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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20241003T143000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20241003T153000
DTSTAMP:20260415T073311
CREATED:20240927T115205Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240927T115550Z
UID:10000536-1727965800-1727969400@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:Moral Philosophy Reading Group
DESCRIPTION:This week we are discussing Pamela Hieronymi’s ‘Of Metaethics and Motivation: The Appeal of Contractualism’.\nHere is the abstract: In his 1982 article\, T. M. Scanlon noted that\, despite the widespread attention to Rawls’ A Theory of Justice\, the appeal of contractualism as a moral theory had been under-appreciated. It seems to me that\, nearly thirty years later\, despite the widespread attention to Scanlon’s work\, this appeal is still largely under-appreciated. In this paper\, I try to present Scanlon’s appealing answer to what he once called “the question of motivation” and the relation of this answer to the more metaethical “question of subject matter.” I then defend Scanlon’s view against various\, standard objections\, which\, I claim\, typically misunderstand it. I close by considering what it would take to wed Scanlon’s attractive answer to the question of motivation to another\, non-contractualist\, theory. I conclude that\, even if the marriage could be arranged\, a good part of the appeal of contractualism would inevitably be lost. In particular\, the marriage would sacrifice the central place in Scanlon’s theory for what might be called liberty of conscience.\nLocation: Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/moral-philosophy-reading-group-9-3/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe G03\, The Scores\, St Salvator's Quad\, KY16 9AL
CATEGORIES:Reading Group
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20241003T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20241003T173000
DTSTAMP:20260415T073311
CREATED:20240912T183630Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240927T115012Z
UID:10000548-1727971200-1727976600@ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk
SUMMARY:CEPPA Talk (in-person & online) – Barry Maguire (Edinburgh)
DESCRIPTION:Title: Two Moralities of Recognition \nAbstract: According to moralities of recognition\, fundamental moral norms are norms for living together. Moral norms explain how living in unity is possible despite being separate individuals\, they explain how we can relate to each other as persons that are more than mere sources of benefits and burdens\, obstacles and opportunities. Those who relate to each other according to these norms stand in relations of mutual recognition. By contrast\, some moral theories are atomistic — they deny that fundamental moral norms are communal norms. The paper explains the appeal of morality of recognition and elaborates a distinction between two kinds of moralities of recognition. Some envision a community founded on respect; according to these theories\, mutual recognition is mutual respect. Others offer a fundamentally different vision of the moral community\, namely\, one founded on concern; according to these theories\, mutual recognition is mutual concern. We examine T. M. Scanlon’s contractualism as a fully developed\, influential\, and relatively recent version of respect morality and argue that Scanlon’s morality of respect has certain distinctive structural features. We then articulate the contours of an alternative\, morality of concern\, which offers a different idea of moral community and has a distinctively different structure. Our goal is not to present an argument for morality of concern\, but to explain what makes it attractive and to make clear that choosing between the two kinds of moralities of recognition involves choosing between two substantively different visions of how to live together. \nLocation: Edgecliffe G03
URL:https://ceppa.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/event/ceppa-talk-in-person-barry-maguire-edinburgh-2/
LOCATION:Edgecliffe 104
CATEGORIES:CEPPA Talk
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