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X-ORIGINAL-URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
X-WR-CALDESC:Events for CEPPA
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260212T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260212T173000
DTSTAMP:20260209T111410Z
CREATED:20260123T101809Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260209T111410Z
UID:10000880-1770912000-1770917400@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in-person) - Enrico Galvagni (University of Edinburgh)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Hume’s One and Only Definition of Virtue \nAbstract: Hume’s moral philosophy is seen by many as a form of virtue ethics that includes two different definitions of virtue. On the one hand\, Hume seems to define virtue as a mental quality generating utility and agreeableness to oneself or others. On the other hand\, he also says that it is a mental quality that receives moral approbation. Interpreters argue about which of these definitions is more fundamental and try to reconcile them into a unified account. Against such readings\, I argue that Hume has only one definition of virtue as a character trait that generates moral approbation. Utility and agreeableness play a fundamental role in his ethics\, but one that does not relate to his definition of virtue. In turn\, this provide reason to question the now mainstream interpretation of Hume as a virtue ethicist. \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03 and online on teams
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-enrico-galvagni-university-of-edinburgh/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03\, The Scores\, St Salvator's Quad\, KY16 9AL
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260219T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260219T173000
DTSTAMP:20260216T155504Z
CREATED:20260123T102009Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260216T155504Z
UID:10000881-1771516800-1771522200@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in-person) - Yoshinari Hattori and Ida Miczske (St Andrews and Stirling)
DESCRIPTION:Yoshinari Hattori – Why We Must Believe in Free Will and Moral Responsibility: Reconsidering Their Foundations \nAbstract: This presentation argues that the practice of blaming wrongdoers—especially directing resentment or indignation towards them—is rationally indispensable for us. Pereboom contends that directing resentment or indignation at others is a form of harming them and is unjustified. As an alternative\, he proposes that when morally wrong actions are performed\, we should respond with disappointment or sadness. Against this proposal\, I argue that there are social functions that cannot be achieved by disappointment or sadness but are fulfilled only by directing resentment or indignation. The fact that we have strong reason to secure the fulfilment of these functions makes the practice of directing resentment or indignation rationally indispensable for us. In particular\, I argue that responding with disappointment or sadness fails\, first\, to treat others as moral agents and\, second\, to exercise the normative force required to compel them to stand in a space of answerability. \nIda Miczske – When love met morality: anonymity\, irreplaceability\, and partial self-effacement \nAbstract: Most of us value relationships such as friendship and love. Surprisingly\, it is not so easy to reconcile the demands they pose on us with living a moral life. In this presentation I want to identify one source of this tension and\, if time allows\, propose a solution based on partial self-effacement. \nI argue that the tension emerges because certain relationships require de re motivation grounded in the identity of an irreplaceable object\, while moral justification abstracts from particular identities. I propose to explicate the latter claim in terms of the requirement of justification anonymity\, and show that it conflicts with de re motivation.\nA common response to the conflict between relationships and morality has been to introduce self-effacement. However\, as full self-effacement is problematic\, I propose that moral theories should instead be partially self-effacing. Drawing on that\, I argue that partial self-effacement allows us to reconcile de re motivation with moral justification.\nLocation: Edgecliffe G03 and online on teams
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-yoshinari-hattori-and-ida-miczske-st-andrews-and-stirling/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03\, The Scores\, St Salvator's Quad\, KY16 9AL
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260226T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260226T173000
DTSTAMP:20260223T134529Z
CREATED:20260123T102136Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260223T134529Z
UID:10000882-1772121600-1772127000@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in-person) - Omar Ruiz Rivera and Craig Ferrie (St Andrews and Stirling)
DESCRIPTION:Omar Ruiz Rivera – Moral Skill \nAbstract: This talk is about moral skill—the capacity for morally excellent behaviour. In particular\, I engage with Shepherd’s (2022) view that moral skill is “limited in scope\, and precarious” (p. 713). To defend this view\, Shepherd relies on a distinction between global and local moral skill. The former involves the action domains that structure human life\, whereas the latter is restricted to specific areas of human life. His claim is that global moral skill is “practically impossible for human agents” (p. 725)\, while local moral skill is possible but precarious. I will argue that Shepherd’s own account of skill supports a more complex picture of moral skill than he allows. Drawing on Shepherd’s (2021) account of skill\, I propose a third model of moral skill—“mid-level moral skill”—which is less demanding than global moral skill but broader in scope than local moral skill. If this claim is correct\, it would entail that framing moral skill exclusively in terms of global or local moral skill risks overlooking alternative perspectives that might lead to a more nuanced conclusion than Shepherd’s (2022) characterisation of moral skill as limited and precarious. \nCraig Ferrie – Normative (Un)knowability and the Hybrid Theory of Normative Truth \nAbstract: There is some plausibility to the idea that if a normative claim\, p\, is true then it should be possible to know p. If correct\, this makes normative truth quite different from natural truth\, which seems capable of outrunning our knowability. This view\, however\, runs up against counterexamples. It seems\, for instance\, that the people of Pompeii had most reason to evacuate in order to escape the eruption of Mt Vesuvius\, but no one could have known that they did. I am interested in whether the truth pluralist is in a unique position to overcome such counterexamples\, provided they accept a hybrid theory\, which treats them as conjunctions\, one part normative and one part natural. To do so\, it needs to be explained why these cases are exempt from the knowability condition on normative truth (which I will try do to!). \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03 and online on teams
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-omar-ruiz-rivera-st-andrews-and-stirling/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03\, The Scores\, St Salvator's Quad\, KY16 9AL
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260312T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260312T173000
DTSTAMP:20260306T200129Z
CREATED:20260123T102224Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260306T200129Z
UID:10000883-1773331200-1773336600@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (online) - Katie McShane (Colorado State University)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Relational Value: Problems and Prospects \nAbstract: The concept of “relational value” is widely used in the environmental ethics and policy literatures. In this talk\, I will critically assess this use\, considering what relational value might add to our existing value categories and what problems it might produce for our thinking about the value of the natural world. I first discuss the history of the concept: why early authors considered it a necessary addition to other value concepts and which claims about the natural environment they thought it was particularly well positioned to capture. I next discuss criticisms of the concept: that the need for it was demonstrated by misrepresenting other categories of value and that it distorts our thinking about them. Finally\, I consider what would be a fruitful way forward given these concerns.  While the concept of relational value might be here to stay\, we would do well to think more carefully about both its meaning and its use.  \nLocation: Online on teams and streamed in Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-katie-mcshane-colorado-state-university/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03\, The Scores\, St Salvator's Quad\, KY16 9AL
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260402T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260402T173000
DTSTAMP:20260401T134540Z
CREATED:20260123T102513Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260401T134540Z
UID:10000885-1775145600-1775151000@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in-person) - Kal Kalewold (Leeds)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Going First: Integration with Compensation as a Duty of Justice. \nAbstract: Racial segregation remains deeply entrenched in many societies such as the United States. (Liberal) integrationists argue that we have a duty to integrate because integration is necessary for racial justice (Anderson 2010). (Egalitarian) pluralists reject a duty to integrate (Shelby 2014\, 2016). They hold that integration impermissibly imposes costs on the disadvantaged. On the pluralist view\, we should instead endeavour to make communities better off however they are spatially distributed. In this talk\, I defend a duty to integrate with compensation. I draw on evidence that has been neglected in the philosophical literature that the costs of integration are differentially distributed across age groups. Compensating those integrating first undermines the foundation of the pluralist objection and vindicates a duty to integrate. \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03 and online on teams
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-kal-kalewold-leeds/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03\, The Scores\, St Salvator's Quad\, KY16 9AL
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260416T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260416T173000
DTSTAMP:20260414T174222Z
CREATED:20260123T102549Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260414T174222Z
UID:10000886-1776355200-1776360600@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in-person) - Matthew Vermaire (St Andrews)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Conflated Questions in the Ethics of Belief \nAbstract: It’s common to suppose that epistemology can be understood in close structural parallel with ethics: as ethics is about what to do\, epistemology is about what to believe. In this paper I draw attention to an important limit of such parallelisms: in reasoning to belief\, agents are concerned in the first instance not with what to believe but with the uniquely theoretical question of what is the case. I demonstrate the relevance this distinction in questions has for the debate between pragmatists and evidentialists in the ethics of belief\, and I suggest a compromise that I expect no one to like. \n\nLocation: Edgecliffe G03 and online on teams
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-matthew-vermaire-st-andrews/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03\, The Scores\, St Salvator's Quad\, KY16 9AL
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260423T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260423T173000
DTSTAMP:20260421T111752Z
CREATED:20260123T102709Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260421T111752Z
UID:10000887-1776960000-1776965400@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Climate Ethics Talk (online and in-person) - Jiewuh Song (Seoul National University)
DESCRIPTION:Title: The Right to a Healthy Environment and the Case of Climate Change \nAbstract: Once regarded as a marginal proposal in international human rights\, the right to a healthy environment has gained surprisingly widespread acceptance in domestic law across the world.  Recently\, the right has become an important part of global climate advocacy\, often anchoring legal arguments for climate action. Yet the status of the right to a healthy environment in international human rights law remains uncertain\, and theoretical suspicion about its justifiability persists.  Using the climate case as an illustrative example and drawing on both human rights theory and recent case law\, I present a justification of the right to a healthy environment as a distinctly useful response to what I call structural threats to human rights\, or widespread and causally opaque threats to the urgent interests that human rights are meant to protect.  This justification helps to guide our thinking about the content and adjudication of the right to a healthy environment. \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03 and online on teams
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-climate-ethics-talk-in-person-jiewuh-song-seoul-national-university/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03\, The Scores\, St Salvator's Quad\, KY16 9AL
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260501T110000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260501T120000
DTSTAMP:20260422T171457Z
CREATED:20260422T171416Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260422T171457Z
UID:10000961-1777633200-1777636800@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA/Arché Seminar: Jennifer Saul
DESCRIPTION:We are delighted to invite you to a special joint CEPPA/Arché Seminar to introduce the new Professorial Fellow Jennifer Saul\, who will give a talk about her recent research\, entitled ‘When Norm Violations Come Out of the Shadows’.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-arche-seminar-jennifer-saul/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260528T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260528T173000
DTSTAMP:20260528T110206Z
CREATED:20260123T102805Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260528T110206Z
UID:10000888-1779984000-1779989400@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in-person) - Richard Arneson (UC San Diego)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Democratic Instrumentalism and the Threat of Authoritarianism \nAbstract: The instrumentalism of the title says roughly that the form of governance that would be feasibly best in any circumstances is any one whose establishment and operation would bring about consequences morally no worse than those of any other that might instead be put in place.  I stipulate that the consequences to be assessed exclude any possible noninstrumental value that attaches to all members of the society having an equal vote or equal opportunity for  political influence (EOPI).  This allows\, components of democratic institutions such as protection of  freedom of speech and association do have such value that weighs on the scales.      Authoritarians favoring nondemocracy might be reasonable liberals\, social democrats\, or conservatives.  Does instrumentalism favor democracy always or almost always in our time?  The stipulated exclusion is incorrect if all having equal vote or EOPI really in themselves have noninstrumental value. This exclusion applies only to political power\, not power generally\, but might be supported by a general claim: The distribution of power over others is normatively neutral in itself and matters only insofar as it gives rise to good or bad consequences.  No person has a moral claim to power over others except on the basis\, that person’s having the power will be fair in its effects on those affected.  The discussion surveys relevant arguments advanced by Niko Kolodny\, Daniel Viehoff\, and Jeremy Waldron. \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03 and online on teams
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-richard-arneson-uc-san-diego/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03\, The Scores\, St Salvator's Quad\, KY16 9AL
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260917T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260917T173000
DTSTAMP:20260914T165918Z
CREATED:20260914T165918Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260914T165918Z
UID:10000966-1789660800-1789666200@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk: Eilidh Beaton (Aberdeen)\, "Paying Attention to Global Politics"
DESCRIPTION:Abstract:\n\nThe Sudanese civil war has been described as a “forgotten crisis” that the world ought to pay more attention to. Some campaigners object that excess attention on migration is a “distraction” from other important issues. Such calls for cross-border attentional change are a frequent feature of our global political landscape. Yet while philosophers have been paying ever more attention to attention in recent years\, political philosophers have mostly theorised about the role of attention within democratic states. This paper shifts away from the dominant statist framing to develop an account of attention’s significance for global politics. Specifically\, the paper (i) offers an account of who is implicated in calls to better attend to global politics\, (ii) explains how collective failure to attend to global politics can constitute an injustice\, and (iii) develops an account of responsibility to attend to global politics.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-eilidh-beaton-aberdeen-paying-attention-to-global-politics/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03\, The Scores\, St Salvator's Quad\, KY16 9AL
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20261008T040000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20261008T173000
DTSTAMP:20261005T094021Z
CREATED:20261005T094021Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20261005T094021Z
UID:10000984-1791432000-1791480600@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA talk: Matti Wilks (Edinburgh)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Who has an expansive moral circle? \nAbstract:\n The moral circle describes who we do and do not think of as worthy of moral concern. In this talk\, I will discuss psychological research that aims to understand variability in our moral circles. I will present work across several projects that aims to (a) map out sources of variability in the moral circle\, (b) track the developmental trajectory of moral expansiveness\, and (c) examine real-world presentations of individuals who appear particularly morally expansive.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-matti-wilks-edinburgh/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03\, The Scores\, St Salvator's Quad\, KY16 9AL
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20261015T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20261015T173000
DTSTAMP:20261013T084650Z
CREATED:20261013T083333Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20261013T084650Z
UID:10000986-1792080000-1792085400@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA TALK: Alex Fisher (Leeds)
DESCRIPTION:Alex Fisher (Leeds) will give a talk entitled ‘QAnon\, Crosswords\, and Videogames: The Aesthetics and Ethics of Inquiry. \nAbstract:\nThe value of many aesthetic practices comes from working stuff out. Detective novels\, cryptic paintings\, and crosswords require us to deduce hidden content. I outline how various recent “knowledge-based” videogames and other media also generate aesthetic value through inquiry – but rather than just into hidden content\, the aim is to uncover how we are meant to interact with them.\nInquiring into how we interact with media can be aesthetically valuable. But I argue that it can also be ethically risky\, with this form of inquiry fuelling the appeal of conspiracy theory movements like QAnon\, where innocuous objects and events are interpreted as conveying secret clues.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-alex-fisher-leeds/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03\, The Scores\, St Salvator's Quad\, KY16 9AL
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
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