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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20241010T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20241010T173000
DTSTAMP:20260414T064811
CREATED:20240912T182924Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20241004T140307Z
UID:10000547-1728576000-1728581400@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in-person & online) – Adrian Walsh (University of New England)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Internal Validity\, External Validity and the Evaluation of Thought Experiments in Applied Ethics and Political Philosophy \nAbstract: Thought experiments clearly play a central role in much contemporary ethical theorising. In the recent literature on thought experiments\, some commentators (e.g. Wilson 2016; Dowding 2019) have criticised the lack of attention paid by moral philosophers to two ideas which are key notions in science. These are internal and external validity. Wilson argues that if thought experiments are indeed a kind of experiment\, then philosophers should begin any plausible search for rigour in the scientific literature on experimental research design. When designing a thought experiment\, Wilson suggests we consider the extent to which ethical judgements that are correct or endorsed in the world of the experiment generalise to the world beyond the experiment. This is an important question to consider. However\, I suggest that Wilson’s approach (i) overstates the connection between real-world scientific experiments and thought experiments (ii) focuses too readily on the formal structure of thought experiments at the expense of the argumentative context. With respect to the former claim\, I suggest that this points towards a more general thesis that it is a mistake to treat the reasoning involved in the use of thought experiments as a subset of scientific reasoning. I shall also consider\, towards the end of the talk\, a more moderate (and plausible) view of the positive role that the concepts of internal and external validity might play in evaluating and assessing the legitimacy of thought experiments. \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-adrian-walsh-university-of-new-england/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20241017T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20241017T173000
DTSTAMP:20260414T064811
CREATED:20240912T183831Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20241011T222115Z
UID:10000549-1729180800-1729186200@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (online) – Valerie Tiberius (Minnesota)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Happy Immoralists and Satisfied Loners: A Pragmatic Perspective on Disagreement about Well-being \nAbstract: Can a morally bad person live well? Can a person without friends achieve well-being? There is long-standing disagreement about the correct answers to these questions. I offer a diagnosis of the debate between those who answer “no” (objectivists about well-being) and those who answer “yes” (subjectivists about well-being). I suggest that the reason people are divided about this question is that the opposing answers represent two different perspectives on well-being that answer to two different sets of practical interests. Given this diagnosis\, the cure is to acknowledge the importance of both perspectives. I discuss different ways of doing this. \nLocation: online & livestreamed from Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-online-valerie-tiberius-minnesota/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20241028T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20241028T170000
DTSTAMP:20260414T064811
CREATED:20241009T150113Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20241009T150113Z
UID:10000557-1730131200-1730134800@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:In person Talk by Tom Angier (University of Cape Town)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Goodness as Natural Perfection. \nAbstract: In this paper I outline Aristotle’s conception of human functioning\, which I take to be a viable and illuminating ground for determining human goods. I then look at alternative schemata for the notion of ‘function’ – ones derived from evolutionary theory – and argue that they are not preferable to their Aristotelian rival. I finish the paper by looking at ‘neo-Aristotelian ethical naturalism’\, in particular that of Philippa Foot\, and argue that it is not Aristotelian enough.\n\nBio: Tom Angier is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Cape Town. He works on neo-Aristotelian ethical and political theory. He is currently completing a monograph entitled “Human Nature\, Human Goods: A Theory of Natural Perfectionism”. It is due to be published by Cambridge University Press in 2025.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/in-person-talk-by-tom-angier-university-of-cape-town/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20241031T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20241031T173000
DTSTAMP:20260414T064811
CREATED:20240912T184058Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20241026T135317Z
UID:10000550-1730390400-1730395800@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in-person & online) – Katharina Bernhard (St Andrews) and Graeme MacGilchrist (St Andrews)
DESCRIPTION:Please join us on 31 October (4-5.30pm) for the launch of the Philosophy of Climate Science (PhiCliSci) working group\, which will bring together philosophers and climate scientists to discuss central themes relating to the climate crisis. In the first session\, climate scientist Graeme MacGilchrist and philosopher Katharina Bernhard will give presentations on the topic of ‘Uncertainty’ in climate science\, after which the floor is open for discussion. \nTitle: Uncertainty \nLocation: The Stewart Room in Younger Hall
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-katharina-bernhard-st-andrews-and-graeme-macgilchrist-st-andrews/
LOCATION:The Stewart Room in Younger Hall\, Younger Hall\, St Andrews\, KY16 9AJ\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20241107T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20241107T173000
DTSTAMP:20260414T064811
CREATED:20240912T184333Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20241101T123533Z
UID:10000551-1730995200-1731000600@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in-person & online) – Patrick Tomlin (Warwick University)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Killing vs Headaches: Wide Proportionality and Limited Aggregation \nAbstract: Philosophers who have discussed ‘limited aggregation’ have focussed discussion on cases in which we must choose which of two groups to save – for example\, whether we should save one person’s life\, or save some enormous number of people from a mild headache. According to one influential view\, which I call the Relevance View\, we should save one person’s life in this case\, since headaches are irrelevant to death. In this paper\, I want to examine what this implies for a different set of cases – cases in which we might inflict harm on some in order to save others from harm. Translating the relevance view from ‘whom-to-save’ to ‘harming-to-save’ cases\, I show\, is not straightforward. We need to consider up to four different ‘relevance rules’\, and to consider the relationships between them. I will further argue that considering the Relevance View in these cases reveals something important about two fundamental principles of preventive morality —  that the proportionality principle is logically prior to\, and constrains the operation of\, the necessity principle \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-online-patrick-tomlin-warwick-university/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20241114T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20241114T173000
DTSTAMP:20260414T064811
CREATED:20240912T184437Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20241108T140838Z
UID:10000552-1731600000-1731605400@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (online) – John Barugahare (Makerere University)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Global Health Equity through Decolonizing Health Research Ethics in Africa: Leveraging Kwame Nkrumah’s Analysis of Neocolonialism. \nAbstract:Background: The foundational contention of this paper is that\, arguably\, the ultimate ethical goal of conducting health research among humans is to provide them with better health opportunities. Because of growing perceptions that ongoing international collaborative health research between the Global North and Africa is colonial in nature\, there is worry that this goal will not be easily met. Hence\, there is an urgent need to decolonize international collaborative health research in Africa. Using Kwame Nkrumah’s analysis of his seminal work on ‘Neocolonialism: the last stage of imperialism’\, the aim of this paper is to reflect on the potential of the current dominant trend in decolonizing health research ethics in Africa to meet the ultimate goal of decolonization. Methods: This is a purely argumentative paper based on Kwame Nkrumah’s views on neocolonialism and decolonization. The paper also uses other secondary sources to corroborate and demonstrate its argument. Results: There is a growing consensus that international collaborative health research is colonial in nature and hence a need to decolonise it. The paper argues that Nkrumah’s analysis of neocolonialism implies that the ultimate goal of decolonizing health research in Africa should be to mitigate and ultimately stop the exploitation of African people in international collaborative health research. Discussion: The paper shows that the outcomes of most decolonizing efforts\, though necessary\, are not enough. Unless conscientiously pursued\, these efforts risk failure at meeting Nkrumah’s ultimate goal of decolonization and arguably are becoming a subtle method for facilitating\, sustaining and entrenching the ultimate goal of neocolonialism—the exploitation of African peoples. Conclusion: The mission of decolonizing health research ethics in Africa needs to clearly demonstrate the potential to mitigate and ultimately end maximin exploitation in health research and be critical enough to avoid the risk of instead facilitating neocolonialism unconsciously. \nJohn Barugahare\, Ph.D.\, is a senior lecturer and Head\, Department of Philosophy at Makerere University\, Kampala – Uganda. He teaches moral philosophy\, human rights and applies these in health care and health-related research. His major interest is in ethics international collaborative research. He is also interest in guiding the development of bioethics in Africa. Lately\, he is exploring concepts and perspectives in the decolonization discussion\, and how these can help shape our understanding of the major ethical issues in international collaborative health research\, hoping to suggest ways these can be eased. \nLocation: online & livestreamed from Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-online-john-barugahare-makerere-university/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20241120T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20241120T180000
DTSTAMP:20260414T064811
CREATED:20241007T113131Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20241007T113131Z
UID:10000556-1732118400-1732125600@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Bradley Hillier-Smith’s 'The Ethics of State Responses to Refugees' Book Launch
DESCRIPTION:You are warmly invited to the book launch for Bradley Hillier-Smith’s brand-new book The Ethics of State Responses to Refugees (abstract below). The author will be interviewed by Kieran Oberman (LSE)\, after which we will all be in the opportunity to ask questions and celebrate the new book with some well-deserved drinks. All welcome!\n\nBradley Hillier-Smith: The Ethics of State Responses to Refugees\n Edgecliffe 104\, 20th November from 4pm – 6pm\, followed by drinks. For those unable to join in person\, the Teams link is here.\n\nAbstract for The Ethics of State Responses to Refugees\nAt a time of intense philosophical and political debates on how states ought to respond to refugees\, this book provides an account of what an ethical response to refugees would be. It does this by developing an understanding of the moral duties that states have towards refugees. The first half of the book analyses state practices used in response to refugees\, to understand the negative duties of states not to harm or violate the rights of innocent refugees. The second half analyses morally significant features of contemporary refugee displacement\, to understand the positive duties of states to alleviate the distinctive harms and injustices that refugees face. The two halves together thereby outline the negative and positive duties of states towards refugees which together constitute the elements of an ethical response. The book then demonstrates this ethical response is not only urgently required but is also within reach.\n\nAbout Kieran Oberman: Kieran Oberman is an Associate Professor in Philosophy at the LSE whose research and numerous publications specialise in the ethics of border control\, immigration\, migration ethics\, the freedoms and rights of migrants\, and obligations towards refugees among other topics in global justice.\n\nhttps://www.routledge.com/The-Ethics-of-State-Responses-to-Refugees/Hillier-Smith/p/book/9781032833675
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/bradley-hillier-smiths-the-ethics-of-state-responses-to-refugees-book-launch/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20241121T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20241121T173000
DTSTAMP:20260414T064811
CREATED:20240912T184522Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20241115T110644Z
UID:10000553-1732204800-1732210200@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in-person & online) – James Hutton (Delft)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Emotion-Based Environmental Ethics: The Radical Implications of Taking Wonder Seriously \nAbstract:\nIn environmental ethics\, we find many competing theories of environmental value\, but little discussion of the epistemological grounds for believing one theory rather than another. Building on the framework of moral empiricism (which I’ve developed elsewhere)\, I propose an “Emotion-Based” methodology for environmental ethics. The Emotion-Based methodology requires treating our emotional experiences as defeasible intuitions about value\, wrongness\, etc. – accepting their contents\, unless we have substantive reason not to. I offer some rationales for adopting the Emotion-Based methodology\, exploiting analogies with other domains of knowledge. In the final part of the talk\, I zoom in on the emotion of wonder. Wonder\, I argue\, presents its object as valuable for its own sake. If we take seriously the full range of our experiences of wonder\, we face pressure to adopt a pluralist view of environmental value\, on which some nonsentient beings (e.g. trees) and collective entities (i.e. ecosystems) are valuable for their own sake. Thus\, while moral empiricism is an abstract view about the conditions for moral knowledge\, it turns out to have fairly radical first-order implications for environmental ethics.\nLocation: Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-online-viviane-fairbank-st-andrews-and-simon-lee-st-andrews/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20241128T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20241128T173000
DTSTAMP:20260414T064811
CREATED:20240912T184554Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20241125T113606Z
UID:10000554-1732809600-1732815000@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in-person & online) – Katrin Flikschuh (LSE)
DESCRIPTION:Title: The Idea of Ancestry in African Philosophy \nAbstract: This paper concerns itself with the rationality of belief in ancestral existence. Although belief in ancestral existence remains widespread globally\, I shall focus on a-thinned out version of African forms of this belief. ‘Thinned-out’ in that I am not interested in this or that substantive version of the belief among different African peoples; nor am I interested in the particular cultural practises that attend or attest to the belief. I am interested in the general form of the belief\, and in the more general conception of the natural world in general which one would have to endorse for belief in ancestral existence to count as rational. In one sense\, the aims of this paper are quite modest: I merely aim to get clearer\, myself\, on what strikes me as an intuitively attractive belief. In another sense\, the paper is quite ambitious: the belief would seem to require Western readers to suspend routine metaphysical and scientific assumptions about the natural order. In putting pressure on these routine assumptions\, I shall touch on discussions around free will and consciousness as phenomena that share some of the features of ancestral existence. Considered comparatively\, belief in ancestral existence may be no less rationally defensible than belief in free will or (non-reductive) consciousness. \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-online-katrin-flikschuh-lse/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20250206T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20250206T173000
DTSTAMP:20260414T064811
CREATED:20250130T200250Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250203T191323Z
UID:10000569-1738857600-1738863000@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in-person & online) – Philip Ebert (University of Stirling)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Philosophical Challenges in Risk Communication of Rare and Severe Events \nAbstract: In this talk\, I will discusses different philosophical challenges in communicating and dealing with the risk of rare and severe events. As a case study\, I use avalanche risk: a form of voluntary risk taking in which the individual is often partly responsible for the occurrence of the relevant event. In particular\, I highlight the challenge that avalanche risk communicators face when “informing” or “educating” individuals about the relevant risks\, and I will present some experimental work on the risk perception of end users of the Scottish avalanche forecasts and discuss their (mis)understanding of the relevant risks. \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-online-philip-ebert-university-of-stirling/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20250213T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20250213T173000
DTSTAMP:20260414T064811
CREATED:20250130T200801Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250210T224151Z
UID:10000570-1739462400-1739467800@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in-person & online) – Simon Lee (Earth & Environmental Sciences) and Viviane Fairbank (Philosophy)
DESCRIPTION:Please join us on for the Second edition of the Philosophy of Climate Science (PhiCliSci) working group\, which will bring together philosophers and climate scientists to discuss central themes relating to the climate crisis. In the first session\, climate scientist Simon Lee and philosopher Viviane Fairbank will give presentations on the topic of ‘Climate Modelling and Climate Communication’ in climate science. \nTitle: Climate Modelling and Climate Communication \nLocation: John Henderson lecture room in Castlecliffe
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-online-simon-lee-earth-environmental-sciences-and-viviane-fairbank-philosophy/
LOCATION:John Henderson lecture room\, Castlecliffe\, St Andrews\, Fife\, KY16 9AZ\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20250227T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20250227T173000
DTSTAMP:20260414T064811
CREATED:20250130T201035Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250130T201035Z
UID:10000572-1740672000-1740677400@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in-person & online) – Katharina Bernhard (St Andrews)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Multiple Aims of Science and the New Demarcation Problem \nAbstract: TBC \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-online-katharina-bernhard-st-andrews/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20250313T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20250313T173000
DTSTAMP:20260414T064811
CREATED:20250130T201114Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250306T171239Z
UID:10000573-1741881600-1741887000@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in-person & online) – Daniela Dover (UCLA)
DESCRIPTION:Title: The Democratic Soul in Plato and Whitman \nAbstract: In Books II-IV of the Republic\, Plato famously proposes an analogy between the constitution of the Greek city-state and the constitution of the human soul. The methodological assumption that underlies the architecture of the Republic is that philosophical questions about topics that we might today group under the heading of ‘moral psychology’–descriptive and normative questions about the workings of the human psyche–cannot be separated from questions of political philosophy. I argue that Plato was right to think that you cannot theorize the soul without at the same time theorizing the city\, and vice versa. I go on to ask: what happens if we retain the idea that there is a profound methodological insight embedded in the city-soul analogy\, but\, unlike Plato\, we want to defend democracy as the best form of government? How might that democratic aspiration interact with our ways of thinking about the soul\, or the self? \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-online-daniela-dover-ucla/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20250320T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20250320T173000
DTSTAMP:20260414T064811
CREATED:20250130T201157Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250317T170729Z
UID:10000574-1742486400-1742491800@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in-person & online) – Tom Sinclair (Oxford)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Hypocrisy as Evasion \nAbstract: Hypocrites attract moral condemnation and are widely thought to lack standing to criticise others. This paper argues against attempts to explain this that appeal to moral conditions on blaming and notions of moral authority\, proposing instead an account based on a conception of moral interactions as fundamentally dialogical in character. According to this account\, blame is just one of many tools of moral exchange whose proper use is the building of a shared moral world of mutually acknowledged responsibilities. The hypocrite misuses these tools\, and this both generates a basic moral objection to hypocrisy that is prior to the more specific objections highlighted by other accounts and explains the hypocrite’s loss of standing. \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-online-tom-sinclair-oxford/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20250327T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20250327T173000
DTSTAMP:20260414T064811
CREATED:20250130T202751Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250324T141500Z
UID:10000581-1743091200-1743096600@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in-person & online) – Katherine Snow (Princeton)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Revisiting the Spinoza Controversy in an age of Environmental Crisis\n \nAbstract: Modern scientific naturalism arguably tries to ontologically describe or account for the entirety of the natural world using necessity. Scientific naturalism presents logical causal necessity as constituting how nature “makes” things exist\, and it presents necessity in the more general or abstract sense as the only principle or idea at the core of what nature is supposed to be. Where did this practice arise in its current form\, how legitimate is it\, and how does this practice matter for the contemporary environmental crisis? In this talk\, I will propose answers to all three of these questions which draw on my reading of the so-called “Spinoza Controversy” of 1785-1812. Among other aspects of this vital dispute\, the Controversy essentially presented the West with a choice vis-à-vis the external non-human world. On the one side were those embracing a new\, monist\, semi-secularized “naturalism” based on neo-Spinozist ideas of nature as an intelligible and necessary whole. On the other side\, skeptics like Friedrich Jacobi denied that such an idea of nature could ever be anything more than an internalist fiction. Of particular relevance to our environmental crisis today\, Jacobi further quite presciently argued that the neo-Spinozist position automatically engaged in a kind of active nihilism with respect to the real external world of our direct experience.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-online-philclisci-tbc/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03\, The Scores\, St Salvator's Quad\, KY16 9AL
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20250403T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20250403T173000
DTSTAMP:20260414T064811
CREATED:20250130T201317Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250401T144731Z
UID:10000575-1743696000-1743701400@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (online) – Christine Korsgaard (Harvard University)
DESCRIPTION:Title: The Incomparable Value of the Individual \nAbstract: Kant believed that every human being should be treated as an end in itself. In the Groundwork\, Kant explains many of our duties by arguing that their violation would involve treating a human being as a mere means. But we cannot explain all of our duties that way. Nor can we explain what is wrong with treating an individual as a mere means unless we have a positive account of what is involved in being an end in itself. Kant does not spell out this positive account. \nI find a clue to what Kant could mean in his claim that individuals who possess dignity have incomparable value. I propose that to treat someone as an end in itself is to evaluate the events and conditions of that person’s life in accordance with the value they have for her\, and to regard that value as incomparable with the value those events and conditions might have for anyone else. I explain why this conception rules out the aggregation of value across the boundaries between individuals and show how it supports John Taurek’s attack on aggregation. I also explain how this conception of the value of the individual is connected to the idea that individuals have rights.\nLocation: Online but live-streamed from Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-online-christine-korsgaard-harvard-university/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20250417T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20250417T173000
DTSTAMP:20260414T064811
CREATED:20250130T201400Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250417T135908Z
UID:10000576-1744905600-1744911000@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in-person & online) – Lucy O’Brien (UCL)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Autonomy and control over one’s social self-consciousness \nAbstract: Humans have the capacity to absorb – to feel – others’ feelings. More particularly we feel others’ feelings about ourselves: at least as long as we are awake\, we are subject to being self-consciously affected in our interactions with others. We are capable of social self-consciousness\, and such a capacity plays a critical part in our general capacity to care about\, calibrate\, and organise human life. In this talk I want to consider a subject’s relation to her own affective social self-consciousness. Two areas I will consider are (i) a subject’s practical management of their social self-consciousness\, and (i) a subject’s appraisals of their own social self-consciousness. I will suggest that the latter concern can be thought of in the context of a general problem of the rationality of deference. I suggest that our self-appraisals should be understood as allowing for a kind of necessary instability\, tension\, and opacity. In so far as our self-conscious lives\, are rationally permeated with the appraisals of others\, we risk standing in an uncomprehending\, but committed\, sense of ourselves and our value \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-online-lucy-obrien-ucl/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20250501T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20250501T173000
DTSTAMP:20260414T064811
CREATED:20250130T201531Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250429T144945Z
UID:10000577-1746115200-1746120600@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (online) – Carla Bagnoli (University of Modena and Reggio Emilia)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Hope and the Powers of Shared Agency \nAbstract: This paper argues that Kant’s theory of radical evil exalts the powers of organized\, shared and institutional\, agency. In section 1\, I illustrate the paradoxicality of radical evil and the novelty of Kant’s “empowering” conception focused on human agency. In section 2\, I argue that radical evil entails a normative variety of unintelligibility\, signaling lack of self-knowledge and self-alienation. In section 3\, I show that the (moral) opacity of maxims does not undermine one’s awareness of the moral law\, does not prevent self and co-legislation\, and therefore does not preclude the exercise of moral agency. In section 4\, I account for the distinctive functions of hope and faith\, denying that they are complementary. In sections 5 and 6\, I argue that the reliance on hope or faith points to different modes of contrasting evil by organizing human agency in institutional forms. In section 7\, I conclude that the most powerful response to radical evil is the organization of shared agency – a communal\, ethical\, political\, and institutional enterprise. \nLocation: Online but streamed from Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-online-carla-bagnoli-university-of-modena-and-reggio-emilia/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20250508T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20250508T173000
DTSTAMP:20260414T064811
CREATED:20250130T201612Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250130T201612Z
UID:10000578-1746720000-1746725400@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in-person & online) – Clotilde Torregrossa (St Andrews)
DESCRIPTION:Title: The (Aesthetic) Value of Environmental Activism \nAbstract: TBC \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-online-clotilde-torregrossa-st-andrews/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20250515T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20250515T173000
DTSTAMP:20260414T064811
CREATED:20250130T201701Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250513T152322Z
UID:10000579-1747324800-1747330200@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in-person & online) – Vid Simoniti (University of Liverpool)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Merely Imagined Moralities\n \nAbstract: Artworks and other cultural products (films\, novels\, operas\, pop songs\, etc.) often express heroic\, pessimistic\, melancholy\, or dark ways of looking at the world (also referred to as ‘perspectives’). Sometimes\, these worldviews appear politically inflected; we may\, for instance\, describe a work as “feminist” or “patriotic” according to the worldview it expresses. Drawing on Elisabeth Camp’s and Nelson Goodman’s work\, I propose that when artworks express worldviews\, they (i) represent sets of mental dispositions for interpreting and reacting to the real world\, and (ii) they achieve this by leading the audience to temporarily inhabit those dispositions. This view has at least two important implications: first\, it makes little sense to morally evaluate artworks for expressing worldviews\, because representing mental dispositions does not amount to endorsing them. Secondly\, the expression of worldviews through artworks and other cultural products nevertheless plays a specific\, underappreciated role in political discourse. \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-online-vid-simoniti-university-of-liverpool/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20250918T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20250918T173000
DTSTAMP:20260414T064811
CREATED:20250825T095841Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250915T115104Z
UID:10000602-1758211200-1758216600@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in-person) - Bel Colburn (University of Glasgow)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Moral Blackmail \nAbstract: Suppose I want you to do something. How can I make you do it? Depending on me\, you\, our context\, and the nature of the thing I want you to do\, I have various options: rational or emotional persuasion; manipulation; coercion; physical compulsion; maybe more. Different mechanisms will be more or less effective\, depending on the features of the interactions that I listed above\, and they will also attract different moral evaluations\, not settled wholly by their effectiveness. In this talk\, I explore a (generally effective and usually problematic) mechanism which has mostly been ignored\, namely moral blackmail. Someone is morally blackmailed when they act as they do because all the alternatives have been made morally unacceptable. Moral blackmail is in this sense analogous to coercion\, on a plausible understanding of the latter. I defend this way of thinking from some objections\, and show that moral blackmail is a real and problematic phenomenon in global challenges of the largest scale\, including how we deal with global poverty and climate change. \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-bel-colburn-university-of-glasgow/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03\, The Scores\, St Salvator's Quad\, KY16 9AL
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20251002T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20251002T173000
DTSTAMP:20260414T064811
CREATED:20250911T143754Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20251002T113730Z
UID:10000603-1759420800-1759426200@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in-person) - Federico Luzzi (University of Aberdeen)
DESCRIPTION:Title:  Against Excellence as the Norm of Ambition \nAbstract: This paper investigates norms of ambition\, which set the level of achievement one ought to aspire to. I critically examine the widely accepted norm of excellence\, which encourages one to seek excellence in one’s pursuits. I argue that while this norm is accepted by default\, we should abandon it—absent of special evidence—in favour of the norm of sufficiency\, which encourages one to perform merely well enough in one’s pursuits. This move is motivated by two problems confronting the norm of excellence: that living by it likely leads to mishandling one’s moral duties; and that living by it carries risk of significant psychological harm to oneself and others. I defend the norm of sufficiency by arguing that its widespread default acceptance would by and large avoid such harms and still allow for excellent achievement to arise\, thus leading to a world no worse and likely better than a world in which the norm of excellence enjoys widespread default acceptance. \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03 \nLink for the Handout
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-federico-luzzi-university-of-aberdeen/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03\, The Scores\, St Salvator's Quad\, KY16 9AL
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20251009T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20251009T173000
DTSTAMP:20260414T064811
CREATED:20250911T144159Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20251008T105930Z
UID:10000604-1760025600-1760031000@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in-person) - Michael Otsuka (Rutgers University)
DESCRIPTION:Title: How nonexistence is worse for us \nAbstract: \n\nI defend the view that\, when a person’s life is worth living\, her existence is not merely good for her. It is also better for her than her never existing. I defend this view against the objection that it absurdly implies that nonexistence is bad for the multitude of merely possible people who are never brought into existence and who therefore have complaints against us for not procreating them. I respond to this objection by defending the following asymmetry\, which consists of an affirmation of the first\, combined with the denial of the second\, of these two claims: \n\n\nClaim 1. If p actually exists with a life worth living\, then: if (contrary to fact) p had not existed\, that would have been worse for p. \n\n\nClaim 2. If p does not actually exist\, then this is worse for p than if (contrary to fact) p had existed with a life worth living. \n\n\nI also defend the view that an appeal to the fact that a person’s life is better for her than her nonexistence can provide a response to the complaint that it is not going as well as it could. \n\nLocation: Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-michael-otsuka-rutgers-university/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03\, The Scores\, St Salvator's Quad\, KY16 9AL
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20251030T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20251030T173000
DTSTAMP:20260414T064811
CREATED:20250911T144357Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20251029T130027Z
UID:10000605-1761840000-1761845400@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in-person) - Alice Murphy (St. Andrews)
DESCRIPTION:Title: “Invasive” Species and the Aesthetics of Nature \nAbstract: This talk explores the intersection of environmental science and environmental aesthetics\, focusing on the discourse surrounding “invasive” species. I will present the ways that debates on invasive species reflect broader issues in the philosophy of science\, particularly concerning the role of moral and political values in scientific practice. I will then discuss how aesthetic judgments also shape this discourse\, influencing research\, management decisions\, and public perceptions. I argue that the intertwined nature of aesthetic and moral values in invasion science challenges traditional approaches to the “new demarcation problem”\, which seeks to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate value influences. Further\, this complicates views in environmental aesthetics that privilege scientific knowledge as the foundation for aesthetic judgments of nature. \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-alice-murphy-ludwig-maximilians-universitat-munchen/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03\, The Scores\, St Salvator's Quad\, KY16 9AL
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20251105T153000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20251105T170000
DTSTAMP:20260414T064811
CREATED:20250911T144910Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20251105T153059Z
UID:10000606-1762356600-1762362000@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CLIMATE ETHICS: CEPPA + COAST (in-person) - Wim Carton on 'Overshoot'
DESCRIPTION:Wednesday (5 Nov) 3.30-5pm please join us at School V for a special event co-hosted by CEPPA with the Climate\, Ocean\, and Atmosphere at St Andrews (COASt) research group and the newly founded St Andrews Global Research Centre for Changing Climates. This event will be in-person only. \nWe will be welcoming Wim Carton (Lund) to discuss the book\, co-written with Andreas Malm\, Overshoot: How the World Surrendered to Climate Breakdown. After a short introduction we will hold an interdisciplinary roundtable discussion with panellists Derek Ball\, Graeme MacGilchrist\, James Rae\, and Mara van der Lugt\, and questions from the audience. All welcome!\n\nOn Overshoot:\n \nThe world is on the cusp of 1.5 degrees of warming – just the rise it has committed itself to avoiding. Even before 1.5\, seasons of climate disaster have struck with ever more devastating force\, and yet a notion has taken hold that the cause is now lost: the intolerable has become unavoidable. The limit will be overshot – perhaps two degrees as well – and the best we can do is cool down the Earth at some later point\, towards the end of the century\, by means of technologies not yet proven.\n\n\nHow did this happen? How could the idea of overshoot gain such traction? What forces are driving us into a climate that people – particularly poor people in the global South – won’t be able to cope with? In Overshoot: How the World Surrendered to Climate Breakdown\, Andreas Malm and Wim Carton present a history of the present phase of the crisis\, likely to extend decades into the future\, as the fossil fuel industry swims in the largest profits ever made. Money continues to flow into the construction of pipelines\, platforms\, terminals\, mines – assets that will have to be destroyed for the planet to remain liveable. Too much heat has become officially acceptable because such revolutionary destruction is not. But should the rest of us abide by that priority? \nUnflinchingly critical of business-as-usual and the calls for surrender to it\, sweeping in scope\, stirring and sobering\, Overshoot lays out the stakes for the climate struggle in the years ahead. \n\n\nFind more information about the book here.\nLocation: School V
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/climate-ethics-ceppa-coast-in-person-andreas-malm-and-wim-carton-on-overshoot/
LOCATION:School V
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20251106T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20251106T173000
DTSTAMP:20260414T064811
CREATED:20250911T145123Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20251104T113129Z
UID:10000607-1762444800-1762450200@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Climate Ethics Talk (in-person) - Kian Mintz-Woo (University College Cork)
DESCRIPTION:Title: What do normative philosophers have to contribute to society? \nAbstract: Normative philosophers (inter alia\, political theorists\, moral philosophers\, applied ethicists) develop arguments which link normative positions to practical (and theoretical) judgments or conclusions. This might sound anodyne\, but I use it as a basis to explain what normative philosophers can add to policy discussions as well as to the moral reasoning of members of the public as a whole. The goal is to motivate a conceptually interesting ground for several forms of public philosophy. \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-climate-ethics-talk-in-person-kian-mintz-woo-university-college-cork/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03\, The Scores\, St Salvator's Quad\, KY16 9AL
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20251113T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20251113T173000
DTSTAMP:20260414T064811
CREATED:20250911T145310Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20251111T124836Z
UID:10000608-1763049600-1763055000@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (online and in-person) - Ami Harbin (Oakland University)
DESCRIPTION:Title:  Co-forming feelings in therapy \nAbstract: This paper opens a project within philosophy of therapy\, on the question of how feelings are formed in the context of interactions between clients and therapists. There is a common assumption within many therapeutic approaches that feelings are formed by individuals in their lives outside therapy\, and then clients come to therapy to understand\, process\, and/or cope with their feelings. Is therapy the setting where we come to identify\, understand\, reflect on\, or cope with feelings? Or do we in some cases depend on the therapeutic relationship for feeling formation?  If we are willing to entertain that idea – what are the risks\, and what are the ethical implications? \nLocation: Online on Teams and streamed in Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-online-and-in-person-ami-harbin-oakland-university/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03\, The Scores\, St Salvator's Quad\, KY16 9AL
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20251120T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20251120T173000
DTSTAMP:20260414T064811
CREATED:20250911T145438Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20251118T133558Z
UID:10000609-1763654400-1763659800@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Climate Ethics Talk (in-person) -  Matthew Brander (University of Edinburgh)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Responsibility\, Causality\, and Carbon Accounting \nAbstract:  Carbon accounting standards hold companies accountable (i.e. responsible) for the greenhouse gas emissions from their value chains\, but what is the basis for this allocation of responsibility? There may be a partial causal ‘logic’ that underpins this assignment of responsibility\, but this is not explicitly reflected on or discussed within carbon accounting standards\, nor the related academic literature. As well as being an interesting question in its own right\, the answer may be useful for guiding the development of carbon accounting standards. E.g. under ‘market-based’ accounting\, is it appropriate for companies to report emissions based on their purchase of ‘emission attribute certificates’? Or does the allocation of emissions need to conform to some kind of real-world physical or causal relationship between the reporter and the emissions reported? This paper offers an initial exploration of the underpinning intuitions or rationales at play within carbon accounting practice. \nLocation:  Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-climate-ethics-talk-in-person-matthew-brander-university-of-edinburgh/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03\, The Scores\, St Salvator's Quad\, KY16 9AL
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260129T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260129T173000
DTSTAMP:20260414T064811
CREATED:20260123T101250Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260123T101617Z
UID:10000878-1769702400-1769707800@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in-person) - Miguel de la Cal Moreno & Mario Bison (University of St Andrews and University of Stirling)
DESCRIPTION:4.05-4.45pm: Miguel de la Cal Moreno – Manufactured Disorientation and Climate Change \nAbstract: Many people experience Anthropogenic Climate Change (ACC) as overwhelming and intimidating\, recognising its seriousness and the need to act while feeling unable to determine what to do or how to decide what to do. This paper characterises this experience as moral disorientation. Drawing on Stephen Gardiner’s account of ACC as a “Perfect Moral Storm\,” I argue that its global\, intergenerational\, ecological\, and theoretical dimensions undermine moral clarity on both epistemic and psychological grounds. While Gardiner’s framework helpfully identifies structural difficulties and risks of moral corruption\, it treats these difficulties largely ahistorically.\nTo address this limitation\, I turn to historical work by Naomi Oreskes\, Erik Conway\, and Geoffrey Supran on the deliberate manipulation of climate science and public discourse by the Carbon Industrial Complex. I argue that practices such as doubt-mongering and manipulative framing—particularly those emphasising individual responsibility—have actively contributed to moral disorientation about ACC. Recognising the historically manufactured dimensions of this disorientation helps render it intelligible and identifies normative constraints on how we ought to reason and act. \n4.50-5.30pm: Mario Bison – How to think about empathy\, and why \nAbstract: Empathy is usually cited in connection with altruistic\, or otherwise other-oriented behaviours and attitudes. An empathic approach is usually cited in everyday moral talk as fostering virtues such as forgiveness\, understanding\, and openness. Nevertheless\, there has also been\, at a theoretical level\, an increasing scepticism toward empathy in general. Philosophers have claimed that empathy is neither necessary for making moral judgments nor indeed the best way to go about our moral lives. The matter is complicated by the fact that empathy is variously defined by psychologists\, and no universally agreed-upon definition exists. In this talk I want to look for a solution to these problems by setting aside the immediate debates\, and instead look at the role that this concept has played in the thought of perhaps its most illustrious and influential historical proponent (David Hume)\, who believes that our moral judgments are fundamentally influenced by ‘sympathy’. By critically analysing this concept in context\, and by setting it against modern critics\, I will try to understand what specific need Hume (and his followers) may have felt for invoking empathy\, or related concepts\, in trying to understand morality. \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03 and online on teams
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-miguel-de-la-cal-moreno-mario-bison-university-of-st-andrews-and-university-of-stirling/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03\, The Scores\, St Salvator's Quad\, KY16 9AL
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260205T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260205T173000
DTSTAMP:20260414T064811
CREATED:20260123T101622Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260202T114332Z
UID:10000879-1770307200-1770312600@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in-person) - Viviane Fairbank (St Andrews and Stirling) & Jacob Librizzi (St Andrews)
DESCRIPTION:Viviante Fairbank – The Responsible-Inquiry Model of Journalism \nAbstract: On the traditional\, so-called Informational Model of journalism\, the primary role of journalism in a functioning democracy is to provide people with true information about a certain range of important topics. Although this model is appealing\, I argue that it is unsatisfactory; importantly\, it does not allow us to properly criticize those journalists who publish true\, relevant\, and useful information without proper warrant or ethical backing. After discussing two recent case studies\, I argue that journalism is best understood as a distinctive kind of inquiry\, and that this understanding of journalism should lead us to reject any simple\, factive account of journalistic publication norms. I propose\, instead\, the Responsible-Inquiry Model of journalism\, according to which the primary role of journalism in a functioning democracy is to provide people with responsibly gathered information while\, in the process\, serving as zetetic models. Good journalists do not only provide useful information; they also conduct (ethically and epistemically) exemplary inquiries into the subject at hand. \nJacob Librizzi – Why Metanormative Constitutivists Should be Voluntarists About Reasons \nAbstract: For two decades\, constitutivist accounts of reasons (CR) have faced the “Shm” (or Shmagency) challenge. I argue that responses so far have misunderstood this challenge. However\, by interpreting CR as a form of voluntarism\, we can render the “Shm” challenge question-begging. In doing so\, we disarm the challenge once and for all. \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03 and online on teams
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-viviane-fairbank-st-andrews-and-stirling-jacob-librizzi-st-andrews/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03\, The Scores\, St Salvator's Quad\, KY16 9AL
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR