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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20231005T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20231005T173000
DTSTAMP:20260405T065539
CREATED:20230602T085741Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231002T124622Z
UID:10000396-1696521600-1696527000@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (online) - Paulina Sliwa (Vienna) & Tom McClelland (Cambridge)
DESCRIPTION:Title: On seeing women as objects: objectification and affordance perception \nLocation: Teams (online only)\, the talk will be streamed from Edgecliffe G03 \nAbstract: Objectification is a central topic in feminist philosophy theorising. But what is it for someone to objectify another person? A common theme is that objectification involves treating and viewing the other person as an object. Thus\, consider the following quotes: \n‘A man\, for example\, who objectifies women will view them and treat them as having a nature which makes them what he desires them to be…’ (Haslanger\, p.73) \n‘The most subtle and deniable way sexualized evaluation is enacted – and arguably the most ubiquitous – is through gaze\, or visual inspection of the body .… when objectified\, women are treated as bodies – and in particular\, as bodies that exist for the use and pleasure of others.’ (Fredrickson and Roberts\, p.175) \nIn a classic paper\, Nussbaum has unpacked the various aspects of “treating someone as an object”. What has received less attention is the role of perception in objectification. It is striking that in describing what objectification involves\, the language of “seeing”\, of “gaze”\, of “looking” is central. Is this purely metaphorical talk? Or is there something literally visual going on? \nOur aim in this paper is to answer this question: can we make sense of  objectification as a phenomenon with a genuinely visual component? We suggest that the notion of affordance perception – the idea that we perceive possibilities for action – allows us to do so. We draw out some consequences for the moral psychology of objectification as well as for the act of looking as a tool of oppression.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-online-paulina-sliwa-vienna/
LOCATION:Microsoft Teams
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
ORGANIZER;CN="Johannes Nickl":MAILTO:jmn20@st-andrews.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20231012T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20231012T173000
DTSTAMP:20260405T065539
CREATED:20231002T145119Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231010T142023Z
UID:10000435-1697126400-1697131800@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (In person) - Joel Joseph (St Andrews)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Eliminative Harming without Intentions \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03 \nAbstract: Consider the following pair of cases  \nRoughshod. You are driving to the hospital for an emergency life-saving operation. If you do not make it in time\, you will die. However\, Victim is lying in the only road that will get you there in time. Although Victim is not physically obstructing your path\, they are too heavy for you to move aside. You can therefore save yourself only by driving over Victim en route to the hospital\, thereby killing her.  \nObstruction. The case is similar to Roughshod. However\, this time you cannot simply drive over Victim on your way to the hospital. This is because her presence in the road is physically obstructing your path. You can therefore save yourself only by getting out of your car and detonating a bomb next to Victim that will blow her to smithereens\, thereby clearing the road ahead.  \nIt seems impermissible to kill Victim in either case. However\, many find it intuitively plausible that killing Victim in Obstruction is harder to justify killing than it is in Roughshod. The Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE) is the only discussed explanation of the moral difference between these two cases. However\, many non-consequentialists find DDE implausible.  \nIn this paper\, I argue that we can distinguish morally between Roughshod and Obstruction without appealing to DDE. I first argue that DDE does not get to the heart of the intuitive moral difference between Roughshod and Obstruction. I then offer an alternative explanation of the moral difference between Roughshod and Obstruction that is extensionally superior to DDE. Finally\, I argue that endorsing my account over DDE is not only theoretically significant\, but that it also has implications for the morality of abortion that differ importantly from DDE. 
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-joel-joseph-st-andrews/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20231026T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20231026T173000
DTSTAMP:20260405T065539
CREATED:20230907T101801Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231002T124833Z
UID:10000428-1698336000-1698341400@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in person) – Alexander Douglas (St. Andrews)
DESCRIPTION:Location: Edgecliffe G03 \nTitle: Positive interest rates block green transitions\, and there is no compelling reason not to fix the interest rate at zero \nCommentator: Carl Mildenberger (Zurich)
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-alexander-douglas-st-andrews/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20231102T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20231102T173000
DTSTAMP:20260405T065539
CREATED:20230602T090158Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231031T111128Z
UID:10000398-1698940800-1698946200@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (online) - Orri Stefánsson (Stockholm)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Chance Prioritarianism \nLocation: Teams (online only)\, and streamed from Edgecliffe G03 \nAbstract: I will defend what we could call survival chance prioritarianism\, according to which the moral value of improving someone’s chance of surviving (some period) is greater the more likely the person was to die before the improvement. I motivate this view by showing that it justifies some common moral judgements that ex post views cannot accommodate\, but I suggest that we should resist generalising the view to all chances (so\, we should resist ex ante prioritarianism) and I give some reason for resisting survival chance egalitarianism. Finally\, I defend the view against some natural objections
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-online-orri-stefansson-stockholm/
LOCATION:Microsoft Teams
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20231109T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20231109T173000
DTSTAMP:20260405T065539
CREATED:20230602T090331Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231106T141622Z
UID:10000399-1699545600-1699551000@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (online) - Lara Buchak (Princeton)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Risk\, Ambiguity\, and Ethical Decision-Making \nAbstract: I argue that it can be rational to defer to an authority about what to believe or what to do even when doing so goes against one’s own reasoning. Indeed\, such deference is rational in typical cases in which individuals treat others as authorities: for example\, experts in a domain\, interpersonal advisors\, and religious traditions. I explain the interplay between authority\, reason\, and disagreement\, and how rational faith gives rise to epistemic communities and governs their encounters with each other. \nLocation: Teams (online only) and streamed from Edgecliffe G03.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-online-lara-buchak-princeton/
LOCATION:Microsoft Teams
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
ORGANIZER;CN="Jessica Brown":MAILTO:jab30@st-andrews.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20231116T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20231116T173000
DTSTAMP:20260405T065539
CREATED:20230907T102813Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231113T103917Z
UID:10000431-1700150400-1700155800@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in person) – Cristina Richie (Edinburgh)
DESCRIPTION:Location: Edgecliffe G03 \nTitle: Green Bioethics: Environmental Sustainability and Health Care \nCommentator: Joseph Millum (St Andrews) \nAbstract: Health care is ubiquitous in the industrialized world. Yet\, every medical development\, technique\, and procedure impacts the environment. By 2017\, the National Health Service’s Health\, and Social Care sectors had a carbon output (CO2) of 27.1 million tons. Carbon dioxide emissions contribute to climate change\, climate-change related health hazards\, and perpetuate environmental racism. In response\, the NHS has implemented a Carbon Reduction Strategy\, but this is a largely superficial approach to reducing the carbon emissions of the medical industry\, because it focuses on health care structures like buildings and transportation. The doctor-patient relationship and health care delivery are indeed the most carbon intensive part of the medical industry\, and indeed the scope of biomedical ethics. Thus\, Green Bioethics synthesizes environmental ethics and biomedical ethics to move towards sustainable\, just health care delivery in practice and policy.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-cristina-richie-edinburgh/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20231123T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20231123T173000
DTSTAMP:20260405T065539
CREATED:20230920T221438Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231121T121239Z
UID:10000433-1700755200-1700760600@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in person) – Oskari Sivula (Turku)
DESCRIPTION:Location: Edgecliffe G03 \nTitle: Is the future a utility monster? \nAbstract: I will revisit Nozick’s utility monster thought experiment and draw an analogy between imagined utility monsters and the long-term future. I argue that the far future can be seen as a real-life utility monster. This is the case if the three premises that form the basis of long-termism are true: 1) the future is vast\, 2) morally speaking\, the future matters\, and 3) current people can (in expectation) positively impact the far future. Following that\, I consider a couple of apparent disanalogies between the original utility monster and the far future utility monster. Lastly\, I discuss some possible reactions to the argument made.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-barry-maguire-edinburgh/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20231214T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20231214T173000
DTSTAMP:20260405T065539
CREATED:20230602T090519Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231128T193827Z
UID:10000400-1702569600-1702575000@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (online) - Matthew Liao (NYU)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Threshold Deontology: Some Lessons from Vagueness \nAbtract: Threshold Deontology is the view that the positive consequences of an act do not normally override moral constraints\, but when the positive balance of the consequences of an act is sufficiently great\, it may be morally permitted\, and possibly required to engage in an act that is otherwise morally prohibited. While many people find Threshold Deontology attractive\, there are a number of issues regarding its nature and its structure that are under explored.  For instance\, suppose that there is a threshold above which a moral constraint against killing an innocent person becomes overridden.  Where is this threshold?  How do we identify it?  In addition\, what happens after one crosses this threshold?  Does one become a full-on act-consequentialist?  Drawing on the literature on vagueness\, I shall argue that there is a sharp threshold for killing and that it is difficult for us to know where this threshold lies because in a certain range of cases\, our moral faculty is not sufficiently reliable to be able to weigh competing moral values.  I shall also explain why one does not become a consequentialist once one crosses the threshold for killing. \nLocation: Teams (online only)
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-online-matthew-liao-nyu/
LOCATION:Microsoft Teams
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
ORGANIZER;CN="Enrico Galvagni":MAILTO:eg240@st-andrews.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240118T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240118T173000
DTSTAMP:20260405T065539
CREATED:20230602T090653Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240104T164052Z
UID:10000401-1705593600-1705599000@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (online) - Selim Berker (Harvard)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Is There Anti-Fittingness?” \nAbstract: The permissible and the forbidden are privative opposites: each is a lack of the other. The good and the bad are\, by contrast\, polar opposites: badness is anti-goodness\, not non-goodness. What about the fitting and the unfitting\, the appropriate and the inappropriate\, the apt and the inapt\, the warranted and the unwarranted? Is unfittingness non-fittingness or anti-fittingness\, inappropriateness non-appropriateness or anti-appropriateness? In this talk I will argue that each of these “aptic” categories—as I call them—stands in a privative rather than a polar relation to its opposite. More generally\, there is no coherent notion of anti-fittingness\, no inversely charged flipside to aptness\, to be found. In order to establish these claims\, a taxonomy of different types of oppositeness will be proposed\, and several tests for distinguishing distinct varieties of opposites will be developed. What will emerge is a better appreciation of the structural characteristics of fittingness and the other aptic categories\, as well as an argument for taking up the nature of oppositeness as a serious philosophical topic that is ripe for further exploration. \nLocation: Teams (online only)
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-online-selim-berker-harvard/
LOCATION:Microsoft Teams
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240125T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240125T173000
DTSTAMP:20260405T065539
CREATED:20230711T085210Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240108T171624Z
UID:10000407-1706198400-1706203800@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in person) - Thom Brooks (Durham)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Justice and the Problem of Alienation \nAbstract: I will focus on why alienation is a problem for many of our major theories of justice (discussing political liberalism\, capabilities approach and republicanism) and what might be done about it. \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-thom-brooks-durham/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240201T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240201T173000
DTSTAMP:20260405T065539
CREATED:20240104T145621Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240109T141826Z
UID:10000439-1706803200-1706808600@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in person) - Jonathan Birch  (LSE)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Debating proportionality at the edge of sentience \nAbstract: Can octopuses feel pain and pleasure? What about crabs\, shrimps\, insects or spiders? How do we tell whether a person unresponsive after severe brain injury might be suffering? When does a fetus in the womb start to have conscious experiences? Could there even be rudimentary feelings in miniature models of the human brain\, grown from human stem cells? And what about AI? These are questions about the “edge of sentience”\, and they are subject to enormous\, disorienting uncertainty. The stakes are immense\, and neglecting the risks can have terrible costs. We need to err on the side of caution in these cases\, yet it’s often far from clear what ‘erring on the side of caution’ should mean in practice. When are we going too far? When are we not doing enough? My forthcoming book The Edge of Sentience: Risk and Precaution in Humans\, Other Animals\, and AI constructs a precautionary framework designed to help us reach ethically sound\, evidence-based decisions despite our uncertainty. This talk will introduce some of the main ideas\, zooming in on the role I think citizens’ assemblies can appropriately play in assessing proportionality. \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03 \n 
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-jonathan-birch-lse/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03\, The Scores\, St Salvator's Quad\, KY16 9AL
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240208T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240208T173000
DTSTAMP:20260405T065539
CREATED:20240104T145953Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240205T120221Z
UID:10000440-1707408000-1707413400@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in person) - Mark Rowlands  (Miami)
DESCRIPTION:Title: World on Fire: Climate\, Extinction\, Pandemic \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03 \n 
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-mark-rowlands-miami/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240215T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240215T173000
DTSTAMP:20260405T065539
CREATED:20240104T150205Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240212T114147Z
UID:10000441-1708012800-1708018200@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in person) - Andreas Mogensen (Oxford)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Welfare and Felt Duration \nAbtract: How should we understand the duration of a pleasant or unpleasant sensation\, insofar as its duration modulates how good or bad the experience is overall? Given that we seem able to distinguish between subjective and objective duration and that how well or badly someone’s life goes is naturally thought of as something to be assessed from her own perspective\, it seems intuitive that it is subjective duration that modulates how good or bad an experience is from the perspective of an individual’s welfare. However\, I argue that we know of no way to make sense of what subjective duration consists in on which this claim turns out to be plausible. Moreover\, some plausible theories of what subjective duration consists in strongly suggest that subjective duration is irrelevant in itself. \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03 \n 
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-andreas-mogensen-oxford/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240222T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240222T173000
DTSTAMP:20260405T065539
CREATED:20240104T150314Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240219T104221Z
UID:10000442-1708617600-1708623000@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in person) - Luca Stroppa (St Andrews & Turin)
DESCRIPTION:This talk is part of our series on Climate Ethics \nTitle: The Ranked Range View \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03 \nAbstract: The bad effects of climate change will affect\, and be affected by\, the number of people who will exist\, and their quality of life. Thus\, when evaluating our climate policies and actions\, we need to know which population is best to choose when the number of people and their quality of life varies. However\, several powerful arguments show that no theory ranking populations can respect some set of very compelling adequacy conditions (the most famous being to avoid the so-called “Repugnant Conclusion”. In this talk\, I introduce the Structured Range View\, a theory for ranking populations that respects all adequacy conditions\, except one\, called “Non-Anti-Egalitarianism”. I however argue that the way the Structured Range View violates “Non-Anti-Egalitarianism” in unproblematic. We should accept the Structured Range View when choosing between populations. (If I have time) I conclude by sketching the impact of the Structured Range View on climate policies.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-luca-stroppa-st-andrews-turin/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240307T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240307T173000
DTSTAMP:20260405T065539
CREATED:20230602T090811Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240304T135228Z
UID:10000402-1709827200-1709832600@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (online) - Renee Jorgensen (Michigan)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Encroachment and epistemic negligence \nAbstract: In this talk\, I argue that the moral duty of non-negligence is a fruitful way to understand and motivate the claim that moral reasons can ‘encroach’ on epistemic norms. More forcefully: we should readily affirm that on the epistemic norms governing agents like us—that is\, who have limited cognitive resources\, conduct inquiries with widely varying practical and moral stakes\, and who rely on belief to simplify and structure their practical deliberation—the strength of evidential warrant necessary to justify belief is responsive to the gravity of the costs of being mistaken. I suggest that a ‘purism’ about doxastic justification that denies this faces a dilemma: either a belief’s being justified suffices to license using it to structure inference and inquiry\, or it isn’t. If it is\, then being insensitive to non-truth-conducive factors leaves the standard for justified belief unresponsive to relevant risks. If it isn’t\, then it is unclear what theoretical value the notion justified belief has\, and we still need something to fill the role of licensing the relevant epistemic moves (which will be responsive to the risks.) \nLocation: Teams (online only)\, we will bee streaming it from Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-online-renee-jorgensen-michigan/
LOCATION:Microsoft Teams
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
ORGANIZER;CN="Jessica Brown":MAILTO:jab30@st-andrews.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240312T173000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240312T190000
DTSTAMP:20260405T065539
CREATED:20231013T121011Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240311T190825Z
UID:10000436-1710264600-1710270000@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:1st Sarah Broadie Memorial Lecture - Ursula Coope
DESCRIPTION:Title: Contingency and the Present \nLocation: School V
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/1st-sarah-broadie-memorial-lecture-ursula-coope/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240314T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240314T173000
DTSTAMP:20260405T065539
CREATED:20230602T090934Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240311T191045Z
UID:10000403-1710432000-1710437400@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (online) - Sergio Tenenbaum (Toronto)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Practical Reason and the Satisfaction of Desire \nLocation: Teams (online only) \nAbstract: I have a desire for dulce de leche ice-cream (or that I myself eat ice-cream) but there’s no ice-cream nearby. A heavenly angel takes pity on me and decides she will help me out. She conjures the ice-cream and quickly shoves it through my mouth at a temperature that burns my taste buds just as I had finished eating a whole watermelon. She then tells me: “Smile away my dear mortal; your desire has been satisfied!”. This vignette illustrates a well-known issue in understanding the nature of desire: the problem of under-specification. This problem has been recently debated mostly in the context of philosophy of language as a problem for a standard theory of propositional attitudes. My interest here is not to settle the dispute in the philosophy of language\, but to understand better how the satisfaction of desire is determined in the context of practical reason. That is\, in the above vignette\, I certainly failed to procure what I wanted. But if not in the mismatch between the proposition (or the common noun\, or the infinitival) that I use to express my desire and the facts on the ground\, in virtue of what has my desire failed to find satisfaction? After all\, the world seems to have conformed to the content of my will. \nIn this paper\, I first investigate the different ways in which desire finds no satisfaction. I then argue that a certain understanding of how desire relates to the good explains\, better than any other alternative\, how what is represented in my desire can fail to find satisfaction in the world despite its content being made true. In fact\, I will argue that this phenomenon provides an important argument for the guise of the good; since “satisfaction” seems to be the major potential alternative as the formal object of desire and intentional action\, the fact that satisfaction is inseparable from at least the apparent good\, shows that these are not rival aims of agency but one and the same formal object of our practical attitudes. I will end with a potential difficulty for this argument; namely\, that some cases of failure of satisfaction seem to require a “guise of the pleasant” above and beyond the “guise of the good”. I briefly sketch how on a Kantian view of human agency the guise of the pleasant is incorporated into the guise of the good and even more briefly try to explain how a similar account might be available to those less sympathetic to the Kantian conception of agency.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-online-sergio-tenenbaum-toronto/
LOCATION:Microsoft Teams
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
ORGANIZER;CN="Johannes Nickl":MAILTO:jmn20@st-andrews.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240321T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240321T173000
DTSTAMP:20260405T065539
CREATED:20230620T081028Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240319T112928Z
UID:10000406-1711036800-1711042200@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in person) - Elad Uzan (Oxford)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Compromises and Lesser-Evil Compromises in Ending Wars. \nAbstract: Contemporary conflicts often lack a clear end-state\, posing challenges to the traditional notion of victory in just wars. This ambiguity calls for a revaluation of war’s objectives\, suggesting that wars should end without a clear victory. In this paper\, I will explore various moral and non-moral considerations that structure the duty to reach war-ending compromises. I will assess whether a defender has a duty to seek a compromise peace before fully achieving its objectives and address the tension between achieving a just peace and a lasting peace. The conclusion of a war often necessitates accepting moral hazards: the just side may need to make sacrifices and relinquish certain entitlements and the unjust side may secure wrongful gains. I will also examine the potential moral risks of prematurely terminating just wars. Lastly\, I will discuss the duty to enter negotiations and the moral complexities of negotiating the conclusion of wars. \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-elad-uzan-oxford/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240328T154500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240328T170000
DTSTAMP:20260405T065539
CREATED:20240104T151109Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240325T110740Z
UID:10000443-1711640700-1711645200@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in person) - Quân Nguyen (Edinburgh)
DESCRIPTION:This talk is part of our series on Climate Ethics \nTitle: Is despair about climate breakdown rational? \nAbstract: Both within the wider climate and environmentalist movement as well as in academic circles\, it has become a common assumption that\, in order to maintain and sustain actions against the climate crisis\, we need to avoid despair. Despair about the climate crisis\, so philosophers and environmentalists alike\, is the opposite of hope\, and should be avoided on grounds of both rational aptness and pragmatic considerations. Despair about climate breakdown is only rationally apt if it is impossible for our actions to make a difference – as our actions do make a difference\, despair is not a fitting response to climate change (McKinnon 2014). Further\, we have pragmatic or strategic reasons to avoid despair as it leads to apathy and inaction about climate change by hindering our agency and our capacity for moral imagination (Malm 2021\, Huber 2023\, Thaler 2022). In this paper\, I argue that this consensus has moved too fast\, and that despair even in its fundamental form is a rationally apt response to the climate crisis. Despair is a fitting response to the structural features of the climate crisis in terms of fragmentation of agency and moral corruption (Gardiner 2006)\, making despair an accurate representation of a situation lacking agency. Despair is thereby an important source of moral knowledge about the structure of the climate crisis\, which in itself is not automatically outweighed by pragmatic reasons of counterproductivity (Hutton 2022\, Srinivasan 2017)\, and a demand to avoid despair can lead to affective injustice for young people\, climate activists\, climate scientists and anyone concerned with the climate crisis. The paper closes with considerations whether despair hinders moral imagination\, arguing that in several paradigmatic cases\, despair can spurn radical militant action just as much as hope can \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03 \n 
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-quan-nguyen-edinburgh/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240404T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240404T173000
DTSTAMP:20260405T065539
CREATED:20230602T091045Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240401T153145Z
UID:10000404-1712246400-1712251800@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in person) - John Broome (Oxford)
DESCRIPTION:Location: Edgecliffe G03 \nTitle: The Continuum Argument Is Invalid \nAbstract: Derek Parfit argues by means of something he calls a ‘continuum argument’ that a particular appealing premise in population axiology implies a conclusion that he and many others consider repugnant. He treats this as a paradox\, and takes up the challenge of resolving it. He looks for a way to avoid the repugnant conclusion. The solution he offers depends on the existence of imprecision within the relation of betterness among populations. Other philosophers have taken up the same challenge\, following Parfit’s lead\, and offered similar solutions. I shall show that actually the repugnant conclusion is not implied by Parfit’s appealing principle. The continuum argument is invalid. There is therefore no paradox and no real challenge. Moreover\, the explanation of why this is so has nothing to do with imprecision\, incompleteness\, incommensurateness\, indeterminacy or vagueness in betterness. It is consistent with a sharp\, complete betterness ordering.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-john-broome-oxford/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03\, The Scores\, St Salvator's Quad\, KY16 9AL
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
ORGANIZER;CN="Luca Stroppa":MAILTO:ls330@st-andrews.ac.uk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240411T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240411T173000
DTSTAMP:20260405T065539
CREATED:20240104T151442Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240408T110141Z
UID:10000444-1712851200-1712856600@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in person) - Michael Gill (Edinburgh)
DESCRIPTION:Title: The Formality of the Humean Authoritative Ought \nAbstract: There are different things we ought to do. There is what we ought to do insofar as we are seeking to advance our long-term interests. There is what we ought to do insofar as we are trying to do our job well. There is what we ought to do insofar as we are trying to be good friends. Different oughts can conflict with each other. There may be times when we think such conflict is irresolvable. But at least sometimes we think the conflict is resolvable. At least sometimes we think that one thing we ought to do overrides all others. You might think\, for instance\, that helping a friend in a particular situation is what you really ought to do\, even if it means neglecting your job and forgoing your own interests. Call the ought that overrides all others the authoritative ought. \nWhat makes it true that we authoritatively ought to perform an action? What I will call Humean views hold that what makes it true that we authoritatively ought to perform an action is that we would\, were we to reflect properly\, have a positive response toward performing the action. In this paper I elucidate a distinction within Humean views of the authoritative ought\, and argue for one side over the other. The distinction is between substantivism and formalism\, and the side I argue for is the formalist. \nHumean substantivists (such as Julia Driver and Dale Dorsey) believe that proper reflection will lead all of us to the same substantive practical principles—to principles with content\, to principles that prescribe particular types of action. According to substantivists\, because proper reflection would lead all of us to certain substantive principles\, we can identify the actions that fall under those principles as those we authoritatively ought to perform.  \nHumean formalists (such as W.D. Falk and Sharon Street) deny that we are warranted in thinking that proper reflection will lead everyone to the same substantive principles. According to formalists\, we can identify the form of authoritative oughts: what we authoritatively ought to do is what we would respond positively to when we reflect properly. But that is all we can do. We cannot identify the authoritative ought with any substantive content. \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03 \n 
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-michael-gill-edinburgh/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240425T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240425T173000
DTSTAMP:20260405T065539
CREATED:20230602T091155Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240422T153549Z
UID:10000405-1714060800-1714066200@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in person) - Helen Frowe (Stockholm)
DESCRIPTION:Title: The Permissibility of Collective Defence Agreements \nAbstract: Collective defence agreements (CDAs)\, of the sort that exist between\, for example\, NATO members\, EU members\, and African Union members\, are a prime example of a prominent deterrence mechanism. They promise a degree of assistance that will make it almost impossible for an adversary to win an aggressive war against any member. On the face of it\, then\, such agreements seem obviously morally permissible and\, indeed\, morally desirable. However\, I suspect that the moral picture is in fact much more mixed. For example\, acting on a CDA is unlikely to minimise harm compared available alternatives. If\, as I believe\, states are usually subject to a duty to minimise harm when aiding\, then acting on CDAs is likely to be permissible only if doing so is exempt from this duty. This talk explores some of the moral issues raised by CDAs and deterrent mechanisms more broadly. \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-helen-frowe-stockholm/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03\, The Scores\, St Salvator's Quad\, KY16 9AL
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
ORGANIZER;CN="Joel Joseph":MAILTO:jj73@st-andrews.ac.uk
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240502T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240502T173000
DTSTAMP:20260405T065539
CREATED:20240104T151957Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240426T161227Z
UID:10000446-1714665600-1714671000@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in person) - Bridget Bradley (St Andrews)
DESCRIPTION:This talk is part of our series on Climate Ethics. \nTitle: Ethical births\, ethical deaths: Climate anxiety in Britain through the life course \nAbstract: This paper is based on anthropological research conducted with climate activists on the topic of climate anxiety in Britain. Drawing on themes of kinship and its relationship to mental health and activism\, the paper considers the ethical questions surrounding birth and death as significant moments in the life course. Through ethnographic and autoethnographic reflections\, this work reveals how climate anxiety re-frames expectations surrounding what counts as appropriate ways to enter and leave the world\, situated within the context of the cultural politics of contemporary Britain in a time of ecological crisis.\n \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03 \n 
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-bridget-bradley-st-andrews/
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240509T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240509T173000
DTSTAMP:20260405T065539
CREATED:20230731T141757Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240509T090022Z
UID:10000410-1715270400-1715275800@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CANCELLED CEPPA Talk (in person) –  Victor Tadros (University of Warwick)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Consent\, Intent\, and Communication \nWhat is consent? I will assume that it is a normative power – a power to alter rights and duties directly. If this is right\, how is consent exercised? I will argue that consent is exercised through the execution of intentions to alter practical reasoning. Successful communication is not needed for valid consent. Even an attempt to communicate is not needed (though it is the central way of consenting). What is needed is an intention that the consentee understands that their practical reasoning is altered – their understanding that they are permitted to do what the consenter consents to. More precisely\, I defend: \nPermissive Intentions: X consents to Y aing where they execute their intention permit Y to a by intending that Y understands that X has permitted Y to a. \nThis View contrasts with familiar alternative views in four ways. \nFirst\, consent is concerned with altering the consentee’s practical reasoning\, and not just with altering the normative status of the consentee’s conduct. So\, a person cannot give consent where they believe that altering the consentee’s practical reasoning is impossible\, even where they wish the normative status of the target’s conduct to be altered. This contrasts with pure mentalist views that consent can be given just by having a mental state or performing a mental action without attempting to alter the consentee’s practical reasoning. Second\, consent can be given without external behaviour that is sufficient to give the consentee grounds to conclude that the consenter has permissive intentions. Consenters can try but fail to give others evidence of their intentions. This contrasts with one kind of externalist view that external evidence or signs of permissive intentions are necessary for consent. Third\, consent is given only if the consenter intends to permit the consentee’s conduct. This contrasts with another kind of externalist view that external evidence or signs of permissive intentions are sufficient for consent. Fourth\, consenters necessarily intend to permit consentees’ conduct. It is insufficient for consent that a person intends the recipient of their communication to believe that they intend to permit them to act. A person can pretend to consent by communicating that they intend to permit an act without actually intending to permit it. And sometimes this might result in the consenter forfeiting a right against the consentee acting. But consent is absent. This contrasts with the view that intending to communicate that one has permissive intentions is sufficient for consent whether or not the consenter has these intentions. \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-online-neil-sinhababu-national-university-of-singapore/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240516T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240516T173000
DTSTAMP:20260405T065539
CREATED:20240506T124545Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240513T150318Z
UID:10000524-1715875200-1715880600@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in person) – Neil Sinhababu (National University of Singapore)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Pleasure Fundamentalism \nAbstract: Pleasure fundamentalism is the view that moral value is the same thing as pleasure and this explains all other moral facts. This talk presents two arguments for pleasure fundamentalism and discusses the form of naturalism they arise from. According to the Reliability Argument\, all processes generating moral belief are unreliable\, except for phenomenal introspection which tells us that pleasure is good. According to the Universality Argument\, pleasure is universal moral value\, because of its qualitative identity with the pleasure in the minds of all possible perceivers of moral value. Both arguments are available within an Einsteinian naturalism combining empiricism with a spacetime ontology\, and avoiding behaviorism in favor of a more Humean psychology. \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-neil-sinhababu-national-university-of-singapore/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240529T170000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240529T183000
DTSTAMP:20260405T065539
CREATED:20240517T182925Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240517T183308Z
UID:10000525-1717002000-1717007400@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Public Lecture: Stephen Gardiner (University of Washington)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Beyond Institutional Denial: A Global Constitutional Convention for Future Generations \nAbstract: Humanity is in deep institutional denial. Current institutions are failing future generations\, in part because there is a governance gap when it comes to promoting intergenerational concern. This gap facilitates a tyranny of the contemporary that puts the young and other future generations at risk. Climate change is a prime example. To confront intergenerational tyranny\, humanity needs more than merely a Summit for the Future. It needs a global constitutional convention focused on future generations.
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/public-lecture-steven-gardiner-university-of-washington/
LOCATION:School II (St. Salvator’s)
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/files/2024/05/Poster-Gardiner.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240530T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240530T173000
DTSTAMP:20260405T065539
CREATED:20240517T183207Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240517T183207Z
UID:10000526-1717084800-1717090200@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Public Lecture: Tahseen Jafry (Glasgow Caledonian University)
DESCRIPTION:Title: About Climate Justice: What Does it Mean and What Lies Ahead? \nAbstract: In July 2023\, Europe reached scorching milestones with relentless heatwaves and Scotland had its hottest June ever. Several regions grappled with unprecedented rainfall\, triggering ecological and socioeconomic upheaval. However\, impacts aren’t equally distributed\, those who contribute minimally to carbon emissions\, find themselves on the frontline of these erratic weather extremes.  \nDespite being on our doorstep\, the reality of climate disparities and injustices remains largely hidden. Scotland must prepare to connect with and apply a climate justice framework. This talk will explore how to embrace the changes we are witnessing in our climate and delve into a positive dialogue on what we needs to be made to combat climate inequality\, ensuring well-being and economic prosperity for all.  \n  \n The second lecture will be followed by a wine reception (location to be announced) – all are very welcome to attend!
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/public-lecture-tahseen-jafry-glasgow-caledonian-university/
LOCATION:School II (St. Salvator’s)
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/files/2024/05/Poster-Jafry.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240919T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240919T173000
DTSTAMP:20260405T065539
CREATED:20240912T181838Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240912T181903Z
UID:10000532-1726761600-1726767000@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (online) – Koshka Duff (Nottingham)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Strip-searching as Abjectification: Racism and Sexual Violence in British Policing \nAbstract: Co-authored with Tom Kemp (Criminology\, University of Nottingham)\, this paper examines police strip-searching practices in the UK. Drawing on newly acquired Freedom of Information data\, publicly available testimonies\, thematic analysis of official literature and media reports\, and first-hand experience\, we advance three arguments. First\, strip-searching is used systematically\, not exceptionally\, and targets young people and people of colour\, especially Black young men and boys. Second\, strip-searching in practice is demonstrably excessive when measured against its stated rationales of ‘crime’ detection and ‘caring’ for detainees; we unpick the circular logics through which it is legitimized in official and public discourse. Third\, drawing on Sharpe’s notion of the abject\, we argue that strip-searching\, as a form of normalized sexual violence folded into the rubric of ‘care’\, is part of a project of abjectification that aims to exclude the individuals and groups it targets from social and political subjecthood \nLocation: online & livestreamed from Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-online-koshka-duff-nottingham/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240926T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240926T173000
DTSTAMP:20260405T065539
CREATED:20240912T182503Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240920T101646Z
UID:10000545-1727366400-1727371800@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in-person & online) – Derek Ball (St Andrews) & Caroline Touburg (Umeå University)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Philosophical Foundations of Green-House Gas Accounting \nAbstract: International agreements such as the Kyoto protocol and the Paris agreement require countries to measure and track their greenhouse gas emissions.  Companies (as well as universities and other organisations) are required by governmental regulations or their own net-zero goals to do the same.  Greenhouse gas accounting is the project of measuring and tracking GHG emissions.  Although there are a range of standards and guidelines governing GHG accounting practice\, a number of issues remain unresolved in the literature\, including how to account for emissions of short-lived but potent GHGs such as methane\, and how (and indeed whether) to account for temporary storage of CO2 (for example\, in wood products); and standard approaches to these issues are\, in our view\, seriously flawed.   Our talk has two aims\, one technical\, the other theoretical.  The technical aim is to sketch a framework that provides a principled resolution of these issues.  The theoretical aim is to discuss the normative presuppositions of the framework.  Notably\, the framework relies on the idea that in some cases\, we should focus on the preservation of some valuable thing – avoiding loss and minimizing damage – rather than on some aggregable value (such as money\, or well-being).  This shift in focus puts us in a position to avoid some of the problems we see in extant approaches\, and has potential for application in other areas of moral philosophy. \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-derek-ball-st-andrews-caroline-touburg-umea-university/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20241003T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20241003T173000
DTSTAMP:20260405T065539
CREATED:20240912T183630Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240927T115012Z
UID:10000548-1727971200-1727976600@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in-person & online) – Barry Maguire (Edinburgh)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Two Moralities of Recognition \nAbstract: According to moralities of recognition\, fundamental moral norms are norms for living together. Moral norms explain how living in unity is possible despite being separate individuals\, they explain how we can relate to each other as persons that are more than mere sources of benefits and burdens\, obstacles and opportunities. Those who relate to each other according to these norms stand in relations of mutual recognition. By contrast\, some moral theories are atomistic — they deny that fundamental moral norms are communal norms. The paper explains the appeal of morality of recognition and elaborates a distinction between two kinds of moralities of recognition. Some envision a community founded on respect; according to these theories\, mutual recognition is mutual respect. Others offer a fundamentally different vision of the moral community\, namely\, one founded on concern; according to these theories\, mutual recognition is mutual concern. We examine T. M. Scanlon’s contractualism as a fully developed\, influential\, and relatively recent version of respect morality and argue that Scanlon’s morality of respect has certain distinctive structural features. We then articulate the contours of an alternative\, morality of concern\, which offers a different idea of moral community and has a distinctively different structure. Our goal is not to present an argument for morality of concern\, but to explain what makes it attractive and to make clear that choosing between the two kinds of moralities of recognition involves choosing between two substantively different visions of how to live together. \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-barry-maguire-edinburgh-2/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR