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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240411T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240411T173000
DTSTAMP:20260414T101624
CREATED:20240104T151442Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240408T110141Z
UID:10000444-1712851200-1712856600@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in person) - Michael Gill (Edinburgh)
DESCRIPTION:Title: The Formality of the Humean Authoritative Ought \nAbstract: There are different things we ought to do. There is what we ought to do insofar as we are seeking to advance our long-term interests. There is what we ought to do insofar as we are trying to do our job well. There is what we ought to do insofar as we are trying to be good friends. Different oughts can conflict with each other. There may be times when we think such conflict is irresolvable. But at least sometimes we think the conflict is resolvable. At least sometimes we think that one thing we ought to do overrides all others. You might think\, for instance\, that helping a friend in a particular situation is what you really ought to do\, even if it means neglecting your job and forgoing your own interests. Call the ought that overrides all others the authoritative ought. \nWhat makes it true that we authoritatively ought to perform an action? What I will call Humean views hold that what makes it true that we authoritatively ought to perform an action is that we would\, were we to reflect properly\, have a positive response toward performing the action. In this paper I elucidate a distinction within Humean views of the authoritative ought\, and argue for one side over the other. The distinction is between substantivism and formalism\, and the side I argue for is the formalist. \nHumean substantivists (such as Julia Driver and Dale Dorsey) believe that proper reflection will lead all of us to the same substantive practical principles—to principles with content\, to principles that prescribe particular types of action. According to substantivists\, because proper reflection would lead all of us to certain substantive principles\, we can identify the actions that fall under those principles as those we authoritatively ought to perform.  \nHumean formalists (such as W.D. Falk and Sharon Street) deny that we are warranted in thinking that proper reflection will lead everyone to the same substantive principles. According to formalists\, we can identify the form of authoritative oughts: what we authoritatively ought to do is what we would respond positively to when we reflect properly. But that is all we can do. We cannot identify the authoritative ought with any substantive content. \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03 \n 
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-michael-gill-edinburgh/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240425T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240425T173000
DTSTAMP:20260414T101624
CREATED:20230602T091155Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240422T153549Z
UID:10000405-1714060800-1714066200@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in person) - Helen Frowe (Stockholm)
DESCRIPTION:Title: The Permissibility of Collective Defence Agreements \nAbstract: Collective defence agreements (CDAs)\, of the sort that exist between\, for example\, NATO members\, EU members\, and African Union members\, are a prime example of a prominent deterrence mechanism. They promise a degree of assistance that will make it almost impossible for an adversary to win an aggressive war against any member. On the face of it\, then\, such agreements seem obviously morally permissible and\, indeed\, morally desirable. However\, I suspect that the moral picture is in fact much more mixed. For example\, acting on a CDA is unlikely to minimise harm compared available alternatives. If\, as I believe\, states are usually subject to a duty to minimise harm when aiding\, then acting on CDAs is likely to be permissible only if doing so is exempt from this duty. This talk explores some of the moral issues raised by CDAs and deterrent mechanisms more broadly. \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-helen-frowe-stockholm/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03\, The Scores\, St Salvator's Quad\, KY16 9AL
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
ORGANIZER;CN="Joel Joseph":MAILTO:jj73@st-andrews.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240502T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240502T173000
DTSTAMP:20260414T101624
CREATED:20240104T151957Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240426T161227Z
UID:10000446-1714665600-1714671000@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in person) - Bridget Bradley (St Andrews)
DESCRIPTION:This talk is part of our series on Climate Ethics. \nTitle: Ethical births\, ethical deaths: Climate anxiety in Britain through the life course \nAbstract: This paper is based on anthropological research conducted with climate activists on the topic of climate anxiety in Britain. Drawing on themes of kinship and its relationship to mental health and activism\, the paper considers the ethical questions surrounding birth and death as significant moments in the life course. Through ethnographic and autoethnographic reflections\, this work reveals how climate anxiety re-frames expectations surrounding what counts as appropriate ways to enter and leave the world\, situated within the context of the cultural politics of contemporary Britain in a time of ecological crisis.\n \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03 \n 
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-bridget-bradley-st-andrews/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240509T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240509T173000
DTSTAMP:20260414T101624
CREATED:20230731T141757Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240509T090022Z
UID:10000410-1715270400-1715275800@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CANCELLED CEPPA Talk (in person) –  Victor Tadros (University of Warwick)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Consent\, Intent\, and Communication \nWhat is consent? I will assume that it is a normative power – a power to alter rights and duties directly. If this is right\, how is consent exercised? I will argue that consent is exercised through the execution of intentions to alter practical reasoning. Successful communication is not needed for valid consent. Even an attempt to communicate is not needed (though it is the central way of consenting). What is needed is an intention that the consentee understands that their practical reasoning is altered – their understanding that they are permitted to do what the consenter consents to. More precisely\, I defend: \nPermissive Intentions: X consents to Y aing where they execute their intention permit Y to a by intending that Y understands that X has permitted Y to a. \nThis View contrasts with familiar alternative views in four ways. \nFirst\, consent is concerned with altering the consentee’s practical reasoning\, and not just with altering the normative status of the consentee’s conduct. So\, a person cannot give consent where they believe that altering the consentee’s practical reasoning is impossible\, even where they wish the normative status of the target’s conduct to be altered. This contrasts with pure mentalist views that consent can be given just by having a mental state or performing a mental action without attempting to alter the consentee’s practical reasoning. Second\, consent can be given without external behaviour that is sufficient to give the consentee grounds to conclude that the consenter has permissive intentions. Consenters can try but fail to give others evidence of their intentions. This contrasts with one kind of externalist view that external evidence or signs of permissive intentions are necessary for consent. Third\, consent is given only if the consenter intends to permit the consentee’s conduct. This contrasts with another kind of externalist view that external evidence or signs of permissive intentions are sufficient for consent. Fourth\, consenters necessarily intend to permit consentees’ conduct. It is insufficient for consent that a person intends the recipient of their communication to believe that they intend to permit them to act. A person can pretend to consent by communicating that they intend to permit an act without actually intending to permit it. And sometimes this might result in the consenter forfeiting a right against the consentee acting. But consent is absent. This contrasts with the view that intending to communicate that one has permissive intentions is sufficient for consent whether or not the consenter has these intentions. \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-online-neil-sinhababu-national-university-of-singapore/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240516T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240516T173000
DTSTAMP:20260414T101624
CREATED:20240506T124545Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240513T150318Z
UID:10000524-1715875200-1715880600@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in person) – Neil Sinhababu (National University of Singapore)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Pleasure Fundamentalism \nAbstract: Pleasure fundamentalism is the view that moral value is the same thing as pleasure and this explains all other moral facts. This talk presents two arguments for pleasure fundamentalism and discusses the form of naturalism they arise from. According to the Reliability Argument\, all processes generating moral belief are unreliable\, except for phenomenal introspection which tells us that pleasure is good. According to the Universality Argument\, pleasure is universal moral value\, because of its qualitative identity with the pleasure in the minds of all possible perceivers of moral value. Both arguments are available within an Einsteinian naturalism combining empiricism with a spacetime ontology\, and avoiding behaviorism in favor of a more Humean psychology. \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-neil-sinhababu-national-university-of-singapore/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240529T170000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240529T183000
DTSTAMP:20260414T101624
CREATED:20240517T182925Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240517T183308Z
UID:10000525-1717002000-1717007400@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Public Lecture: Stephen Gardiner (University of Washington)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Beyond Institutional Denial: A Global Constitutional Convention for Future Generations \nAbstract: Humanity is in deep institutional denial. Current institutions are failing future generations\, in part because there is a governance gap when it comes to promoting intergenerational concern. This gap facilitates a tyranny of the contemporary that puts the young and other future generations at risk. Climate change is a prime example. To confront intergenerational tyranny\, humanity needs more than merely a Summit for the Future. It needs a global constitutional convention focused on future generations.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/public-lecture-steven-gardiner-university-of-washington/
LOCATION:School II (St. Salvator’s)
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/files/2024/05/Poster-Gardiner.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240530T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240530T173000
DTSTAMP:20260414T101624
CREATED:20240517T183207Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240517T183207Z
UID:10000526-1717084800-1717090200@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Public Lecture: Tahseen Jafry (Glasgow Caledonian University)
DESCRIPTION:Title: About Climate Justice: What Does it Mean and What Lies Ahead? \nAbstract: In July 2023\, Europe reached scorching milestones with relentless heatwaves and Scotland had its hottest June ever. Several regions grappled with unprecedented rainfall\, triggering ecological and socioeconomic upheaval. However\, impacts aren’t equally distributed\, those who contribute minimally to carbon emissions\, find themselves on the frontline of these erratic weather extremes.  \nDespite being on our doorstep\, the reality of climate disparities and injustices remains largely hidden. Scotland must prepare to connect with and apply a climate justice framework. This talk will explore how to embrace the changes we are witnessing in our climate and delve into a positive dialogue on what we needs to be made to combat climate inequality\, ensuring well-being and economic prosperity for all.  \n  \n The second lecture will be followed by a wine reception (location to be announced) – all are very welcome to attend!
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/public-lecture-tahseen-jafry-glasgow-caledonian-university/
LOCATION:School II (St. Salvator’s)
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/files/2024/05/Poster-Jafry.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240919T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240919T173000
DTSTAMP:20260414T101624
CREATED:20240912T181838Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240912T181903Z
UID:10000532-1726761600-1726767000@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (online) – Koshka Duff (Nottingham)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Strip-searching as Abjectification: Racism and Sexual Violence in British Policing \nAbstract: Co-authored with Tom Kemp (Criminology\, University of Nottingham)\, this paper examines police strip-searching practices in the UK. Drawing on newly acquired Freedom of Information data\, publicly available testimonies\, thematic analysis of official literature and media reports\, and first-hand experience\, we advance three arguments. First\, strip-searching is used systematically\, not exceptionally\, and targets young people and people of colour\, especially Black young men and boys. Second\, strip-searching in practice is demonstrably excessive when measured against its stated rationales of ‘crime’ detection and ‘caring’ for detainees; we unpick the circular logics through which it is legitimized in official and public discourse. Third\, drawing on Sharpe’s notion of the abject\, we argue that strip-searching\, as a form of normalized sexual violence folded into the rubric of ‘care’\, is part of a project of abjectification that aims to exclude the individuals and groups it targets from social and political subjecthood \nLocation: online & livestreamed from Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-online-koshka-duff-nottingham/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240926T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240926T173000
DTSTAMP:20260414T101624
CREATED:20240912T182503Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240920T101646Z
UID:10000545-1727366400-1727371800@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in-person & online) – Derek Ball (St Andrews) & Caroline Touburg (Umeå University)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Philosophical Foundations of Green-House Gas Accounting \nAbstract: International agreements such as the Kyoto protocol and the Paris agreement require countries to measure and track their greenhouse gas emissions.  Companies (as well as universities and other organisations) are required by governmental regulations or their own net-zero goals to do the same.  Greenhouse gas accounting is the project of measuring and tracking GHG emissions.  Although there are a range of standards and guidelines governing GHG accounting practice\, a number of issues remain unresolved in the literature\, including how to account for emissions of short-lived but potent GHGs such as methane\, and how (and indeed whether) to account for temporary storage of CO2 (for example\, in wood products); and standard approaches to these issues are\, in our view\, seriously flawed.   Our talk has two aims\, one technical\, the other theoretical.  The technical aim is to sketch a framework that provides a principled resolution of these issues.  The theoretical aim is to discuss the normative presuppositions of the framework.  Notably\, the framework relies on the idea that in some cases\, we should focus on the preservation of some valuable thing – avoiding loss and minimizing damage – rather than on some aggregable value (such as money\, or well-being).  This shift in focus puts us in a position to avoid some of the problems we see in extant approaches\, and has potential for application in other areas of moral philosophy. \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-derek-ball-st-andrews-caroline-touburg-umea-university/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20241003T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20241003T173000
DTSTAMP:20260414T101624
CREATED:20240912T183630Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240927T115012Z
UID:10000548-1727971200-1727976600@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in-person & online) – Barry Maguire (Edinburgh)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Two Moralities of Recognition \nAbstract: According to moralities of recognition\, fundamental moral norms are norms for living together. Moral norms explain how living in unity is possible despite being separate individuals\, they explain how we can relate to each other as persons that are more than mere sources of benefits and burdens\, obstacles and opportunities. Those who relate to each other according to these norms stand in relations of mutual recognition. By contrast\, some moral theories are atomistic — they deny that fundamental moral norms are communal norms. The paper explains the appeal of morality of recognition and elaborates a distinction between two kinds of moralities of recognition. Some envision a community founded on respect; according to these theories\, mutual recognition is mutual respect. Others offer a fundamentally different vision of the moral community\, namely\, one founded on concern; according to these theories\, mutual recognition is mutual concern. We examine T. M. Scanlon’s contractualism as a fully developed\, influential\, and relatively recent version of respect morality and argue that Scanlon’s morality of respect has certain distinctive structural features. We then articulate the contours of an alternative\, morality of concern\, which offers a different idea of moral community and has a distinctively different structure. Our goal is not to present an argument for morality of concern\, but to explain what makes it attractive and to make clear that choosing between the two kinds of moralities of recognition involves choosing between two substantively different visions of how to live together. \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-barry-maguire-edinburgh-2/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20241010T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20241010T173000
DTSTAMP:20260414T101624
CREATED:20240912T182924Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20241004T140307Z
UID:10000547-1728576000-1728581400@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in-person & online) – Adrian Walsh (University of New England)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Internal Validity\, External Validity and the Evaluation of Thought Experiments in Applied Ethics and Political Philosophy \nAbstract: Thought experiments clearly play a central role in much contemporary ethical theorising. In the recent literature on thought experiments\, some commentators (e.g. Wilson 2016; Dowding 2019) have criticised the lack of attention paid by moral philosophers to two ideas which are key notions in science. These are internal and external validity. Wilson argues that if thought experiments are indeed a kind of experiment\, then philosophers should begin any plausible search for rigour in the scientific literature on experimental research design. When designing a thought experiment\, Wilson suggests we consider the extent to which ethical judgements that are correct or endorsed in the world of the experiment generalise to the world beyond the experiment. This is an important question to consider. However\, I suggest that Wilson’s approach (i) overstates the connection between real-world scientific experiments and thought experiments (ii) focuses too readily on the formal structure of thought experiments at the expense of the argumentative context. With respect to the former claim\, I suggest that this points towards a more general thesis that it is a mistake to treat the reasoning involved in the use of thought experiments as a subset of scientific reasoning. I shall also consider\, towards the end of the talk\, a more moderate (and plausible) view of the positive role that the concepts of internal and external validity might play in evaluating and assessing the legitimacy of thought experiments. \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-adrian-walsh-university-of-new-england/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20241017T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20241017T173000
DTSTAMP:20260414T101624
CREATED:20240912T183831Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20241011T222115Z
UID:10000549-1729180800-1729186200@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (online) – Valerie Tiberius (Minnesota)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Happy Immoralists and Satisfied Loners: A Pragmatic Perspective on Disagreement about Well-being \nAbstract: Can a morally bad person live well? Can a person without friends achieve well-being? There is long-standing disagreement about the correct answers to these questions. I offer a diagnosis of the debate between those who answer “no” (objectivists about well-being) and those who answer “yes” (subjectivists about well-being). I suggest that the reason people are divided about this question is that the opposing answers represent two different perspectives on well-being that answer to two different sets of practical interests. Given this diagnosis\, the cure is to acknowledge the importance of both perspectives. I discuss different ways of doing this. \nLocation: online & livestreamed from Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-online-valerie-tiberius-minnesota/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20241028T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20241028T170000
DTSTAMP:20260414T101624
CREATED:20241009T150113Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20241009T150113Z
UID:10000557-1730131200-1730134800@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:In person Talk by Tom Angier (University of Cape Town)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Goodness as Natural Perfection. \nAbstract: In this paper I outline Aristotle’s conception of human functioning\, which I take to be a viable and illuminating ground for determining human goods. I then look at alternative schemata for the notion of ‘function’ – ones derived from evolutionary theory – and argue that they are not preferable to their Aristotelian rival. I finish the paper by looking at ‘neo-Aristotelian ethical naturalism’\, in particular that of Philippa Foot\, and argue that it is not Aristotelian enough.\n\nBio: Tom Angier is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Cape Town. He works on neo-Aristotelian ethical and political theory. He is currently completing a monograph entitled “Human Nature\, Human Goods: A Theory of Natural Perfectionism”. It is due to be published by Cambridge University Press in 2025.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/in-person-talk-by-tom-angier-university-of-cape-town/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20241031T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20241031T173000
DTSTAMP:20260414T101624
CREATED:20240912T184058Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20241026T135317Z
UID:10000550-1730390400-1730395800@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in-person & online) – Katharina Bernhard (St Andrews) and Graeme MacGilchrist (St Andrews)
DESCRIPTION:Please join us on 31 October (4-5.30pm) for the launch of the Philosophy of Climate Science (PhiCliSci) working group\, which will bring together philosophers and climate scientists to discuss central themes relating to the climate crisis. In the first session\, climate scientist Graeme MacGilchrist and philosopher Katharina Bernhard will give presentations on the topic of ‘Uncertainty’ in climate science\, after which the floor is open for discussion. \nTitle: Uncertainty \nLocation: The Stewart Room in Younger Hall
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-katharina-bernhard-st-andrews-and-graeme-macgilchrist-st-andrews/
LOCATION:The Stewart Room in Younger Hall\, Younger Hall\, St Andrews\, KY16 9AJ\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20241107T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20241107T173000
DTSTAMP:20260414T101624
CREATED:20240912T184333Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20241101T123533Z
UID:10000551-1730995200-1731000600@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in-person & online) – Patrick Tomlin (Warwick University)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Killing vs Headaches: Wide Proportionality and Limited Aggregation \nAbstract: Philosophers who have discussed ‘limited aggregation’ have focussed discussion on cases in which we must choose which of two groups to save – for example\, whether we should save one person’s life\, or save some enormous number of people from a mild headache. According to one influential view\, which I call the Relevance View\, we should save one person’s life in this case\, since headaches are irrelevant to death. In this paper\, I want to examine what this implies for a different set of cases – cases in which we might inflict harm on some in order to save others from harm. Translating the relevance view from ‘whom-to-save’ to ‘harming-to-save’ cases\, I show\, is not straightforward. We need to consider up to four different ‘relevance rules’\, and to consider the relationships between them. I will further argue that considering the Relevance View in these cases reveals something important about two fundamental principles of preventive morality —  that the proportionality principle is logically prior to\, and constrains the operation of\, the necessity principle \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-online-patrick-tomlin-warwick-university/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20241114T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20241114T173000
DTSTAMP:20260414T101624
CREATED:20240912T184437Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20241108T140838Z
UID:10000552-1731600000-1731605400@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (online) – John Barugahare (Makerere University)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Global Health Equity through Decolonizing Health Research Ethics in Africa: Leveraging Kwame Nkrumah’s Analysis of Neocolonialism. \nAbstract:Background: The foundational contention of this paper is that\, arguably\, the ultimate ethical goal of conducting health research among humans is to provide them with better health opportunities. Because of growing perceptions that ongoing international collaborative health research between the Global North and Africa is colonial in nature\, there is worry that this goal will not be easily met. Hence\, there is an urgent need to decolonize international collaborative health research in Africa. Using Kwame Nkrumah’s analysis of his seminal work on ‘Neocolonialism: the last stage of imperialism’\, the aim of this paper is to reflect on the potential of the current dominant trend in decolonizing health research ethics in Africa to meet the ultimate goal of decolonization. Methods: This is a purely argumentative paper based on Kwame Nkrumah’s views on neocolonialism and decolonization. The paper also uses other secondary sources to corroborate and demonstrate its argument. Results: There is a growing consensus that international collaborative health research is colonial in nature and hence a need to decolonise it. The paper argues that Nkrumah’s analysis of neocolonialism implies that the ultimate goal of decolonizing health research in Africa should be to mitigate and ultimately stop the exploitation of African people in international collaborative health research. Discussion: The paper shows that the outcomes of most decolonizing efforts\, though necessary\, are not enough. Unless conscientiously pursued\, these efforts risk failure at meeting Nkrumah’s ultimate goal of decolonization and arguably are becoming a subtle method for facilitating\, sustaining and entrenching the ultimate goal of neocolonialism—the exploitation of African peoples. Conclusion: The mission of decolonizing health research ethics in Africa needs to clearly demonstrate the potential to mitigate and ultimately end maximin exploitation in health research and be critical enough to avoid the risk of instead facilitating neocolonialism unconsciously. \nJohn Barugahare\, Ph.D.\, is a senior lecturer and Head\, Department of Philosophy at Makerere University\, Kampala – Uganda. He teaches moral philosophy\, human rights and applies these in health care and health-related research. His major interest is in ethics international collaborative research. He is also interest in guiding the development of bioethics in Africa. Lately\, he is exploring concepts and perspectives in the decolonization discussion\, and how these can help shape our understanding of the major ethical issues in international collaborative health research\, hoping to suggest ways these can be eased. \nLocation: online & livestreamed from Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-online-john-barugahare-makerere-university/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20241120T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20241120T180000
DTSTAMP:20260414T101624
CREATED:20241007T113131Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20241007T113131Z
UID:10000556-1732118400-1732125600@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Bradley Hillier-Smith’s 'The Ethics of State Responses to Refugees' Book Launch
DESCRIPTION:You are warmly invited to the book launch for Bradley Hillier-Smith’s brand-new book The Ethics of State Responses to Refugees (abstract below). The author will be interviewed by Kieran Oberman (LSE)\, after which we will all be in the opportunity to ask questions and celebrate the new book with some well-deserved drinks. All welcome!\n\nBradley Hillier-Smith: The Ethics of State Responses to Refugees\n Edgecliffe 104\, 20th November from 4pm – 6pm\, followed by drinks. For those unable to join in person\, the Teams link is here.\n\nAbstract for The Ethics of State Responses to Refugees\nAt a time of intense philosophical and political debates on how states ought to respond to refugees\, this book provides an account of what an ethical response to refugees would be. It does this by developing an understanding of the moral duties that states have towards refugees. The first half of the book analyses state practices used in response to refugees\, to understand the negative duties of states not to harm or violate the rights of innocent refugees. The second half analyses morally significant features of contemporary refugee displacement\, to understand the positive duties of states to alleviate the distinctive harms and injustices that refugees face. The two halves together thereby outline the negative and positive duties of states towards refugees which together constitute the elements of an ethical response. The book then demonstrates this ethical response is not only urgently required but is also within reach.\n\nAbout Kieran Oberman: Kieran Oberman is an Associate Professor in Philosophy at the LSE whose research and numerous publications specialise in the ethics of border control\, immigration\, migration ethics\, the freedoms and rights of migrants\, and obligations towards refugees among other topics in global justice.\n\nhttps://www.routledge.com/The-Ethics-of-State-Responses-to-Refugees/Hillier-Smith/p/book/9781032833675
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/bradley-hillier-smiths-the-ethics-of-state-responses-to-refugees-book-launch/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20241121T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20241121T173000
DTSTAMP:20260414T101624
CREATED:20240912T184522Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20241115T110644Z
UID:10000553-1732204800-1732210200@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in-person & online) – James Hutton (Delft)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Emotion-Based Environmental Ethics: The Radical Implications of Taking Wonder Seriously \nAbstract:\nIn environmental ethics\, we find many competing theories of environmental value\, but little discussion of the epistemological grounds for believing one theory rather than another. Building on the framework of moral empiricism (which I’ve developed elsewhere)\, I propose an “Emotion-Based” methodology for environmental ethics. The Emotion-Based methodology requires treating our emotional experiences as defeasible intuitions about value\, wrongness\, etc. – accepting their contents\, unless we have substantive reason not to. I offer some rationales for adopting the Emotion-Based methodology\, exploiting analogies with other domains of knowledge. In the final part of the talk\, I zoom in on the emotion of wonder. Wonder\, I argue\, presents its object as valuable for its own sake. If we take seriously the full range of our experiences of wonder\, we face pressure to adopt a pluralist view of environmental value\, on which some nonsentient beings (e.g. trees) and collective entities (i.e. ecosystems) are valuable for their own sake. Thus\, while moral empiricism is an abstract view about the conditions for moral knowledge\, it turns out to have fairly radical first-order implications for environmental ethics.\nLocation: Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-online-viviane-fairbank-st-andrews-and-simon-lee-st-andrews/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20241128T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20241128T173000
DTSTAMP:20260414T101624
CREATED:20240912T184554Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20241125T113606Z
UID:10000554-1732809600-1732815000@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in-person & online) – Katrin Flikschuh (LSE)
DESCRIPTION:Title: The Idea of Ancestry in African Philosophy \nAbstract: This paper concerns itself with the rationality of belief in ancestral existence. Although belief in ancestral existence remains widespread globally\, I shall focus on a-thinned out version of African forms of this belief. ‘Thinned-out’ in that I am not interested in this or that substantive version of the belief among different African peoples; nor am I interested in the particular cultural practises that attend or attest to the belief. I am interested in the general form of the belief\, and in the more general conception of the natural world in general which one would have to endorse for belief in ancestral existence to count as rational. In one sense\, the aims of this paper are quite modest: I merely aim to get clearer\, myself\, on what strikes me as an intuitively attractive belief. In another sense\, the paper is quite ambitious: the belief would seem to require Western readers to suspend routine metaphysical and scientific assumptions about the natural order. In putting pressure on these routine assumptions\, I shall touch on discussions around free will and consciousness as phenomena that share some of the features of ancestral existence. Considered comparatively\, belief in ancestral existence may be no less rationally defensible than belief in free will or (non-reductive) consciousness. \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-online-katrin-flikschuh-lse/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20250206T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20250206T173000
DTSTAMP:20260414T101624
CREATED:20250130T200250Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250203T191323Z
UID:10000569-1738857600-1738863000@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in-person & online) – Philip Ebert (University of Stirling)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Philosophical Challenges in Risk Communication of Rare and Severe Events \nAbstract: In this talk\, I will discusses different philosophical challenges in communicating and dealing with the risk of rare and severe events. As a case study\, I use avalanche risk: a form of voluntary risk taking in which the individual is often partly responsible for the occurrence of the relevant event. In particular\, I highlight the challenge that avalanche risk communicators face when “informing” or “educating” individuals about the relevant risks\, and I will present some experimental work on the risk perception of end users of the Scottish avalanche forecasts and discuss their (mis)understanding of the relevant risks. \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-online-philip-ebert-university-of-stirling/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20250213T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20250213T173000
DTSTAMP:20260414T101624
CREATED:20250130T200801Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250210T224151Z
UID:10000570-1739462400-1739467800@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in-person & online) – Simon Lee (Earth & Environmental Sciences) and Viviane Fairbank (Philosophy)
DESCRIPTION:Please join us on for the Second edition of the Philosophy of Climate Science (PhiCliSci) working group\, which will bring together philosophers and climate scientists to discuss central themes relating to the climate crisis. In the first session\, climate scientist Simon Lee and philosopher Viviane Fairbank will give presentations on the topic of ‘Climate Modelling and Climate Communication’ in climate science. \nTitle: Climate Modelling and Climate Communication \nLocation: John Henderson lecture room in Castlecliffe
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-online-simon-lee-earth-environmental-sciences-and-viviane-fairbank-philosophy/
LOCATION:John Henderson lecture room\, Castlecliffe\, St Andrews\, Fife\, KY16 9AZ\, United Kingdom
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20250227T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20250227T173000
DTSTAMP:20260414T101624
CREATED:20250130T201035Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250130T201035Z
UID:10000572-1740672000-1740677400@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in-person & online) – Katharina Bernhard (St Andrews)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Multiple Aims of Science and the New Demarcation Problem \nAbstract: TBC \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-online-katharina-bernhard-st-andrews/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20250313T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20250313T173000
DTSTAMP:20260414T101624
CREATED:20250130T201114Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250306T171239Z
UID:10000573-1741881600-1741887000@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in-person & online) – Daniela Dover (UCLA)
DESCRIPTION:Title: The Democratic Soul in Plato and Whitman \nAbstract: In Books II-IV of the Republic\, Plato famously proposes an analogy between the constitution of the Greek city-state and the constitution of the human soul. The methodological assumption that underlies the architecture of the Republic is that philosophical questions about topics that we might today group under the heading of ‘moral psychology’–descriptive and normative questions about the workings of the human psyche–cannot be separated from questions of political philosophy. I argue that Plato was right to think that you cannot theorize the soul without at the same time theorizing the city\, and vice versa. I go on to ask: what happens if we retain the idea that there is a profound methodological insight embedded in the city-soul analogy\, but\, unlike Plato\, we want to defend democracy as the best form of government? How might that democratic aspiration interact with our ways of thinking about the soul\, or the self? \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-online-daniela-dover-ucla/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20250320T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20250320T173000
DTSTAMP:20260414T101624
CREATED:20250130T201157Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250317T170729Z
UID:10000574-1742486400-1742491800@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in-person & online) – Tom Sinclair (Oxford)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Hypocrisy as Evasion \nAbstract: Hypocrites attract moral condemnation and are widely thought to lack standing to criticise others. This paper argues against attempts to explain this that appeal to moral conditions on blaming and notions of moral authority\, proposing instead an account based on a conception of moral interactions as fundamentally dialogical in character. According to this account\, blame is just one of many tools of moral exchange whose proper use is the building of a shared moral world of mutually acknowledged responsibilities. The hypocrite misuses these tools\, and this both generates a basic moral objection to hypocrisy that is prior to the more specific objections highlighted by other accounts and explains the hypocrite’s loss of standing. \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-online-tom-sinclair-oxford/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20250327T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20250327T173000
DTSTAMP:20260414T101624
CREATED:20250130T202751Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250324T141500Z
UID:10000581-1743091200-1743096600@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in-person & online) – Katherine Snow (Princeton)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Revisiting the Spinoza Controversy in an age of Environmental Crisis\n \nAbstract: Modern scientific naturalism arguably tries to ontologically describe or account for the entirety of the natural world using necessity. Scientific naturalism presents logical causal necessity as constituting how nature “makes” things exist\, and it presents necessity in the more general or abstract sense as the only principle or idea at the core of what nature is supposed to be. Where did this practice arise in its current form\, how legitimate is it\, and how does this practice matter for the contemporary environmental crisis? In this talk\, I will propose answers to all three of these questions which draw on my reading of the so-called “Spinoza Controversy” of 1785-1812. Among other aspects of this vital dispute\, the Controversy essentially presented the West with a choice vis-à-vis the external non-human world. On the one side were those embracing a new\, monist\, semi-secularized “naturalism” based on neo-Spinozist ideas of nature as an intelligible and necessary whole. On the other side\, skeptics like Friedrich Jacobi denied that such an idea of nature could ever be anything more than an internalist fiction. Of particular relevance to our environmental crisis today\, Jacobi further quite presciently argued that the neo-Spinozist position automatically engaged in a kind of active nihilism with respect to the real external world of our direct experience.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-online-philclisci-tbc/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03\, The Scores\, St Salvator's Quad\, KY16 9AL
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20250403T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20250403T173000
DTSTAMP:20260414T101624
CREATED:20250130T201317Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250401T144731Z
UID:10000575-1743696000-1743701400@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (online) – Christine Korsgaard (Harvard University)
DESCRIPTION:Title: The Incomparable Value of the Individual \nAbstract: Kant believed that every human being should be treated as an end in itself. In the Groundwork\, Kant explains many of our duties by arguing that their violation would involve treating a human being as a mere means. But we cannot explain all of our duties that way. Nor can we explain what is wrong with treating an individual as a mere means unless we have a positive account of what is involved in being an end in itself. Kant does not spell out this positive account. \nI find a clue to what Kant could mean in his claim that individuals who possess dignity have incomparable value. I propose that to treat someone as an end in itself is to evaluate the events and conditions of that person’s life in accordance with the value they have for her\, and to regard that value as incomparable with the value those events and conditions might have for anyone else. I explain why this conception rules out the aggregation of value across the boundaries between individuals and show how it supports John Taurek’s attack on aggregation. I also explain how this conception of the value of the individual is connected to the idea that individuals have rights.\nLocation: Online but live-streamed from Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-online-christine-korsgaard-harvard-university/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20250417T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20250417T173000
DTSTAMP:20260414T101624
CREATED:20250130T201400Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250417T135908Z
UID:10000576-1744905600-1744911000@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in-person & online) – Lucy O’Brien (UCL)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Autonomy and control over one’s social self-consciousness \nAbstract: Humans have the capacity to absorb – to feel – others’ feelings. More particularly we feel others’ feelings about ourselves: at least as long as we are awake\, we are subject to being self-consciously affected in our interactions with others. We are capable of social self-consciousness\, and such a capacity plays a critical part in our general capacity to care about\, calibrate\, and organise human life. In this talk I want to consider a subject’s relation to her own affective social self-consciousness. Two areas I will consider are (i) a subject’s practical management of their social self-consciousness\, and (i) a subject’s appraisals of their own social self-consciousness. I will suggest that the latter concern can be thought of in the context of a general problem of the rationality of deference. I suggest that our self-appraisals should be understood as allowing for a kind of necessary instability\, tension\, and opacity. In so far as our self-conscious lives\, are rationally permeated with the appraisals of others\, we risk standing in an uncomprehending\, but committed\, sense of ourselves and our value \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-online-lucy-obrien-ucl/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20250501T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20250501T173000
DTSTAMP:20260414T101624
CREATED:20250130T201531Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250429T144945Z
UID:10000577-1746115200-1746120600@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (online) – Carla Bagnoli (University of Modena and Reggio Emilia)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Hope and the Powers of Shared Agency \nAbstract: This paper argues that Kant’s theory of radical evil exalts the powers of organized\, shared and institutional\, agency. In section 1\, I illustrate the paradoxicality of radical evil and the novelty of Kant’s “empowering” conception focused on human agency. In section 2\, I argue that radical evil entails a normative variety of unintelligibility\, signaling lack of self-knowledge and self-alienation. In section 3\, I show that the (moral) opacity of maxims does not undermine one’s awareness of the moral law\, does not prevent self and co-legislation\, and therefore does not preclude the exercise of moral agency. In section 4\, I account for the distinctive functions of hope and faith\, denying that they are complementary. In sections 5 and 6\, I argue that the reliance on hope or faith points to different modes of contrasting evil by organizing human agency in institutional forms. In section 7\, I conclude that the most powerful response to radical evil is the organization of shared agency – a communal\, ethical\, political\, and institutional enterprise. \nLocation: Online but streamed from Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-online-carla-bagnoli-university-of-modena-and-reggio-emilia/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20250508T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20250508T173000
DTSTAMP:20260414T101624
CREATED:20250130T201612Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250130T201612Z
UID:10000578-1746720000-1746725400@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in-person & online) – Clotilde Torregrossa (St Andrews)
DESCRIPTION:Title: The (Aesthetic) Value of Environmental Activism \nAbstract: TBC \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-online-clotilde-torregrossa-st-andrews/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20250515T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20250515T173000
DTSTAMP:20260414T101624
CREATED:20250130T201701Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250513T152322Z
UID:10000579-1747324800-1747330200@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in-person & online) – Vid Simoniti (University of Liverpool)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Merely Imagined Moralities\n \nAbstract: Artworks and other cultural products (films\, novels\, operas\, pop songs\, etc.) often express heroic\, pessimistic\, melancholy\, or dark ways of looking at the world (also referred to as ‘perspectives’). Sometimes\, these worldviews appear politically inflected; we may\, for instance\, describe a work as “feminist” or “patriotic” according to the worldview it expresses. Drawing on Elisabeth Camp’s and Nelson Goodman’s work\, I propose that when artworks express worldviews\, they (i) represent sets of mental dispositions for interpreting and reacting to the real world\, and (ii) they achieve this by leading the audience to temporarily inhabit those dispositions. This view has at least two important implications: first\, it makes little sense to morally evaluate artworks for expressing worldviews\, because representing mental dispositions does not amount to endorsing them. Secondly\, the expression of worldviews through artworks and other cultural products nevertheless plays a specific\, underappreciated role in political discourse. \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-online-vid-simoniti-university-of-liverpool/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR