for example\, which environment-protecting measures to adopt in my personal life. This talk is about how to evaluate the other-affecting component of my decisions. In cases in which all of the empirical facts are known\, it may be easy to say which decision is best for another person. But in cases of risk—we don’t know how the world will turn out—or ambiguity—we don’t even know the probability of the world turning out in various ways—things are less simple. This is particularly the case given the wide range of attitudes towards risk and towards ambiguity that a person could rationally take. After laying out a framework for thinking about these choices\, I will argue for some principles that should govern them.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-2020-10-01-2021-01-28/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210203T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210203T160000
DTSTAMP:20260414T072907
CREATED:20201120T090404Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210116T113802Z
UID:10000296-1612364400-1612368000@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:CEPPA’s Moral Philosophy Reading Group reads and discusses an article per week\, chosen by a different member each time. \nSemester 2 schedule: \nWednesdays 3pm – 4pm\, beginning 3 February and ending 28 April. We will skip the following Wednesdays: 10 Feb\, 24 Mar\, 31 Mar\, 21 Apr. (Due to staff meetings and spring break.) \nOrganizer: Theron Pummer (tgp4). Teams link will be circulated in January 2021.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-3/2021-02-03/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210204T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210204T173000
DTSTAMP:20260414T072907
CREATED:20200819T115311Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210129T204937Z
UID:10000265-1612454400-1612459800@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk - Gwen Bradford (Rice University)
DESCRIPTION:TITLE: Uniqueness\, Intrinsic Value\, and Reasons \n  \nABSTRACT: Uniqueness appears to enhance intrinsic value. A unique stamp sells for millions of dollars; Stradivarius violins are all the more precious because they are unlike any others. This observation has not gone overlooked in the value theory literature: uniqueness plays a starring role recalibrating the dominant Moorean understanding of the nature of intrinsic value. But the thesis that uniqueness enhances intrinsic value is in tension with another deeply plausible and widely-held thesis\, namely the thesis that there is a pro tanto reason to promote the good. It is argued that there is a second\, distinct type of uniqueness that plays a more interesting and important axiological role: uniqueness imparts irreplaceable value. This gives occasion to develop the surprisingly undertheorized notion of irreplaceable value. While one might think the irreplaceable value of persons can now be explained\, it turns out that there is yet a third sense of uniqueness.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-gwen-bradford-rice-university/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20210215
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20210217
DTSTAMP:20260414T072907
CREATED:20210116T121521Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210127T093621Z
UID:10000303-1613347200-1613519999@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Graduate Conference
DESCRIPTION:3rd Annual CEPPA Graduate Conference
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-graduate-conference/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Conference
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210217T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210217T160000
DTSTAMP:20260414T072907
CREATED:20201120T090404Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210116T113802Z
UID:10000297-1613574000-1613577600@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:CEPPA’s Moral Philosophy Reading Group reads and discusses an article per week\, chosen by a different member each time. \nSemester 2 schedule: \nWednesdays 3pm – 4pm\, beginning 3 February and ending 28 April. We will skip the following Wednesdays: 10 Feb\, 24 Mar\, 31 Mar\, 21 Apr. (Due to staff meetings and spring break.) \nOrganizer: Theron Pummer (tgp4). Teams link will be circulated in January 2021.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-3/2021-02-17/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210218T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210218T173000
DTSTAMP:20260414T072907
CREATED:20200709T164951Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210209T130436Z
UID:10000258-1613664000-1613669400@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Works-in-Progress Talk – Lara Jost (St Andrews)
DESCRIPTION:The Epistemic Value of Affective Intentional Experience \nIn this paper\, I argue that despite risks of falsehood\, theorists should recognize that affective intentional experience (AIE)\, which includes emotions\, pains/pleasures and some gut feelings\, can be a source of knowledge and justification. Indeed\, AIE provides the best explanation for how we know certain things. I will focus the analysis on two such cases: pain in patients with endometriosis and microaggressions. I will then discuss points of resistance against the conclusion that AIE is epistemically valuable and why one might defend that it is not a genuine source of knowledge and justification. I will then offer some responses those challenges and explain how such resistance towards AIE impoverishes our epistemological theories and how it contributes to the silencing of marginalized agents\, in particular women and people of colour.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-2020-10-01-2021-02-18/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210224T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210224T160000
DTSTAMP:20260414T072907
CREATED:20201120T090404Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210116T113802Z
UID:10000298-1614178800-1614182400@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:CEPPA’s Moral Philosophy Reading Group reads and discusses an article per week\, chosen by a different member each time. \nSemester 2 schedule: \nWednesdays 3pm – 4pm\, beginning 3 February and ending 28 April. We will skip the following Wednesdays: 10 Feb\, 24 Mar\, 31 Mar\, 21 Apr. (Due to staff meetings and spring break.) \nOrganizer: Theron Pummer (tgp4). Teams link will be circulated in January 2021.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-3/2021-02-24/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210225T100000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210226T170000
DTSTAMP:20260414T072907
CREATED:20200710T111413Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210315T164010Z
UID:10000260-1614247200-1614358800@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Online Workshop: Universal Basic Income and the Meaning of Work
DESCRIPTION:The Centre for Ethics\, Philosophy\, and Public Affairs \nUniversity of St. Andrews \n  \nThis workshop took place 25-26 February\, 2021.  The four presented papers were: \nDeryn Thomas – University of St. Andrews/University of Stirling: “Basic Income and The Collective Benefits of Work”. Paper here and slides here. \nMaria Koumenta – Queen Mary University of London: “The Case Against UBI”. Session video here. \nTom Parr – University of Warwick: “The Significance of Employment”. Session video here. \nAngie O’Sullivan — University of Edinburgh: “Work as Just Compensation: What Nietzschean Genealogy Teaches Us about UBI”. Paper here. \n  \nThis workshop was a prelude to a larger project\, an AHRC-funded Research Network called “The Future of Work and Income”. To join the network and be kept up-to-date on its activities\, please contact the workshop’s organiser. \n  \n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n With gratefully acknowledged support from the
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/workshop-universal-basic-income-and-the-meaning-of-work/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Workshop
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/files/2020/07/pexels-photo-3943746.jpg
ORGANIZER;CN="Ben Sachs":MAILTO:bas7@st-andrews.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR