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X-WR-CALDESC:Events for CEPPA
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220929T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220929T173000
DTSTAMP:20260405T125736
CREATED:20220704T085613Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230705T102513Z
UID:10000286-1664467200-1664472600@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (online only) – Nancy Fraser (The New School)
DESCRIPTION:Location: Teams (online only) \nTitle: Three Faces of Capitalist Labor: Uncovering the Hidden Ties among Gender\, Race\, and Class \nAbstract: Dissatisfied with identity-based politics\, many activists and intellectuals are now seeking larger paradigms that can unify disparate struggles. Aiming to advance that project\, I propose that labor forms the hidden link between gender\, race\, and class. My inspiration is W.E.B. Du Bois’s claim\, in Black Reconstruction\, that nineteenth century America had two labor movements\, anti-slavery and trade unionism\, which tragically failed to unite. Extending this idea to the present\, I expand it by adding a third. Construing feminism\, too\, as a labor movement\, focused on the work of care\, I argue that that capitalist society relies on three distinct types of labor: exploited\, expropriated\, and domesticated. Their structural entwinement\, I maintain\, constitutes the inner\, systemic ties between gender\, race\, and class.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-online-nancy-fraser-the-new-school/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
ORGANIZER;CN="Ben Sachs":MAILTO:bas7@st-andrews.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220928T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220928T140000
DTSTAMP:20260405T125736
CREATED:20220919T152953Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20220919T152953Z
UID:10000358-1664370000-1664373600@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:Description: This group reads and discusses an article per week\, chosen by a different member each time.\nDay/time: Wednesdays 1pm-2pm.\nLocation: Edgecliffe G03 and Teams.\nOrganizer: Theron Pummer (tgp4).
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-5/2022-09-28/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220922T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220922T173000
DTSTAMP:20260405T125736
CREATED:20220704T085350Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230703T153809Z
UID:10000285-1663862400-1663867800@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (online only) – Sally Haslanger (MIT)
DESCRIPTION:Location: Teams (online only) \nTitle: Ideology\, Culture\, and Social Meaning \nAbstract: My aim in this paper is to sketch a conception of ideology that draws on the critical theory tradition. This conception of ideology is a response to a particular challenge for those working on social justice: Why is it that most of us\, most of the time\, act in ways that perpetuate injustice? To begin to answer this question\, I will develop an account\, inspired by Althusser among others\, that embeds ideology in social practices. Social practices enable both human and non-human animals to coordinate fluently and flexibly in response to each other and our environment; and they depend on something like a “language” – a system of signs and signals – that makes socially intelligible agency possible. I call such a framework of meaning and its material apparatus a cultural technē. I go on to argue that Grice’s distinction between natural and non-natural meaning is too coarse to provide us an account of social meaning\, and drawing on Skyrms and others working on signals\, I propose that a cultural technē is a framework or system of signs. I then consider how we might capture the publicity of social meanings in terms that don’t require complex metacognition. I conclude that account of ideology as a cultural technē “gone wrong” provides us the basics of a critical account of ideology. \nYou can read the full paper\, but attendees are not expected to have read the paper in advance.\nCo-hosted with ECT.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-online-sally-haslanger-mit/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
ORGANIZER;CN="Nick Kuespert":MAILTO:nk94@st-andrews.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220921T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220921T140000
DTSTAMP:20260405T125736
CREATED:20220919T152953Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20220919T152953Z
UID:10000357-1663765200-1663768800@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:Description: This group reads and discusses an article per week\, chosen by a different member each time.\nDay/time: Wednesdays 1pm-2pm.\nLocation: Edgecliffe G03 and Teams.\nOrganizer: Theron Pummer (tgp4).
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-5/2022-09-21/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220915T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220915T173000
DTSTAMP:20260405T125736
CREATED:20220704T085204Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20220909T151309Z
UID:10000276-1663257600-1663263000@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in person) – Ben Sachs-Cobbe (St Andrews)
DESCRIPTION:Location: Edgecliffe G03 and Teams \nTitle: What’s wrong with teaching our children to be good citizens? \nAbstract: Character education is a common part of schooling in the U.S. and U.K.\, and one popular argument in favour of character education is that it is conducive to producing citizens who have the virtues that make someone a good citizen.  But there is an oft-heard objection to the idea that educators should try to inculcate the virtues of citizenship\, namely that doing so serves a conservative agenda.  In this talk I investigate what separates a conservative from an anti-conservative theory of good citizenship\, and conclude that educating children for the virtues of citizenship cannot possibly serve a conservative agenda\, or for that matter any controversial political agenda at all.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-ben/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220914T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220914T140000
DTSTAMP:20260405T125736
CREATED:20220919T152953Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20220919T152953Z
UID:10000356-1663160400-1663164000@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:Description: This group reads and discusses an article per week\, chosen by a different member each time.\nDay/time: Wednesdays 1pm-2pm.\nLocation: Edgecliffe G03 and Teams.\nOrganizer: Theron Pummer (tgp4).
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-5/2022-09-14/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20220912
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20220913
DTSTAMP:20260405T125736
CREATED:20220520T094436Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20220911T054038Z
UID:10000270-1662940800-1663027199@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Book Workshop: Elizabeth Ashford's *Hunger’s Witting Executioners*
DESCRIPTION:One-day book workshop on Elizabeth Ashford’s Hunger’s Witting Executioners: Structural Violations of the Right to Subsistence \nPre-read: workshop participants will be expected to read the book manuscript distributed in advance. \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03 and Teams. \nSchedule: \n10:30am to noon: discussion \nLunch break (free time) \n1:30pm to 3pm: discussion \n 
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/book-workshop-elizabeth-ashfords-hungers-witting-executioners/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Workshop
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220908T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220908T173000
DTSTAMP:20260405T125736
CREATED:20220628T053818Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20220831T091553Z
UID:10000274-1662652800-1662658200@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in person) – Cécile Fabre (Oxford)
DESCRIPTION:Location: Edgecliffe G03 \nTitle: The Morality of Gossip \nAbstract: Gossip is pervasive and wide-ranging. It lubricates and wrecks social relationships. Many people openly confess to loving it yet acknowledge that gossiping\, while often gratifying\, is\, if not morally wrong\, at least not quite right. Gossip has not received much attention in moral philosophy. In this paper\, I argue that notwithstanding the fact that gossip often has beneficial effects\, it is often wrong\, on Kantian grounds. To that end\, I first provide an account of the phenomenon of gossip and of its value. I then argue that two fairly standard arguments against gossip do capture some morally problematic features of gossip (to do with breach of trust and deception) but are under inclusive. The deeper underlying worry about gossip\, I go on to claim\, is that it amounts to a particular kind of failure to treat others – be they gossipees or gossipers – as persons.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-cecile-fabre-oxford/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20220901
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20220902
DTSTAMP:20260405T125736
CREATED:20220414T151636Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20220830T125509Z
UID:10000350-1661990400-1662076799@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Contractarianism\, Role Obligations\, and Political Morality
DESCRIPTION:An in-person symposium in St. Andrews on themes from the recently-published\, Contractarianism\, Role Obligations\, and Political Morality\, by Ben Sachs. \nLocation: Edgecliffe\, G03 \nSchedule (all times PM) \n1:30-1:55: Ben Sachs-Cobbe\, Philosophy\, University of St. Andrews\, “Welcome and Summary” (Chs. 1-3) \n1:55-2:35: Michael Moore\, Law\, University of Illinois\, “Finding the Purposes of Staplers and States” (Ch. 4) \n2:35-3:15: Antony Duff\, Philosophy\, University of Stirling (Emeritus)\, “Legal Liberalism+ and the Varieties of Legal Moralism” (Ch. 5) \n3:15-3:45: Tea/coffee break \n3:45-4:25: Cécile Fabre\, Political Philosophy\, University of Oxford\, “Who’s In\, Who’s Out: the Scope of Contractarian Political Morality” (Ch. 6) \n4:30-5:10: Visa Kurki\, Jurisprudence\, University of Helsinki\, “Sachs on the Legal Status of Sentient Animals” (Ch. 7) \n5:15-5:45: Panel Session\, with all speakers mentioned above as panelists \nBook Precis \nContractarianism is well suited as a political morality…or so this book argues\, before going on to explore the implications of deploying contractarianism in this way.  Its starting point is the natural thought that the state owes things to its people: physical security\, public health and sanitation services\, and a functioning judiciary\, for example.  But we need a theory—a political morality—that can explain why this is so and identify who the state’s ‘people’ are.  The book argues that what it means for the state to have obligations is for the state’s office-holders (e.g.\, its legislators\, judges\, and bureaucrats) to have role obligations.  These role obligations derive from the purpose of the state\, which is grounded in the intentions of those who partake in the sustaining of the state. By way of extracting implications from this new version of contractarianism\, the book argues first that at least an extremely weak version of political liberalism follows from it.  And this small dose of political liberalism yields a very strong version of legal liberalism (the view that the goodness/badness of an act doesn’t figure in to the question of how the law\, including the criminal law\, ought to deal with that act).  Second\, the book argues that there is an important sense in which it’s false that sentient animals as such are among the state’s people\, and that the arguments for extending citizenship to this fail.  Finally\, from there the book argues for a moderate position on the proper legal status of such animals. \nRegistration \nAttendance is free\, thanks to gratefully acknowledged support from the Scots Philosophical Association.  Although registration is not required\, it would be helpful if you’d register by sending an email to Ben Sachs-Cobbe (bas7@st-andrews.ac.uk).  Those who register might get a free meal or two\, budget allowing! \nThe symposium venue is disability accessible and funds are available to pay for childcare for those who need it in order to attend.  If you have any questions about the symposium\, please contact Ben Sachs-Cobbe (bas7@st-andrews.ac.uk).
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/contractarianism-role-obligations-and-political-morality/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03\, The Scores\, St Salvator's Quad\, KY16 9AL
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/files/2022/05/pexels-ethan-wilkinson-5428705-scaled.jpg
ORGANIZER;CN="Ben Sachs":MAILTO:bas7@st-andrews.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20220701
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20220703
DTSTAMP:20260405T125736
CREATED:20211011T102433Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20220520T070930Z
UID:10000338-1656633600-1656806399@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:SAF aesthetics and social epistemology conference
DESCRIPTION:For details: \nhttps://www.scottishaestheticsforum.com/upcoming-events
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/saf-aesthetics-and-social-epistemology-conference-dates-tentative/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20220624
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20220626
DTSTAMP:20260405T125736
CREATED:20220128T091308Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230703T153448Z
UID:10000340-1656028800-1656201599@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Epistemic Breakthroughs Conference
DESCRIPTION:Epistemic Breakthroughs: A workshop\nUniversity of St Andrews \nJoin us for a philosophical workshop on the topic of “epistemic breakthroughs\,” held at the University of St Andrews\, in partnership with the JN Wright Trust\, The Mind Association\, and the Scots Philosophical Association. \n\nWhen?\n\nFriday\, June 24th\nSaturday\, June 25th\n\nWhere?\nLecture Room 2\, at St Mary’s College (See picture below for entry point – room is on 1st floor\, first door on the left) University of St Andrews \nWhat’s it about?\nOur epistemic lives are marked by discoveries\, changes of mind\, epiphanies (if we are lucky)\, and ‘turning points’ – some of them potentially radical in nature. We may call these events epistemic breakthroughs. This philosophical workshop invites participants to think about the nature\, varieties\, and causation of such breakthroughs\, as well as about their role in politics\, society\, and personal life. \nHow do I attend online?\nFor those who would like to attend online\, we will be live-streaming the event. To attend the live-stream\, you must register (Please note that\, while we may take questions from the online audience\, priority will be given to in person discussion). \n\n24th June\n\n9:00 – 9:30: Arrival and coffee\n9:30 – 11:00\n\nSanford Goldberg (Northwestern) “What do Speakers Deserve? The Ethics and Epistemology of #BelieveWomen”\nCommentator: Susanne Burri (Universität Konstanz)\n\n\n11:15 – 12:45\n\nFabienne Peter (Warwick) “On Trusting Your Own Political Judgment”\nCommentator: Robert Talisse (Vanderbilt)\n\n\n12:45 – 1:45: Lunch\n2:00 – 3:30\n\nCatarina Dutilh Novaes (VU Amsterdam) “Can Arguments Change Minds?”\nCommentator: Jim Weatherall\n\n\n3:45 – 5:15\n\nRachel Fraser (Oxford) “Understanding is Seeing”\nCommentator: Justin Snedegar (St Andrews)\n\n\n\n25th June\n\n9:00 – 9:30: Arrival and coffee\n9:30 – 11:00\n\nSophie-Grace Chappell (Open University) “Epiphanies”\nCommentator: Julia Driver (Texas at Austin)\n\n\n11:15 – 12:45\n\nAdam Etinson (St Andrews) “Inducing Wonder”\nCommentator: Louise Hanson (Oxford)\n\n\n12:45 – 1:45: Lunch\n2:00 – 3:30\n\nC. Thi Nguyen (Utah) “Trust as an Unquestioning Attitude”\nCommentator: Natalie Ashton (Stirling)\n\n\n3:45 – 5:15\n\nCailin O’Connor (UC Irvine) “Interdisciplinarity Can Aid the Spread of Better Methods Between Scientific Communities”\nCommentator: Katharina Bernhard (St Andrews)
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/epistemic-breakthroughs-conference/
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/files/2022/01/Epistemic-Breakthroughs-Poster-scaled.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20220615
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20220616
DTSTAMP:20260405T125736
CREATED:20220530T151615Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20220530T151718Z
UID:10000272-1655251200-1655337599@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:SOCIETY AND HUMAN NATURE: A Workshop in Early Modern Philosophy
DESCRIPTION:Wednesday\, 15 June 2022\nEdgecliffe\, Room 104\, University of St Andrews \n9:30-10:00: Welcome coffee \nMorning session: \nChair: James Harris (University of St Andrews) \n10:00-10:45: David Harmon (University of St Andrews) “The Model of Human Nature and Whether ‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’ in Spinoza” \n10:45-11:30: Ruth Boeker (University College Dublin) “Catharine Trotter Cockburn on Self-interest\, Self-love\, and Benevolence” \n11:30-12:00: Coffee Break \n12:00-12:45: M. Folescu (University of Missouri) “Some remarks on Mary Shepherd’s Essays on the Perception of an External Universe” \n12:45-14:00: Lunch \nAfternoon session: \nChair: Mara van der Lugt (University of St Andrews) \n14:00-14.45: Xiao Qi (University of St Andrews) “Unpacking the Sentiment of Moral Obligation in Hume’s Treatise: Ambiguities and Tentative Solutions” \n14:45-15:30: Catherine Dromelet (University of Antwerp) “Hume and Durkheim. Common views on sociality” \n15:30-16:00: Coffee Break \n16:00-16:45: Tim Stuart-Buttle (University of York) “‘The only true conservatism’: Hume\, Dewey\, and the experimental method in morals” \n18:00: Dinner \nPlease email eg240@st.andrews.ac.uk by 10 June to register \nOrganized by Enrico Galvagni with the generous support of the University of St Andrews\, St Leonard’s Postgraduate College\, Scots Philosophical Association\, CEPPA\, and the British Society for the History of Philosophy
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/society-and-human-nature-a-workshop-in-early-modern-philosophy/
ORGANIZER;CN="Enrico Galvagni":MAILTO:eg240@st-andrews.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220609T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220609T173000
DTSTAMP:20260405T125736
CREATED:20220402T100027Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20220609T053016Z
UID:10000349-1654790400-1654795800@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in person) – Brian Hedden (ANU)
DESCRIPTION:Location: School 6 \nTitle: Counterfactual Decision Theory \nAbstract: I defend counterfactual decision theory\, which says that you should evaluate an act in terms of which outcomes would likely obtain\, were you to perform it. Counterfactual decision theory has traditionally been subsumed under causal decision theory as a particular formulation of the latter. This is a mistake. Counterfactual decision theory is importantly different from\, and superior to\, causal decision theory. Causation and counterfactuals come apart in three kinds of cases. In cases of overdetermination\, an act can cause a good outcome without the latter counterfactually depending on the former. In cases of constitution\, an act can constitute a good outcome rather than causing it. In cases of determinism\, either the laws or the past counterfactually depend on your act\, even though your act cannot cause the laws or the past to be different. In each of these cases\, it is counterfactual decision theory which gives the right verdict\, and for the right reasons. \nCo-Hosted with ECT
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-brian-hedden-anu/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
ORGANIZER;CN="Jessica Brown":MAILTO:jab30@st-andrews.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220601T143000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220601T160000
DTSTAMP:20260405T125736
CREATED:20220322T174603Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230703T152539Z
UID:10000348-1654093800-1654099200@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Enrico Galvagni – CEPPA Work-In-Progress Talk (in person)
DESCRIPTION:Location: Edgecliffe G03 \nTitle: Hume’s Account of Virtue and Its Place in the History of Ethics \nAbstract: Hume’s account of virtue is notoriously puzzling. On the one hand\, he claims that the virtues are qualities useful or agreeable to oneself or to others. On the other\, he says that they are qualities which give a pleasing sentiment of approbation to a spectator. In this paper\, I argue that these two claims are part of one unified definition of virtue and that Hume’s apparently idiosyncratic account is best explained historically. To do so\, I show that Hume inherited from Natural Law theorists (such as Pufendorf and Locke) the problem of squaring the existence of morality with the belief that physical entities have\, in themselves\, no moral relevance. The solution offered by his predecessors\, however\, was not available to Hume who refused to ground morality in the authoritative command of God. I claim that Hume’s account of virtue has to be explained as an attempt to introduce a naturalistic and secular solution to this central problem in the history of ethics.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/enrico-galvagni-ceppa-work-in-progress-talk/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
ORGANIZER;CN="Luca Stroppa":MAILTO:ls330@st-andrews.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20220531
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20220601
DTSTAMP:20260405T125736
CREATED:20210602T093951Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20220427T214551Z
UID:10000312-1653955200-1654041599@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:The Ethics Cup - The Finals
DESCRIPTION:The finals of 2022 The Ethics Cup\, featuring the 12 top-performing teams from across the U.K.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/john-stuart-mill-cup-the-finals/
LOCATION:United College\, St. Andrews\, KY16 9AL\, United Kingdom
ORGANIZER;CN="Ben Sachs":MAILTO:bas7@st-andrews.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20220527
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20220529
DTSTAMP:20260405T125736
CREATED:20220216T201845Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20220519T195547Z
UID:10000341-1653609600-1653782399@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:4th St Andrews CEPPA Graduate Conference -- May 27-28\, 2022 (Online)
DESCRIPTION:You can participate in the conference via this Teams link. For socializing after the conference\, visit this Gather.town space. \nFor any questions\, please write to ceppaconference@st-andrews.ac.uk. \n  \nProgramme\n\nMay 27\n  \n10:00 – 11:15 Keynote: Charlotte Unruh (Munich): Doing Harm\, Doing Good \nAbstract: The Harm-Benefit-Asymmetry is the claim that the reason against doing harm is stronger than the reason for doing good. Shelly Kagan has argued that deontologists face a challenge: they need to accept the Harm-Benefit-Asymmetry to explain intuitions in rescue cases\, but they lack a justification for the asymmetry. In this talk\, I aim to resolve Kagan’s challenge. I first argue that deontologists can explain rescue cases without appealing to the Harm-Benefit-Asymmetry\, but that they need the asymmetry to explain pure benefit cases. I then sketch a justification for the Harm-Benefit-Asymmetry that draws on the deontological distinction between doing and allowing. \n  \n11:15 – 11:30 Short break \n  \n11:30 – 12:45 Jonas Haeg (KCL): A Duty to Accommodate Wrongdoers? \nCommentator: Theron Pummer \nAbstract: It is intuitive to think that we are required to take at least minor steps to\, effectively\, accommodate wrongdoers. For instance\, we should run away rather than impose serious defensive harm on aggressors\, and we should avoid getting ourselves into dangerous situations if we can relatively easily avoid it. Some argue against this and claim that we are never under a duty to incur any costs for the sake of accommodating wrongdoers in these kinds of cases. Part of their argument is that a duty to accommodate wrongdoers leads to counterintuitive results. In this paper\, I argue that the sceptic is wrong. Their alleged counterexamples do not entail that we are never required to accommodate wrongdoers. It is perfectly compatible with the more intuitively plausible view that we are sometimes required to accommodate wrongdoers at small costs to ourselves. \n  \n12:45 – 14:00 Lunch Break \n  \n15:00 – 16:15 Pietro Cibinel (Princeton): Second Thoughts on the Paretian Route to Utilitarianism \nCommentator: Luca Stroppa \nAbstract. If\, in a decision under risk\, every person affected by your choice rationally prefers that you act one way\, then you should act that way. This Paretian principle should be appealing to many\, including non-utilitarians. However\, accepting this Paretian principle and rejecting a utilitarian principle of distribution delivers counterintuitive verdicts in the context of diachronic choice\, as Doody (manuscript) and Kowalczyk (forthcoming) show. I suggest that Paretian non-utilitarians respond to this problem by adopting a limited version of the diachronic principle of resolute choice\, for moral decision-making. This move can be motivated by appealing both to people’s capacity to waive future claims at some earlier time\, and to the fact that\, the further apart these two times are\, the harder it becomes to exercise this capacity. This limit to this capacity is due to the fact that one’s later self might justifiably have second thoughts about the earlier self’s decision. The resulting view shares more with utilitarianism than some non-utilitarians would be willing to accept; unlike utilitarianism\, however\, it makes room for certain considerations of fairness. \n  \n16:15 – 16:30 Small Break \n  \n16:30 – 17:45 Keynote: Jonathan Quong (USC): Paternalism\, Disagreement\, and Groups \nAbstract: Some claim that paternalism necessarily involves attempting to benefit someone against their expressed or assumed preferences. More strongly\, Jonathan Parry has argued that is it always presumptively wrong to benefit someone against their competent wishes. This\, I argue\, is false: there are many cases where we do not wrong someone by benefitting them against their competent wishes. This is true\, I suggest\, because paternalism’s distinctive wrongness involves the paternalizer acting on the basis of a negative judgment about the paternalizee. Benefitting someone against their wishes need not involve this kind of negative judgment. I argue that this alternative construal of paternalism has significant practical implications for acts that involve benefits to groups. \n  \nMay 28\n  \n10:00 – 11:15 Solmu Anttila (VU Amsterdam): Do Citizens have a Responsibility to be Informed? \nCommentator: Ben Sachs \nAbstract: This paper investigates 1) whether or what kind of moral and political responsibilities citizens have to be knowledgeable about some set of topics or claims\, and 2) whether or what kinds of epistemic responsibilities citizens have to treat\, receive\, transmit\, exchange\, or generate information. I call these two sets of responsibilities the political-epistemic responsibilities (of citizens). \nThe first section of the paper investigates the moral and political responsibilities of citizens to be knowledgeable about some set of topics and claims. First\, I make a distinction between moral and political responsibilities. Moral responsibilities of citizens’ knowledgeability involve the ethical nature and ethically relevant aspects of the informing oneself. Moral responsibilities involve a freedom and an epistemic condition: to be morally responsible\, citizens must be free in their actions to inform themselves and they must be aware about the moral nature and consequences of their actions. I raise challenges to both of these conditions\, and argue that the freedom condition is at best highly limited especially in regard to politically relevant claims\, while the epistemic condition of moral responsibility in general cannot reasonably be met. Political responsibilities of information involve the responsibilities of each agent in the political structure to fulfil their political role and duty. Political responsibilities involve a responsibility distribution within the citizens’ state or constituency. I argue that proportional responsibility distributions (see Pasternak\, 2021) do not suggest political responsibilities for citizens\, while non-proportional responsibility distributions are ultimately unjustified (Anttila\, forthcoming). Additionally\, I argue that if it is understood that both kinds of responsibility involve accountability\, because without some form of consequence of being held liable\, responsibility is meaningless\, the condition of accountability is infeasible. \nThe second section investigates whether citizenship involves some set of epistemic responsibilities to treat\, receive\, transmit\, exchange\, or generate information in specific ways. Epistemic responsibilities are responsibilities according to which an epistemic agent ought to treat information in a specific way or in accordance with a set of epistemic virtues in order for their belief in it to be justified or in order\, in the case that someone is epistemically responsible for another person\, to not mislead others. I argue that while the liberal conception of citizenship (Honohan\, 2017) does not conceptually entail any specific epistemic responsibilities\, the republican conception of citizenship (ibid.; Beiner\, 1995) can be interpreted to include epistemic responsibilities. This opens a narrow possibility for a republican political-epistemic responsibility that takes into account the previously discussed limitations from moral and political responsibility. \nThe penultimate section discusses the implications of the argument against political-epistemic responsibilities for the theory of epistemic democracy\, according to which a strength of democratic systems of government is their ability to ‘track the truth’ (List & Goodin\, 2001) about political decisions. I argue that the argument against political-epistemic responsibility does not threaten the viability of deliberative and non-deliberative forms of epistemic democracy. In fact\, I argue\, a strong accountability measure for political-epistemic responsibilities might threaten epistemic democracy. \nThe last section summarises more plausibly effective ways to combat and prevent the spread of misinformation than a bestowal of political-epistemic responsibilities. \n  \n11:15 – 11:30 Short break \n  \n11:30 – 12:45 Ronja Griep (Cambridge): When Does Bodily Shame Go Wrong? The Case of Menstrual Shaming \nCommentator: Lara Jost \nAbstract: I argue that menstrual shaming constitutes an injustice in a grey area: attending to the phenomenology of menstrual shaming shows that such shaming restricts women’s habits and lifestyles severely. I argue that such habit-formation influenced by shame and institutional failures leads to women’s self-respect being undermined. It undermines their self-respect at early yet important stages of women’s lives\, while remaining often invisible and highly normalised. This account of injustice arising from the phenomenology of menstrual shaming\, I conclude\, gives us important insights into which other forms of bodily shaming constitute injustice and why they do so. \n  \n12:45 – 14:00 Lunch Break \n  \n15:00 – 16:15 Eliza Wells (MIT): Social Roles and Moral Ignorance \nCommentator: Nick Küspert \nAbstract: The following claim is frequently offered as an attempt to avoid blame for wrong actions: “I didn’t know I was doing anything wrong; I was just doing my job.” Philosophers and laypeople alike tend to reject this kind of excuse; in particular\, the appeal to one’s job as a way to deflect responsibility can seem morally suspect. I argue\, however\, that this appeal can be legitimate. Social roles involve deliberative as well as behavioral constraints. These deliberative constraints can include exclusionary reasons: second-order reasons not to take certain considerations into account. Role-occupants may thus be genuinely ignorant that their actions are wrong\, because they exclude the considerations that ground their actions’ wrongness from their practical reasoning. I argue that in these cases\, the excuse above functions as a successful appeal to the epistemic condition on moral responsibility\, which allows ignorance to excuse agents from blameworthiness for wrong actions. Agents who are “just doing their jobs” may experience non-culpable ignorance. \n  \n16:15 – 16:30 Small Break \n  \n16:30 – 17:45 Keynote: Susan Notess (Durham): The Mistakenness of ‘Charity’: On Organ Donation and Reciprocity \nAbstract: When we do philosophy\, we always start from somewhere\, and where we start from shapes the kinds of questions we ask and the types of answers we will be able to find. The starting places ordinarily available to us in mainstream analytic philosophy lead us to find a rich vein of normative questions to be asked around issues such as the ethics of charity\, including the fairly unusual case of charitable organ donation. In this talk\, I locate a very different potential starting point in North American Indigenous Philosophers’ work\, and I trace the rather different sets of questions and answers that arise when we begin from there. I invite the audience to think with me through the comparison between these sets of questions\, reflecting on what we can learn about reciprocity and charity\, including in the case of organ donation. Finally\, I will suggest some ways that our meta-philosophical assumptions might be troubled by this exercise\, inviting discussion of the philosophical values of accountability\, responsibility\, and reciprocity.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/4th-st-andrews-ceppa-graduate-conference-may-27-28-2022-online/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Conference
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220525T143000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220525T160000
DTSTAMP:20260405T125736
CREATED:20220321T173710Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20220525T062903Z
UID:10000347-1653489000-1653494400@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in person) – Matthew Adler (Duke University)
DESCRIPTION:Location: Edgecliffe G03 and Teams \nTitle: “Person-Affecting Consequentialism: Equity-Regarding\, Desert-Neutral\, Repugnant” \nAbstract: \nThe philosophical literature on consequentialism regularly distinguishes between “person-affecting” and “impersonal” moral justifications or accounts.   The “person-affecting”/”impersonal” distinction can be interpreted in various ways.  I understand it as follows.  A person-affecting justificatory framework sees individuals’ well-being gains and losses—well-being effects on persons—as the fundamental moral considerations that underlie the moral goodness of outcomes. \nMy research has investigated the implications of the person-affecting framework\, using the concept of “claims-across-outcomes”—a concept that seeks to make the framework more rigorous and to draw clear implications from it. This talk will present and synthesize the results of this research program. \nIn a nutshell: the claims-across-outcomes framework argues for a moral-goodness ranking that satisfies an equity axiom (the Pigou-Dalton axiom)\, as opposed to utilitarianism; is neutral to individual differences in desert; and (extended to the variable-population context) implies the Repugnant Conclusion.  In short\, person-affecting consequentialism is equity-regarding\, desert-neutral\, and repugnant.  Surprisingly\, perhaps\, the simple idea that moral goodness is grounded on well-being gains and losses has these upshots.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-matthew-adler-duke-university/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220519T171500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220519T184500
DTSTAMP:20260405T125736
CREATED:20210820T142825Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20220412T154432Z
UID:10000313-1652980500-1652985900@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Knox Lecture 2022 - Frances Kamm (Rutgers University)
DESCRIPTION:The 2022 Knox Lecture will be delivered online by Professor Frances Kamm (Rutgers University) on Thursday\, 19 May at 5:15pm UK time. \nTitle: “Handling Future Pandemics: Harming\, Not Aiding\, and Liberty” \nAbstract: All over the world there have been protests\, based on a concern with liberty\, against restrictions intended to defeat the current pandemic. In the light of possible future pandemics\, this paper is concerned with which moral duties are justifiable in principle to those concerned with liberty. It considers the distinction between duties not to harm or risk harm and those to aid\, the idea of morally innocent threats\, the role of self-defense against harm\, and the allocation of benefits and burdens among those who are and are not likely to harm others. \nTeams link: https://teams.microsoft.com/l/meetup-join/19%3ameeting_NDQ4M2UyMzYtMDljYS00ZGYzLWI2MzMtYzZiZTdkODk0YzFh%40thread.v2/0?context=%7b%22Tid%22%3a%22f85626cb-0da8-49d3-aa58-64ef678ef01a%22%2c%22Oid%22%3a%22a103bbeb-82cb-4813-ad29-375809eca528%22%2c%22IsBroadcastMeeting%22%3atrue%7d&btype=a&role=a
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/knox-lecture-2022-frances-kamm-rutgers-university/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220512T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220512T173000
DTSTAMP:20260405T125736
CREATED:20220302T121057Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20220509T151523Z
UID:10000345-1652371200-1652376600@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (online only) – Jeff McMahan (Oxford University)
DESCRIPTION:Title: “Compensation for Wrongful Life” \nAbstract: In a recent case in the UK\, a 20-year-old woman with spina bifida brought an action against her mother’s physician for failing to advise her to take folic acid supplements for several months before becoming pregnant. The court ruled in the woman’s favor\, accepting her claim that\, had the physician not acted negligently\, the mother would have had a healthy child. Yet this healthy child would have been a different child. So the physician’s omission was not worse\, or on balance bad\, for the plaintiff\, who has a life that is well worth living. If anything\, it benefited her. So on what basis can she claim a right to compensation\, or damages? I consider whether the court might have justified its decision by appealing to Parfit’s “No-Difference View\,” which asserts that it makes no moral difference whether a bad effect is worse for anyone. I will consider as well whether there is a requirement to cause a better-off individual to exist rather than a different\, less well-off individual\, or whether it might be permissible to cause the less well-off individual to exist. Also\, do an agent’s intentions matter to whether the agent is liable to pay damages in a case of wrongful life? Finally\, is a claim of wrongful life better grounded if the explanation of why the individual ought not to have been caused to exist concerns suffering in the individual’s life rather than a comparative lack of benefits?
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-jeff-mcmahan-oxford-university/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
ORGANIZER;CN="Joel Joseph":MAILTO:jj73@st-andrews.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220505T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220505T173000
DTSTAMP:20260405T125736
CREATED:20220223T092105Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20220223T165153Z
UID:10000342-1651766400-1651771800@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in person) – Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (Duke University)
DESCRIPTION:Location: Edgecliffe G03 \nTitle: How to Build Morality into AI \nAbstract: AI is spreading fast. We humans need to figure out the best way to prevent AI from making the worst decisions\, which are harmful\, unfair\, or otherwise morally wrong. One way is to design AI to predict what humans would judge to be immoral if they were informed\, rational\, and impartial. Then the AI can use that information when making its choices. This talk will illustrate this method in a test case of who gets the kidney when two patients need a transplant but only one kidney is available. This same approach can be extended to other areas of morality\, including end-of-life decisions in medicine\, hiring and promotion in business\, pretrial release in criminal law\, and autonomous vehicles and weapons. The result will be AI that aligns with our deepest values.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-walter-sinnott-armstrong-duke-university/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220421T103000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220421T120000
DTSTAMP:20260405T125736
CREATED:20220225T155313Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20220414T150818Z
UID:10000344-1650537000-1650542400@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk – Stephanie Collins (Monash University)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Legislative Intent: A Rational Unity Account\n(co-authored with David Tan (Deakin University)) \nAbstract: Does the legislature have intentions concerning the effects of legislation? If so\, how can that intent be known by outsiders? Existing theories of legislative intent can be divided into three camps: skepticism\, constructivism\, and realism. This paper begins by outlining problems for existing realist accounts. The paper then offers a new realist theory of legislative intent: the rational unity account. The paper explains how this account avoids the problems with existing versions of realism\, while also capturing the sense in which the legislature is a rational agent with intentions that can be distinguished from the intentions of individual legislators. We explain what evidence outsiders can\, and should\, use when attributing intentions to the legislature. \nCo-Hosted with ECT.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-stephanie-collins-monash-university/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
ORGANIZER;CN="Jessica Brown":MAILTO:jab30@st-andrews.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220414T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220414T173000
DTSTAMP:20260405T125736
CREATED:20220225T154946Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20220405T075532Z
UID:10000343-1649952000-1649957400@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk – David Christensen (Brown University)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Epistemic Akrasia: No Apology Required \nAbstract: It is natural to think that rationality imposes some relationship between what a person believes\, and what she believes about what she’s rational to believe. Epistemic akrasia—for example\, believing P while believing that P is not rational to believe in your situation—is often seen as intrinsically irrational. This paper argues otherwise. In certain cases\, akrasia is intuitively rational. Understanding why akratic beliefs in those case are indeed rational provides a deeper explanation how typical akratic beliefs are irrational—an explanation that does not flow from akrasia per se. This understanding also allows us to diagnose where general anti-akratic arguments go wrong. We can then see why even principles designed to allow only moderate akrasia fail\, and also why recognizing the possibility of rational akratic beliefs does not call for finding some other epistemic defect in agents who believe akratically. Believing akratically\, in itself\, is nothing to apologize for.\nCo-Hosted with ECT.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-david-christensen-brown-university/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
ORGANIZER;CN="Nick Kuespert":MAILTO:nk94@st-andrews.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220407T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220407T173000
DTSTAMP:20260405T125736
CREATED:20210830T152931Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20211130T150505Z
UID:10000322-1649347200-1649352600@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk – Kristie Dotson (University of Michigan)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Beyond the Now: Epistemic Oppression and the “Common” Sense of Incarceration \nAbstract: In this presentation\, I narrate an encounter with 2 Black teenagers who attempted to steal my cellphone and the difficulty of insisting on accountability while avoiding the worst parts of the state-run criminal justice system. Ultimately\, I demonstrate that\, at times\, when a situation calls for accountability for a serious wrongdoing in the U.S. one can find oneself trapped in a “now” that has been constructed by 1) ineffective carceral imaginations\, 2) insufficient structural options for accountability\, and 3) inadequate lexicons of permissibility. I conclude by suggesting key questions for exploration in the U.S. carceral state are: what are the communities we want to build with the accountability options on which we rely? How can we make the current “common” sense of incarceration “uncommon?” \nCo-Hosted with ECT and FPST \n 
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-kristie-dotson/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
ORGANIZER;CN="Nick Kuespert":MAILTO:nk94@st-andrews.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220331T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220331T173000
DTSTAMP:20260405T125736
CREATED:20220315T213313Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20220315T213527Z
UID:10000346-1648742400-1648747800@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in person) – Thomas Schmidt (Humboldt-University)
DESCRIPTION:Location: Edgecliffe G03 \nTitle: Ought and the Transmission of Reasons \nAbstract: According to the widely held Weightiest Reasons view about how reasons for action and the practical ought are related to one another\, \n(WR)  an agent ought to φ if\, and only if\, the reasons for φ are weightier than the reasons for every incompatible alternative to φ. \nI show that complementing (WR) in a way that results in an extensionally adequate account is surprisingly difficult and compromises intuitive plausibility. In particular\, it turns out that (WR) only returns correct results when it is combined with principles of reasons transmission some of which entail an implausible proliferation of reasons. Even so\, the theoretical package that friends of (WR) must accept is to be preferred over competing views.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-thomas-schmidt/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220317T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220317T173000
DTSTAMP:20260405T125736
CREATED:20220113T195455Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20220316T171405Z
UID:10000339-1647532800-1647538200@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Lara Jost - CEPPA Work-In-Progress Talk
DESCRIPTION:Title: The Labours of Chronic Illness \nAbstract: In this presentation\, I aim to explain the three types of labour- administrative labour\, hermeneutic labour and epistemic labour- that chronically ill people have to engage in to get good care. The goal is to highlight why being chronically ill is often considered by many chronically ill people to be a full-time or part-time job\, often without being recognized as such by others. I focus on the epistemic labour and the hermeneutic labour and explain why they are disproportionately higher when it comes to certain chronic illnesses. I argue that this higher cost is in part the result of a deep disagreement about how these patients should testify about their illness\, caused by a cluster of types of epistemic injustices. To illustrate this dynamic\, I attend to the applied case of endometriosis\, a gynaecological chronic illness causing pelvic pain and infertility. Finally\, I offer some avenues for improvement that the healthcare system could focus on to lessen the epistemic and hermeneutic labour of chronic illness and improve the lives of chronically ill people.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/lara-jost-ceppa-work-in-progress-talk/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
ORGANIZER;CN="Nick Kuespert":MAILTO:nk94@st-andrews.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220210T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220210T173000
DTSTAMP:20260405T125736
CREATED:20210930T163726Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210930T163726Z
UID:10000337-1644508800-1644514200@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk – Michael Huemer (University of Colorado Boulder)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Justice Before Role Obligations \nAbstract: Many believe that agents in the justice system are morally constrained to follow certain assigned roles\, understood as excluding the exercise of moral judgement: lawyers to serve the interests of their clients\, judges to enforce the law as written by the legislature\, and juries to assess the factual evidence and apply the law as directed by the judge. These roles\, however\, often entail knowingly bringing about serious\, unjust harms. I argue that agents in the justice system should ignore putative role obligations that conflict with justice.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-michael-huemer-university-of-colorado-boulder/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
ORGANIZER;CN="Luca Stroppa":MAILTO:ls330@st-andrews.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211216T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211216T173000
DTSTAMP:20260405T125736
CREATED:20210830T153341Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20211207T104022Z
UID:10000324-1639670400-1639675800@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk – Jennifer Morton (University of Pennsylvania)
DESCRIPTION:Title: An Agential Account of Poverty \nAbstract: Poverty has traditionally been conceived as a state of deprivation. To be poor is to lack something that is essential to human flourishing. How that something is conceived—in terms of welfare\, resources\, or capabilities—and how it is to be measured—in absolute terms or as relative to a social standard—has been the subject of much debate within development circles. Though many philosophers have written about our obligations to the poor\, relatively little philosophical attention has been devoted to thinking of poverty as a phenomenon ripe for philosophical analysis. In this paper\, I put forward a theory of poverty rooted in the philosophy of action. I argue that to be poor is to be in a context in which an agent’s capacity for long-term deliberation is systemically undermined by rational pressure to engage in efficient short-term deliberation. In other words\, to be poor is to have to constantly turn one’s mind to the immediate satisfaction of current needs and desires at the expense of deliberating about the pursuit of long-term projects and ends that one deeply values.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-jennifer-morton-university-of-pennsylvania/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211209T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211209T173000
DTSTAMP:20260405T125736
CREATED:20210830T153109Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20211202T170202Z
UID:10000323-1639065600-1639071000@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk – Peter Railton (University of Michigan)
DESCRIPTION:Climate Change\, COVID-19\, Justice\, and Quality of Life \nAbstract: Justice would appear to require that those who are the principal beneficiaries of a history of economic and political behavior that has resulted in harmful global climate change should bear a correspondingly large share of the burden in contending with these harms worldwide. At the same time\, however\, a prevalent material conception of quality of life has led many to assume that taking on this burden would require diminishing the quality of life—and associated level of well-being or happiness—enjoyed in the most-developed countries. For such societies fully to accept this burden therefore seems unlikely to achieve the social and political support it would need. However\, I will argue that a material conception of quality of life is at odds with what can be learned from an extensive body of evidence regarding “subjective well-being”—an imperfect though informative empirical measure of how people experience and evaluate their lives. This evidence suggests an account of the sources and nature of subjective well-being that is compatible with more sustainable levels of resource utilization and more equitable global distribution. The COVID-19 pandemic can be seen as a stress-test for responses to global climate change\, and it has witnessed wide differences in the health outcomes for countries that are not simply a function of the level of material wealth or available technological or medical resources. Effective social policies\, institutions\, and practices have been accompanied by better and fairer health outcomes with less disruption of daily life\, suggesting that the purported “health vs. economy” or “health vs. personal freedom” trade-offs in the most-developed societies have been misconceived. Might something similar be true of the supposed costs to the quality of life of more effective environmental policies and practices on the part of the most-developed societies?
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-peter-railton-university-of-michigan/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
ORGANIZER;CN="Nick Kuespert":MAILTO:nk94@st-andrews.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211201T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211201T160000
DTSTAMP:20260405T125736
CREATED:20210830T180836Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210830T181258Z
UID:10000336-1638370800-1638374400@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:Moral Philosophy Reading Group\nDescription: This group reads and discusses an article per week\, chosen by a different member each time. \nDay/time: Wednesdays 3pm to 4pm on Teams. \nOrganizer: Theron Pummer (tgp4).
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-4/2021-12-01/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211124T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211124T160000
DTSTAMP:20260405T125736
CREATED:20210830T180836Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210830T181258Z
UID:10000335-1637766000-1637769600@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:Moral Philosophy Reading Group\nDescription: This group reads and discusses an article per week\, chosen by a different member each time. \nDay/time: Wednesdays 3pm to 4pm on Teams. \nOrganizer: Theron Pummer (tgp4).
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-4/2021-11-24/
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