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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20250918T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20250918T173000
DTSTAMP:20260414T031252
CREATED:20250825T095841Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250915T115104Z
UID:10000602-1758211200-1758216600@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in-person) - Bel Colburn (University of Glasgow)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Moral Blackmail \nAbstract: Suppose I want you to do something. How can I make you do it? Depending on me\, you\, our context\, and the nature of the thing I want you to do\, I have various options: rational or emotional persuasion; manipulation; coercion; physical compulsion; maybe more. Different mechanisms will be more or less effective\, depending on the features of the interactions that I listed above\, and they will also attract different moral evaluations\, not settled wholly by their effectiveness. In this talk\, I explore a (generally effective and usually problematic) mechanism which has mostly been ignored\, namely moral blackmail. Someone is morally blackmailed when they act as they do because all the alternatives have been made morally unacceptable. Moral blackmail is in this sense analogous to coercion\, on a plausible understanding of the latter. I defend this way of thinking from some objections\, and show that moral blackmail is a real and problematic phenomenon in global challenges of the largest scale\, including how we deal with global poverty and climate change. \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-bel-colburn-university-of-glasgow/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03\, The Scores\, St Salvator's Quad\, KY16 9AL
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20251002T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20251002T173000
DTSTAMP:20260414T031252
CREATED:20250911T143754Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20251002T113730Z
UID:10000603-1759420800-1759426200@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in-person) - Federico Luzzi (University of Aberdeen)
DESCRIPTION:Title:  Against Excellence as the Norm of Ambition \nAbstract: This paper investigates norms of ambition\, which set the level of achievement one ought to aspire to. I critically examine the widely accepted norm of excellence\, which encourages one to seek excellence in one’s pursuits. I argue that while this norm is accepted by default\, we should abandon it—absent of special evidence—in favour of the norm of sufficiency\, which encourages one to perform merely well enough in one’s pursuits. This move is motivated by two problems confronting the norm of excellence: that living by it likely leads to mishandling one’s moral duties; and that living by it carries risk of significant psychological harm to oneself and others. I defend the norm of sufficiency by arguing that its widespread default acceptance would by and large avoid such harms and still allow for excellent achievement to arise\, thus leading to a world no worse and likely better than a world in which the norm of excellence enjoys widespread default acceptance. \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03 \nLink for the Handout
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-federico-luzzi-university-of-aberdeen/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03\, The Scores\, St Salvator's Quad\, KY16 9AL
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20251009T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20251009T173000
DTSTAMP:20260414T031252
CREATED:20250911T144159Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20251008T105930Z
UID:10000604-1760025600-1760031000@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in-person) - Michael Otsuka (Rutgers University)
DESCRIPTION:Title: How nonexistence is worse for us \nAbstract: \n\nI defend the view that\, when a person’s life is worth living\, her existence is not merely good for her. It is also better for her than her never existing. I defend this view against the objection that it absurdly implies that nonexistence is bad for the multitude of merely possible people who are never brought into existence and who therefore have complaints against us for not procreating them. I respond to this objection by defending the following asymmetry\, which consists of an affirmation of the first\, combined with the denial of the second\, of these two claims: \n\n\nClaim 1. If p actually exists with a life worth living\, then: if (contrary to fact) p had not existed\, that would have been worse for p. \n\n\nClaim 2. If p does not actually exist\, then this is worse for p than if (contrary to fact) p had existed with a life worth living. \n\n\nI also defend the view that an appeal to the fact that a person’s life is better for her than her nonexistence can provide a response to the complaint that it is not going as well as it could. \n\nLocation: Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-michael-otsuka-rutgers-university/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03\, The Scores\, St Salvator's Quad\, KY16 9AL
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20251030T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20251030T173000
DTSTAMP:20260414T031252
CREATED:20250911T144357Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20251029T130027Z
UID:10000605-1761840000-1761845400@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in-person) - Alice Murphy (St. Andrews)
DESCRIPTION:Title: “Invasive” Species and the Aesthetics of Nature \nAbstract: This talk explores the intersection of environmental science and environmental aesthetics\, focusing on the discourse surrounding “invasive” species. I will present the ways that debates on invasive species reflect broader issues in the philosophy of science\, particularly concerning the role of moral and political values in scientific practice. I will then discuss how aesthetic judgments also shape this discourse\, influencing research\, management decisions\, and public perceptions. I argue that the intertwined nature of aesthetic and moral values in invasion science challenges traditional approaches to the “new demarcation problem”\, which seeks to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate value influences. Further\, this complicates views in environmental aesthetics that privilege scientific knowledge as the foundation for aesthetic judgments of nature. \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-alice-murphy-ludwig-maximilians-universitat-munchen/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03\, The Scores\, St Salvator's Quad\, KY16 9AL
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20251105T153000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20251105T170000
DTSTAMP:20260414T031252
CREATED:20250911T144910Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20251105T153059Z
UID:10000606-1762356600-1762362000@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CLIMATE ETHICS: CEPPA + COAST (in-person) - Wim Carton on 'Overshoot'
DESCRIPTION:Wednesday (5 Nov) 3.30-5pm please join us at School V for a special event co-hosted by CEPPA with the Climate\, Ocean\, and Atmosphere at St Andrews (COASt) research group and the newly founded St Andrews Global Research Centre for Changing Climates. This event will be in-person only. \nWe will be welcoming Wim Carton (Lund) to discuss the book\, co-written with Andreas Malm\, Overshoot: How the World Surrendered to Climate Breakdown. After a short introduction we will hold an interdisciplinary roundtable discussion with panellists Derek Ball\, Graeme MacGilchrist\, James Rae\, and Mara van der Lugt\, and questions from the audience. All welcome!\n\nOn Overshoot:\n \nThe world is on the cusp of 1.5 degrees of warming – just the rise it has committed itself to avoiding. Even before 1.5\, seasons of climate disaster have struck with ever more devastating force\, and yet a notion has taken hold that the cause is now lost: the intolerable has become unavoidable. The limit will be overshot – perhaps two degrees as well – and the best we can do is cool down the Earth at some later point\, towards the end of the century\, by means of technologies not yet proven.\n\n\nHow did this happen? How could the idea of overshoot gain such traction? What forces are driving us into a climate that people – particularly poor people in the global South – won’t be able to cope with? In Overshoot: How the World Surrendered to Climate Breakdown\, Andreas Malm and Wim Carton present a history of the present phase of the crisis\, likely to extend decades into the future\, as the fossil fuel industry swims in the largest profits ever made. Money continues to flow into the construction of pipelines\, platforms\, terminals\, mines – assets that will have to be destroyed for the planet to remain liveable. Too much heat has become officially acceptable because such revolutionary destruction is not. But should the rest of us abide by that priority? \nUnflinchingly critical of business-as-usual and the calls for surrender to it\, sweeping in scope\, stirring and sobering\, Overshoot lays out the stakes for the climate struggle in the years ahead. \n\n\nFind more information about the book here.\nLocation: School V
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/climate-ethics-ceppa-coast-in-person-andreas-malm-and-wim-carton-on-overshoot/
LOCATION:School V
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20251106T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20251106T173000
DTSTAMP:20260414T031252
CREATED:20250911T145123Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20251104T113129Z
UID:10000607-1762444800-1762450200@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Climate Ethics Talk (in-person) - Kian Mintz-Woo (University College Cork)
DESCRIPTION:Title: What do normative philosophers have to contribute to society? \nAbstract: Normative philosophers (inter alia\, political theorists\, moral philosophers\, applied ethicists) develop arguments which link normative positions to practical (and theoretical) judgments or conclusions. This might sound anodyne\, but I use it as a basis to explain what normative philosophers can add to policy discussions as well as to the moral reasoning of members of the public as a whole. The goal is to motivate a conceptually interesting ground for several forms of public philosophy. \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-climate-ethics-talk-in-person-kian-mintz-woo-university-college-cork/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03\, The Scores\, St Salvator's Quad\, KY16 9AL
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20251113T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20251113T173000
DTSTAMP:20260414T031252
CREATED:20250911T145310Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20251111T124836Z
UID:10000608-1763049600-1763055000@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (online and in-person) - Ami Harbin (Oakland University)
DESCRIPTION:Title:  Co-forming feelings in therapy \nAbstract: This paper opens a project within philosophy of therapy\, on the question of how feelings are formed in the context of interactions between clients and therapists. There is a common assumption within many therapeutic approaches that feelings are formed by individuals in their lives outside therapy\, and then clients come to therapy to understand\, process\, and/or cope with their feelings. Is therapy the setting where we come to identify\, understand\, reflect on\, or cope with feelings? Or do we in some cases depend on the therapeutic relationship for feeling formation?  If we are willing to entertain that idea – what are the risks\, and what are the ethical implications? \nLocation: Online on Teams and streamed in Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-online-and-in-person-ami-harbin-oakland-university/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03\, The Scores\, St Salvator's Quad\, KY16 9AL
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20251120T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20251120T173000
DTSTAMP:20260414T031252
CREATED:20250911T145438Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20251118T133558Z
UID:10000609-1763654400-1763659800@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Climate Ethics Talk (in-person) -  Matthew Brander (University of Edinburgh)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Responsibility\, Causality\, and Carbon Accounting \nAbstract:  Carbon accounting standards hold companies accountable (i.e. responsible) for the greenhouse gas emissions from their value chains\, but what is the basis for this allocation of responsibility? There may be a partial causal ‘logic’ that underpins this assignment of responsibility\, but this is not explicitly reflected on or discussed within carbon accounting standards\, nor the related academic literature. As well as being an interesting question in its own right\, the answer may be useful for guiding the development of carbon accounting standards. E.g. under ‘market-based’ accounting\, is it appropriate for companies to report emissions based on their purchase of ‘emission attribute certificates’? Or does the allocation of emissions need to conform to some kind of real-world physical or causal relationship between the reporter and the emissions reported? This paper offers an initial exploration of the underpinning intuitions or rationales at play within carbon accounting practice. \nLocation:  Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-climate-ethics-talk-in-person-matthew-brander-university-of-edinburgh/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03\, The Scores\, St Salvator's Quad\, KY16 9AL
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260129T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260129T173000
DTSTAMP:20260414T031252
CREATED:20260123T101250Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260123T101617Z
UID:10000878-1769702400-1769707800@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in-person) - Miguel de la Cal Moreno & Mario Bison (University of St Andrews and University of Stirling)
DESCRIPTION:4.05-4.45pm: Miguel de la Cal Moreno – Manufactured Disorientation and Climate Change \nAbstract: Many people experience Anthropogenic Climate Change (ACC) as overwhelming and intimidating\, recognising its seriousness and the need to act while feeling unable to determine what to do or how to decide what to do. This paper characterises this experience as moral disorientation. Drawing on Stephen Gardiner’s account of ACC as a “Perfect Moral Storm\,” I argue that its global\, intergenerational\, ecological\, and theoretical dimensions undermine moral clarity on both epistemic and psychological grounds. While Gardiner’s framework helpfully identifies structural difficulties and risks of moral corruption\, it treats these difficulties largely ahistorically.\nTo address this limitation\, I turn to historical work by Naomi Oreskes\, Erik Conway\, and Geoffrey Supran on the deliberate manipulation of climate science and public discourse by the Carbon Industrial Complex. I argue that practices such as doubt-mongering and manipulative framing—particularly those emphasising individual responsibility—have actively contributed to moral disorientation about ACC. Recognising the historically manufactured dimensions of this disorientation helps render it intelligible and identifies normative constraints on how we ought to reason and act. \n4.50-5.30pm: Mario Bison – How to think about empathy\, and why \nAbstract: Empathy is usually cited in connection with altruistic\, or otherwise other-oriented behaviours and attitudes. An empathic approach is usually cited in everyday moral talk as fostering virtues such as forgiveness\, understanding\, and openness. Nevertheless\, there has also been\, at a theoretical level\, an increasing scepticism toward empathy in general. Philosophers have claimed that empathy is neither necessary for making moral judgments nor indeed the best way to go about our moral lives. The matter is complicated by the fact that empathy is variously defined by psychologists\, and no universally agreed-upon definition exists. In this talk I want to look for a solution to these problems by setting aside the immediate debates\, and instead look at the role that this concept has played in the thought of perhaps its most illustrious and influential historical proponent (David Hume)\, who believes that our moral judgments are fundamentally influenced by ‘sympathy’. By critically analysing this concept in context\, and by setting it against modern critics\, I will try to understand what specific need Hume (and his followers) may have felt for invoking empathy\, or related concepts\, in trying to understand morality. \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03 and online on teams
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-miguel-de-la-cal-moreno-mario-bison-university-of-st-andrews-and-university-of-stirling/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03\, The Scores\, St Salvator's Quad\, KY16 9AL
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260205T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260205T173000
DTSTAMP:20260414T031252
CREATED:20260123T101622Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260202T114332Z
UID:10000879-1770307200-1770312600@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in-person) - Viviane Fairbank (St Andrews and Stirling) & Jacob Librizzi (St Andrews)
DESCRIPTION:Viviante Fairbank – The Responsible-Inquiry Model of Journalism \nAbstract: On the traditional\, so-called Informational Model of journalism\, the primary role of journalism in a functioning democracy is to provide people with true information about a certain range of important topics. Although this model is appealing\, I argue that it is unsatisfactory; importantly\, it does not allow us to properly criticize those journalists who publish true\, relevant\, and useful information without proper warrant or ethical backing. After discussing two recent case studies\, I argue that journalism is best understood as a distinctive kind of inquiry\, and that this understanding of journalism should lead us to reject any simple\, factive account of journalistic publication norms. I propose\, instead\, the Responsible-Inquiry Model of journalism\, according to which the primary role of journalism in a functioning democracy is to provide people with responsibly gathered information while\, in the process\, serving as zetetic models. Good journalists do not only provide useful information; they also conduct (ethically and epistemically) exemplary inquiries into the subject at hand. \nJacob Librizzi – Why Metanormative Constitutivists Should be Voluntarists About Reasons \nAbstract: For two decades\, constitutivist accounts of reasons (CR) have faced the “Shm” (or Shmagency) challenge. I argue that responses so far have misunderstood this challenge. However\, by interpreting CR as a form of voluntarism\, we can render the “Shm” challenge question-begging. In doing so\, we disarm the challenge once and for all. \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03 and online on teams
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-viviane-fairbank-st-andrews-and-stirling-jacob-librizzi-st-andrews/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03\, The Scores\, St Salvator's Quad\, KY16 9AL
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260212T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260212T173000
DTSTAMP:20260414T031252
CREATED:20260123T101809Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260209T111410Z
UID:10000880-1770912000-1770917400@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in-person) - Enrico Galvagni (University of Edinburgh)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Hume’s One and Only Definition of Virtue \nAbstract: Hume’s moral philosophy is seen by many as a form of virtue ethics that includes two different definitions of virtue. On the one hand\, Hume seems to define virtue as a mental quality generating utility and agreeableness to oneself or others. On the other hand\, he also says that it is a mental quality that receives moral approbation. Interpreters argue about which of these definitions is more fundamental and try to reconcile them into a unified account. Against such readings\, I argue that Hume has only one definition of virtue as a character trait that generates moral approbation. Utility and agreeableness play a fundamental role in his ethics\, but one that does not relate to his definition of virtue. In turn\, this provide reason to question the now mainstream interpretation of Hume as a virtue ethicist. \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03 and online on teams
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-enrico-galvagni-university-of-edinburgh/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03\, The Scores\, St Salvator's Quad\, KY16 9AL
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260219T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260219T173000
DTSTAMP:20260414T031252
CREATED:20260123T102009Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260216T155504Z
UID:10000881-1771516800-1771522200@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in-person) - Yoshinari Hattori and Ida Miczske (St Andrews and Stirling)
DESCRIPTION:Yoshinari Hattori – Why We Must Believe in Free Will and Moral Responsibility: Reconsidering Their Foundations \nAbstract: This presentation argues that the practice of blaming wrongdoers—especially directing resentment or indignation towards them—is rationally indispensable for us. Pereboom contends that directing resentment or indignation at others is a form of harming them and is unjustified. As an alternative\, he proposes that when morally wrong actions are performed\, we should respond with disappointment or sadness. Against this proposal\, I argue that there are social functions that cannot be achieved by disappointment or sadness but are fulfilled only by directing resentment or indignation. The fact that we have strong reason to secure the fulfilment of these functions makes the practice of directing resentment or indignation rationally indispensable for us. In particular\, I argue that responding with disappointment or sadness fails\, first\, to treat others as moral agents and\, second\, to exercise the normative force required to compel them to stand in a space of answerability. \nIda Miczske – When love met morality: anonymity\, irreplaceability\, and partial self-effacement \nAbstract: Most of us value relationships such as friendship and love. Surprisingly\, it is not so easy to reconcile the demands they pose on us with living a moral life. In this presentation I want to identify one source of this tension and\, if time allows\, propose a solution based on partial self-effacement. \nI argue that the tension emerges because certain relationships require de re motivation grounded in the identity of an irreplaceable object\, while moral justification abstracts from particular identities. I propose to explicate the latter claim in terms of the requirement of justification anonymity\, and show that it conflicts with de re motivation.\nA common response to the conflict between relationships and morality has been to introduce self-effacement. However\, as full self-effacement is problematic\, I propose that moral theories should instead be partially self-effacing. Drawing on that\, I argue that partial self-effacement allows us to reconcile de re motivation with moral justification.\nLocation: Edgecliffe G03 and online on teams
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-yoshinari-hattori-and-ida-miczske-st-andrews-and-stirling/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03\, The Scores\, St Salvator's Quad\, KY16 9AL
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260226T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260226T173000
DTSTAMP:20260414T031252
CREATED:20260123T102136Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260223T134529Z
UID:10000882-1772121600-1772127000@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in-person) - Omar Ruiz Rivera and Craig Ferrie (St Andrews and Stirling)
DESCRIPTION:Omar Ruiz Rivera – Moral Skill \nAbstract: This talk is about moral skill—the capacity for morally excellent behaviour. In particular\, I engage with Shepherd’s (2022) view that moral skill is “limited in scope\, and precarious” (p. 713). To defend this view\, Shepherd relies on a distinction between global and local moral skill. The former involves the action domains that structure human life\, whereas the latter is restricted to specific areas of human life. His claim is that global moral skill is “practically impossible for human agents” (p. 725)\, while local moral skill is possible but precarious. I will argue that Shepherd’s own account of skill supports a more complex picture of moral skill than he allows. Drawing on Shepherd’s (2021) account of skill\, I propose a third model of moral skill—“mid-level moral skill”—which is less demanding than global moral skill but broader in scope than local moral skill. If this claim is correct\, it would entail that framing moral skill exclusively in terms of global or local moral skill risks overlooking alternative perspectives that might lead to a more nuanced conclusion than Shepherd’s (2022) characterisation of moral skill as limited and precarious. \nCraig Ferrie – Normative (Un)knowability and the Hybrid Theory of Normative Truth \nAbstract: There is some plausibility to the idea that if a normative claim\, p\, is true then it should be possible to know p. If correct\, this makes normative truth quite different from natural truth\, which seems capable of outrunning our knowability. This view\, however\, runs up against counterexamples. It seems\, for instance\, that the people of Pompeii had most reason to evacuate in order to escape the eruption of Mt Vesuvius\, but no one could have known that they did. I am interested in whether the truth pluralist is in a unique position to overcome such counterexamples\, provided they accept a hybrid theory\, which treats them as conjunctions\, one part normative and one part natural. To do so\, it needs to be explained why these cases are exempt from the knowability condition on normative truth (which I will try do to!). \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03 and online on teams
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-omar-ruiz-rivera-st-andrews-and-stirling/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03\, The Scores\, St Salvator's Quad\, KY16 9AL
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260312T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260312T173000
DTSTAMP:20260414T031252
CREATED:20260123T102224Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260306T200129Z
UID:10000883-1773331200-1773336600@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (online) - Katie McShane (Colorado State University)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Relational Value: Problems and Prospects \nAbstract: The concept of “relational value” is widely used in the environmental ethics and policy literatures. In this talk\, I will critically assess this use\, considering what relational value might add to our existing value categories and what problems it might produce for our thinking about the value of the natural world. I first discuss the history of the concept: why early authors considered it a necessary addition to other value concepts and which claims about the natural environment they thought it was particularly well positioned to capture. I next discuss criticisms of the concept: that the need for it was demonstrated by misrepresenting other categories of value and that it distorts our thinking about them. Finally\, I consider what would be a fruitful way forward given these concerns.  While the concept of relational value might be here to stay\, we would do well to think more carefully about both its meaning and its use.  \nLocation: Online on teams and streamed in Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-katie-mcshane-colorado-state-university/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03\, The Scores\, St Salvator's Quad\, KY16 9AL
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260402T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260402T173000
DTSTAMP:20260414T031252
CREATED:20260123T102513Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260401T134540Z
UID:10000885-1775145600-1775151000@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in-person) - Kal Kalewold (Leeds)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Going First: Integration with Compensation as a Duty of Justice. \nAbstract: Racial segregation remains deeply entrenched in many societies such as the United States. (Liberal) integrationists argue that we have a duty to integrate because integration is necessary for racial justice (Anderson 2010). (Egalitarian) pluralists reject a duty to integrate (Shelby 2014\, 2016). They hold that integration impermissibly imposes costs on the disadvantaged. On the pluralist view\, we should instead endeavour to make communities better off however they are spatially distributed. In this talk\, I defend a duty to integrate with compensation. I draw on evidence that has been neglected in the philosophical literature that the costs of integration are differentially distributed across age groups. Compensating those integrating first undermines the foundation of the pluralist objection and vindicates a duty to integrate. \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03 and online on teams
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-kal-kalewold-leeds/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03\, The Scores\, St Salvator's Quad\, KY16 9AL
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260416T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260416T173000
DTSTAMP:20260414T031252
CREATED:20260123T102549Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260123T102549Z
UID:10000886-1776355200-1776360600@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in-person) - Matthew Vermaire (St Andrews)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Conflated Questions in the Ethics of Belief \nAbstract: tbc \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03 and online on teams
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-matthew-vermaire-st-andrews/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03\, The Scores\, St Salvator's Quad\, KY16 9AL
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260423T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260423T173000
DTSTAMP:20260414T031252
CREATED:20260123T102709Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260123T102709Z
UID:10000887-1776960000-1776965400@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Climate Ethics Talk (in-person) - Jiewuh Song (Seoul National University)
DESCRIPTION:Title: The Right to a Healthy Environment and the Case of Climate Change \nAbstract: tbc \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03 and online on teams
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-climate-ethics-talk-in-person-jiewuh-song-seoul-national-university/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03\, The Scores\, St Salvator's Quad\, KY16 9AL
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260528T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260528T173000
DTSTAMP:20260414T031252
CREATED:20260123T102805Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260123T102805Z
UID:10000888-1779984000-1779989400@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in-person) - Richard Arneson (UC San Diego)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Democratic Instrumentalism and the Threat of Authoritarianism \nAbstract: tbc \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03 and online on teams
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-richard-arneson-uc-san-diego/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03\, The Scores\, St Salvator's Quad\, KY16 9AL
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR