CEPPA Talk (in-person) - Federico Luzzi (University of Aberdeen)
2025-10-02 16:00 - 17:30 (Europe/London) | Edgecliffe G03, The Scores, St Salvator's Quad, KY16 9AL
Title: Against Excellence as the Norm of Ambition
Abstract: This paper investigates norms of ambition, which set the level of achievement one ought to aspire to. I critically examine the widely accepted norm of excellence, which encourages one to seek excellence in one’s pursuits. I argue that while this norm is accepted by default, we should abandon it—absent of special evidence—in favour of the norm of sufficiency, which encourages one to perform merely well enough in one’s pursuits. This move is motivated by two problems confronting the norm of excellence: that living by it likely leads to mishandling one’s moral duties; and that living by it carries risk of significant psychological harm to oneself and others. I defend the norm of sufficiency by arguing that its widespread default acceptance would by and large avoid such harms and still allow for excellent achievement to arise, thus leading to a world no worse and likely better than a world in which the norm of excellence enjoys widespread default acceptance.
Location: Edgecliffe G03
Link for the Handout

CEPPA Talk (in-person) - Michael Otsuka (Rutgers University)
2025-10-09 16:00 - 17:30
Title: How nonexistence is worse for us
Abstract:

I defend the view that, when a person’s life is worth living, her existence is not merely good for her. It is also better for her than her never existing. I defend this view against the objection that it absurdly implies that nonexistence is bad for the multitude of merely possible people who are never brought into existence and who therefore have complaints against us for not procreating them. I respond to this objection by defending the following asymmetry, which consists of an affirmation of the first, combined with the denial of the second, of these two claims:

Claim 1. If p actually exists with a life worth living, then: if (contrary to fact) p had not existed, that would have been worse for p.

Claim 2. If p does not actually exist, then this is worse for p than if (contrary to fact) p had existed with a life worth living.

I also defend the view that an appeal to the fact that a person’s life is better for her than her nonexistence can provide a response to the complaint that it is not going as well as it could.

Location: Edgecliffe G03

CEPPA Talk (in-person) - Alice Murphy (St. Andrews)
2025-10-30 16:00 - 17:30
Title: “Invasive” Species and the Aesthetics of Nature
Abstract: This talk explores the intersection of environmental science and environmental aesthetics, focusing on the discourse surrounding “invasive” species. I will present the ways that debates on invasive species reflect broader issues in the philosophy of science, particularly concerning the role of moral and political values in scientific practice. I will then discuss how aesthetic judgments also shape this discourse, influencing research, management decisions, and public perceptions. I argue that the intertwined nature of aesthetic and moral values in invasion science challenges traditional approaches to the “new demarcation problem”, which seeks to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate value influences. Further, this complicates views in environmental aesthetics that privilege scientific knowledge as the foundation for aesthetic judgments of nature.
Location: Edgecliffe G03
